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Dear Readers,
For nearly 15 years, The Journal of ERW and Mine Action has been 
a fundamental information source for the ERW and mine-action 
communities by generating conversations; providing useful and timely 
information from a variety of viewpoints; sharing project successes, 
challenges and failures; and creating an historical record.
 
The Journal provides interesting content written by field experts. Like any 
periodical, we do our best to verify information, question inconsistencies 
and provide clarity. Since our staff is not embedded with demining 
organizations, we have no way to verify if figures are absolutely correct. 
We expect our authors to provide content in good faith, having confirmed 
and documented the information and quotations in their articles. We 
leave technical critiques to our readers.
Recently, however, online fora have been ignited with unfair and often 
spurious comments about The Journal and its work ethic. The conversation 
regarding an article in Issue 14.2 (pp. 40–45) raises important questions 
about the sad state of global information management; however, it 
incorrectly frames the question of responsibility for the article’s content. 
All of the facts and figures within it were furnished by the authors using 
internal organizational documents. Consequently, the responsibility for 
the numbers lies with the authors. 
With all this in mind, I want to share with the community what our 
publication is and is not. All sections of The Journal of ERW and Mine 
Action are dedicated to those involved in making the world safer. The 
Journal covers innovations in technology and research, lessons learned 
in programming and development, and current trends in humanitarian 
intervention. It has contained a section on Research, Development and 
Technology since 2004, and this section has been peer-reviewed since Issue 
8.2 (November 2004). In the interest of keeping The Journal’s publication 
timely and affordable, the remainder of its articles are not peer-reviewed 
but rather depend on the authors to provide accurate information. 
I invite those disaffected by any article’s content to use The Journal as 
it is intended—to drive conversations, ask questions, support your 
peers and challenge the community by writing an article or letter to the 
editor. All submissions to The Journal will be considered under the same 
unprejudiced conditions all authors receive from our editorial staff. 
If we are to advance as a community, those with the knowledge to write 
articles and critique the work of others must take responsibility for their 
comments and suggest improvements. We look forward to receiving your 
contributions.
 
Sincerely,
 
Ken Rutherford
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In the last 20 years, the organized sup-port for humanitarian mine action has allowed us to make great strides in re-
ducing the landmine threat worldwide. Now, 
however, we find ourselves in a position where 
the traditional lines between mine action and 
the threat of excess and poorly secured small 
arms/light weapons and other conventional 
weapons have blurred. 
The traditional approach to taking mines 
and unexploded ordnance out of the ground 
has evolved. The mine-action community has 
begun widening its scope to focus on armed vi-
olence and the problems caused by aging stock-
piles, remaining landmines and UXO, and the 
removal of all of this hazardous debris of con-
flict to make the land safe. We now actively 
Integrating ERW Programs:  
 The Case for Consolidating  
    CWD Activities 
by Mark Adams [ PM/WRA ]
work to eliminate the unintended consequenc-
es of unstable ammunition detonation or loss 
of control of poorly secured government stock-
piles of weapons, which are just as dangerous 
as explosive remnants of war. Mine-risk educa-
tion and risk management have now broadened 
to become “armed-violence risk” or “ERW-risk 
education/risk management.” 
Wisely, our community has refined and re-
vised its views about ERW. Perhaps it is time 
to consider revising and refining our strategies 
as well. I believe these new ideas should be re-
flected in integrated approaches to programs, 
policies and budgets for dealing with ERW. 
Since we no longer think about UXO, land-
mines, aging ammunition stockpiles or aban-
doned ordnance as separate entities, why do 
we have separate budgets, programs 
and strategies for dealing with them? 
Is there perhaps a better, more effi-
cient way of doing business?
Integration
At this time of global financial 
downturn and international do-
nor fatigue toward HMA activities, 
I argue that finding a way to bet-
ter deal with the ERW problem in 
affected countries will allow us to 
more effectively justify budgets to 
our lawmakers and donors. I often 
discuss with many of my counter-
parts “eating the elephant” one bite 
at a time. I have nothing against el-
ephants, but the analogy is that we 
can only solve the problem one piece 
at a time by collectively putting to-
gether all of our problems related to 
ERW and integrating our efforts re-
garding policy, programs, resource 
management and direct action. This 
process allows us to deal with a very 
serious problem over time in a well-
thought-out, systematic way. 
An integrated, centralized strat-
egy for dealing with ERW allows us 
to more effectively and compelling-
ly demonstrate our needs and ob-
jectives. An integrated approach to 
ERW brings together similar skill 
sets related to explosive ordnance 
disposal under one umbrella. It 
streamlines communication. It can 
accelerate decision-making. It al-
lows us to be more nimble and re-
sponsive. It ensures a unified, rather 
than competing, agenda for ERW. It 
improves our visibility across relat-
ed programs. It enhances our ability 
to see and monitor the totality of our 
efforts, and track and measure our 
successes. It improves cost-effective-
ness. And at a time when we are be-
ing asked and often required to do 
more with less, these benefits seem 
For years, the mine-action community has been revising its definition of explosive 
remnants of war. Viewing unexploded ordnance, landmines, ammunition stockpiles, 
and small arms/light weapons as individual threats, the mine-action community has 
created distinct budgets, programs and policies to address each of them. What we’re 
beginning to realize, however, is that a more integrated approach allows for greater 
progress in reducing the ERW threat.
a technician throws away remnants of surplus weapons destroyed by the congolese armed forces (farDc) at 
the central logistics base during a collaboration project between Mines advisory Group and the farDc.
all Photos courtesy of J.B. russell/MaG
to be worth the effort involved to 
consolidate and integrate our inter-
ests and missions as follows: HMA 
+ SA/LW = ERW. Thus, the action 
of dealing with ERW can be called 
“conventional weapons destruction.”
Perhaps we should rethink nation-
al strategies and review our collective 
ERW strategy. This review would run 
the gamut from where to place the 
“Office of ERW” to appeals for do-
nor support to the development of a 
new ERW national strategy. This ap-
proach is radical and even anathema 
to many governments compared to 
the way we have conducted business 
in the past, but I believe it helps de-
velop a national vision and provides 
better synchronization and synergy 
in the program and project manage-
ment of all ERW activities.
Although there will always be is-
sues of how to resolve different min-
istries’ equities (usually mine action 
Members of MaG loading munitions stockpiled at a farDc central logistics base onto trucks to be transported to a demolition ground.
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is conducted by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs or Ministry of Interior 
and SA/LW/ammunition destruc-
tion is relegated to the Ministry of 
Defense), an integrated approach 
allows one office or one ministry 
to take the lead. Whether Defense 
or Foreign Affairs, it doesn’t mat-
ter, but having it all under one roof 
allows for a more streamlined deci-
sion-making process to deal with a 
huge, multi-level problem. 
In the early years, the inter-
national community always en-
couraged affected governments to 
develop their own mine-action ca-
pacity and a national mine-action 
center, as well as to develop a stra-
tegic, integrated mine-action plan. 
Progress was measured by one or 
more of these yardsticks:
• Area cleared 
• Decreasing numbers of civilians 
injured or killed 
• Area of roads opened up
• Any similarly appropriate mea-
suring tool
Now, the international commu-
nity can do the same by also mea-
suring the number of weapons/tons 
of ammunition destroyed or the 
number of facilities strengthened 
with better security systems. 
The Challenges of Integration
A national strategic plan that 
conducts humanitarian mine action 
and executes the reduction of stock-
piles of excess weapons and unstable 
ammunition could be managed by 
an “Office of ERW Removal” or “Of-
fice of Conventional Weapons De-
struction.” Below is a sample list of 
challenges that office might face:
• Preventing loss of life (since civil-
ian communities have grown up 
around ammunition storage sites)
• Reducing the amount of weap-
ons and high stocks of unstable 
ammunition accessible to criminal 
elements by improving inventory 
control
• Designating stockpiled ammuni-
tion as “excess” if unassociated with 
a host-nation’s weapons system 
• Identifying old weapons systems 
no longer required by defense 
forces 
• Developing a destruction plan for 
SA/LW and ammunition to re-
duce loss of control and acciden-
tal explosion risks
• Managing and protecting the ap-
propriate amount of weapons nec-
essary to meet host-nation security 
and defense needs
• Conducting an adequate defense 
modernization review to indenti-
fy real war-fighting needs.
• Initiating strict security for at-risk 
weapons systems (such as shoul-
der-fired missile systems) to pre-
vent civilian and commercial 
impacts
This sounds great in theory, but 
how does it “play” in the real world? 
In 2004, the U.S. Department of 
State’s Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs merged the program offic-
es of Humanitarian Demining and 
SA/LW Destruction to form the Of-
fice of Weapons Removal and Abate-
ment (PM/WRA). The next step in 
this evolution will integrate all as-
pects of ERW into one program bud-
get, thereby focusing a single lens 
on the global human-security prob-
lem of ERW. Our consolidated bud-
get will be called Non-proliferation 
Antiterrorism Demining and other 
Related Conventional Weapons De-
struction. With this consolidated 
budget, we can better focus on the 
most severe ERW problems in the 
world. We will continue to be  fully 
engaged in severely mine-/UXO-af-
fected countries such as Afghanistan, 
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cambodia, Iraq, Laos and Viet-
nam, and further strengthen our 
efforts to reduce excess stockpiles 
of weapons and destroy old, unsta-
ble ammunition in these and other 
countries.
The United States is not the only 
nation or organization that has seen 
efficiencies in merging CWD pro-
grams. The International Trust Fund 
for Demining and Mine Victims As-
sistance has developed a five-year 
strategic plan envisioning the ex-
pansion of its role from HMA in the 
Balkans to global ERW remedia-
tion. I salute the Slovenian govern-
ment for its great vision and huge 
Mark Adams is Senior Advisor for U.S. 
Conventional Weapons Destruction, U.S. 
Department of State. Prior to his retire-
ment from active duty as a Colonel in the 
U.S. Marine Corps, Adams served as the 
Marine Corps Advisor to the U.S. Secre-
tary of State and the Deputy Director, 
Office of Humanitarian Demining Pro-
grams, a position he held from 1998–
2001. In his current assignment, Adams 
has negotiated numerous small arms/
light weapons/man-portable air-defense 
systems (MANPADS)/ammunition-de-
struction agreements worldwide.
Mark W. Adams
Senior Advisor
U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction
Office of Weapons Removal  
   and Abatement
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
U.S. Department of State (PM/WRA)
SA-3, Suite 6100
2121 Virginia Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20522 / USA
Tel: +1 202 663 0111
Fax: + 1 202 663 0090
E-mail: AdamsMW@state.gov
Website: http://state.gov/t/pm/wra
undertaking. Similarly, James Mad-
ison University’s Center for Inter-
national Stabilization and Recovery 
has changed the name of this pub-
lication to The Journal of ERW and 
Mine Action. Other examples exist; 
these are but two. 
Change takes time. New nation-
al policies and mine-action orga-
nization objectives won’t happen 
overnight. For that reason, when I 
talk to groups of landmine experts, 
I encourage embracing the problem 
of inventory control, destruction 
and security of SA/LW and am-
munition. Likewise, when I talk to 
SA/LW experts, I encourage them 
to talk to and coordinate with their 
mine-action counterparts. 
I realize the difficulty for those 
in some countries to talk laterally 
to their counterparts in the Minis-
try of Defense, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or Ministry of Interior, but 
reaching across ministries is the way 
of the future. With a unified, ERW 
strategic plan the global CWD com-
munity can increase its outreach 
and access to the donor community 
and, ideally, reduce the ERW impact 
on civilians. 
Conclusion
Whether you work in government 
or a regional organization, I encour-
age you to review your achievements 
over the past years, embrace an ex-
panded view of dealing with ERW 
and reinvent your organization. I 
believe our great collective com-
munity has a wealth of knowledge 
and capacity for innovation that can 
carry us far into the future to better 
handle the ERW problem and, thus, 
make our world a safer place. 
Members of MaG and the farDc pre-
pare a demolition pit to destroy stockpiles 
of munitions as part of a MaG-farDc 
project to eliminate munitions stocks and 
reduce the risk of accidents. Letter to the Editor
Dear Ms. Carter Fay,
I would first like to take this opportunity to introduce myself. I have recently been appointed as 
Geneva Call's Coordinator for Landmines and other Explosive Devices. I will therefore be the main 
contact person for all related issues within the organization.
I would also like to inquire whether the authors of the article "Non-state Actors and Mine Action: 
Complications and Solutions," in the most recent issue of The Journal of ERW and Mine Action (Is-
sue 14.2), have any illustrations of where humanitarian engagement with NSAs have led to their 
enjoying "a new bargaining position that they may in turn use to advance their international stand-
ing," or use "to their advantage by recruiting new members or securing new resources from inter-
ested sponsors"? As you are probably well aware, this is an issue that is potentially of great concern 
to Geneva Call, and which we endeavour to mitigate. It is also one side of an argument used to dis-
credit such humanitarian engagement. We'd therefore be very keen to receive any supporting evi-
dence where this proved to be the case.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Best regards,
Katherine Kramer
Programme Director (Asia)
Acting Coordinator on Landmines and Other Explosives
Geneva Call
E-mail: info@genevacall.org
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Subscriber Survey Results
by Lois Carter Fay [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
The staff of The Journal of ERW and Mine Action wants to thank you, our subscribers, for telling us what you think about our publication. We 
want you to know, “We heard you!” Over the next few is-
sues, we will implement several changes as a result of this 
feedback. For instance, we plan to do the following:
• Create a discussion-driven forum rather than a topic-
driven publication
• Redesign and relaunch the CISR website, better inte-
grating it with the MAIC website
• Emphasize popular content (Notes from the Field, 
R&D and more articles about victim assistance)
• Create new sections (several ideas were given) and 
publish some of the less popular sections (Book Re-
views, Unsung Heroes) online-only 
• Target specific authors to provide in-depth content 
from experienced field personnel
• Limit or eliminate the student-written articles
In total, 176 readers completed the survey, which is an 
outstanding 10-percent response rate. Contrary to what 
we believed, we discovered that The Journal is being de-
livered in a timely manner, with 64 percent of the respon-
dents saying they receive it within one month of mailing. 
In addition, although we do not plan to implement a sub-
scription fee, we were pleased to learn that 59 percent of 
those responding would be willing to pay US$10 or more 
to continue receiving The Journal.
When asked, “Which topics do you find most help-
ful?” several sections/topics were listed multiple times. 
In particular, many readers noted they like the R&D ar-
ticles, Notes from the Field, and articles dealing with risk 
education and victim assistance. Case studies, hero pro-
files and organization profiles were also mentioned re-
peatedly, with some respondents loving them and others 
not liking them at all.
On the other hand, when asked, “Which sections pro-
vide the least value?” readers again repeatedly said hero 
profiles. Book reviews, country profiles and “sob stories” 
were also mentioned. One respondent said, “I think ev-
ery now and again, you have an ‘odd’ article that could 
have been approached from a different perspective; how-
ever, overall, any article that makes it to publication is 
worth the time to read it.”
We found that many of our readers are sharing their 
Journal copies with others; some share it with as few as 
one other person while others share it with as many as 
20 people. Several readers mentioned that they never let 
their printed editions out of their offices because they 
find the content too valuable to lose and they refer to past 
articles frequently. One respondent commented, “I cite 
the article and make a photocopy of the article. I don’t 
want to lose my copy.”
Below are selected responses* to the question, “What 
do you like best about The Journal?”:
• The focus on various regions and topics of current 
concern or interest. 
• Accuracy and details.
• Some useful articles, like a recent issue on ERW had 
one very good article from Arms Control people. Top 
quality paper.
• Electronic availability and maintenance of links; also 
historic links (i.e., online links to archived articles).
• Good mix between text and pictures; easy to read.
• Focus on content relating to mine action and its vari-
ous pillars of engagement (clearance, mine-risk ed-
ucation, survivor assistance, program development, 
etc.).
• It’s keeping the community together, allowing us to 
share experiences.
• It’s all industry-related. No distractions and nothing 
too political.
• Articles on actual experiences in mine action and ex-
plosive remnants of war.
• I feel The Journal presents a balanced and technical 
response regarding the issue of demining. 
would like to see more topics relat-
ed to the betterment of deminers’ 
lives (working conditions, problems, 
benefits, etc.), and topics exposing 
sloppy UXO removal work. Other 
suggestions were:
• Guest editorial or op-ed, trends, 
“Where Are They Now?,” histor-
ical essays, victim assistance, 
more integration of conventional 
weapons destruction
• New developments in standards 
and procedures; new equipment 
developments
• Things from a social-scientif-
ic perspective, incorporating an 
understanding of how politics, 
economics and social issues im-
pact the manner in which mine 
action is carried out
• Straightforward articles dealing 
with successes and failures
• Updates on the global landmine/
ERW situation
• Personal stories of people in the 
field; this is an unforgiving busi-
ness and it’s nice to read stories 
about others whom I have met
• All in all, we feel we have re-
ceived valuable survey feedback. 
We will take your suggestions to 
heart and evaluate which ones 
are feasible as we chart our future 
course. Thank you for your time 
and ideas! 
*Note: All responses have been ed-
ited for grammar, spelling and clarity.
“What do you like least about The 
Journal?” elicited these (selected) re-
sponses:*
• Sometimes the articles are a lit-
tle irrelevant and self-promo-
tional. Time lag between article 
development and publication.
• The Journal’s use of the term 
“mines” is inexact, considering 
the amount of UXO and also im-
provised explosive devices en-
countered.
• I miss the discussion of the future 
need for MA and the discussion 
of how to integrate MA in devel-
opment and reconstruction.
• The lack of discussion forum. 
• The lack of editorial rigour or 
peer review. It appears more like 
a magazine than a journal.
• Articles are too theoretical.
• Sometimes, I see some articles 
that are written in a very high 
level of literacy and technical lan-
guage that is not easy to under-
stand.
• Same sources for articles.
We also received several interest-
ing ideas from our readers regard-
ing what new sections or topics they 
would like to see. One reader sug-
gested adding more photo essays to 
the printed edition and more vid-
eo on the website. Another said he 
Do you share your copy of The Journal 
with others?
Which format do you prefer when you 
read The Journal—hard copy or online?
Profile of Journal Subscribers:
Lois Carter Fay, APR, is Editor-in-
Chief of The Journal of ERW and 
Mine Action and Project Manager 
on other publishing projects, includ-
ing To Walk the Earth in Safety. Prior 
to joining the MAIC in 2005, Carter 
Fay was self-employed with Market-
ingIdeaShop.com, a consulting and 
publishing company, and today she 
continues this activity part-time. 
Lois Carter Fay, APR 
Editor-in-Chief
The Journal of ERW and Mine Action
Mine Action Information Center
Center for International  
   Stabilization and Recovery
James Madison University
800 South Main Street, MSC 4902
Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA
Tel: +1 540 568 2503
Fax: +1 540 568 8176
E-mail: carterlx@jmu.edu
Website: http://cisr.jmu.edu or  
   http://maic.jmu.edu
What sections of The Journal do you tend to read?
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Now Zad, located in the district of Helmand province that bears the same name, was once the second largest 
city of the province with a population of more 
than 30,000. Although somewhat isolated in 
the northern part of Helmand, it had everything 
that an Afghan needed to flourish, including fer-
tile farmland and bustling bazaars. However, in 
early 2006 the Taliban took control and drove 
away the entire population of Now Zad. Many of 
the residents moved as far away as Lashkar Gah, 
an arduous 125-kilometer (48-mile) journey on 
rough roads through Taliban-infested areas, 
and wondered if they would ever return to their 
homes. After taking over Now Zad, the mili-
tants filled the homes, shops, schools and streets 
with mines and improvised explosive devices, 
much as they had done in many other areas.
The second major offensive in Helmand 
province for Task Force Leatherneck (the 2nd 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade), Operation Co-
bra’s Anger in December 2009, was to remove the 
Taliban from Now Zad. Once cleared, Now Zad 
was a prime candidate for immediate assistance 
and the type of international development crit-
ical to the United States’ counterinsurgency 
strategy of "Clear-Hold-Build." This strategy 
involves clearing a target area of insurgents 
(Clear), providing security and infrastructure 
to locals while screening the population for 
insurgents (Hold), and establishing or re-estab-
lishing essential services using both NGO and 
local workforces (Build). The only problem was 
The Bridge from Hold to Build
by Colonel Yori Escalante [ United States Marine Corps ]
In Afghanistan, the United States and United Nations are developing a new approach 
to community-based demining by funding local nongovernmental organizations. The 
use of these Afghan NGOs has not only allowed clearance to begin more quickly and 
continue more effectively, but has also helped the local population along the path to 
recovery and supported overall counterinsurgency efforts.
that the explosive remnants of the battle for 
Now Zad and the large number of mines and 
IEDs left by the Taliban still littered the area.
The Strategy
The Office of Weapons Removal and Abate-
ment in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) man-
ages and executes the work required to create 
the “bridge” from hold to build within the U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy. Known as Con-
ventional Weapons Destruction, the effort ad-
dresses humanitarian mine action, battle-area 
clearance and small-arms and light-weapons 
destruction. CWD has enabled the United 
States to be the international leader in this im-
portant aspect of humanitarian assistance and 
development. Since 1993, the United States has 
provided more than US$1.8 billion to more 
than 80 countries to conduct demining and un-
exploded-ordnance clearance, and since 2001 
has destroyed more than 1.4 million weapons 
and 80,000 tons of otherwise at-risk, unstable 
or unsecure weapons and ammunition that 
could find their way into the militants’ hands.1 
In Afghanistan alone, the United States has 
funded projects totaling nearly $200 million. 
PM/WRA provides funds to U.S. contractors 
and international nongovernmental organi-
zations to conduct clearance and destruction 
operations, develop survivor and educational 
services, and establish capacity for the host na-
tion to eventually take ownership of the effort. 
Community-Based Demining 
A concept now being used by 
the United States and the United 
Nations in Afghanistan is one of 
community-based demining. Often, 
when contractors and internation-
al NGOs establish demining and 
clearance operations in an area, the 
workforce is recruited from the lo-
cal area, trained and employed to 
execute the project, and later dis-
patched to other areas needing clear-
ance. Thus, in a way, all demining 
and clearance operations can be 
called community-based. Howev-
er, CBD in Afghanistan is different 
in many ways because the approach 
uses Afghan NGOs that have worked 
in Afghanistan for 20 years or more. 
The Afghan NGOs have built a re-
lationship with the population and 
are able to recruit individuals who 
will remain after the project is com-
plete. The NGOs can also enter an 
area very soon after combat opera-
tions have ceased. Often, interna-
tional NGOs will not be welcomed 
or cannot gain access to those areas 
due to the security situation. This 
aspect is important since in the past, 
demining and clearance operations 
have only been attempted after con-
flicts have ended. In the conflict in 
Afghanistan, quick action is vital 
to rebuilding trust and confidence 
with the local residents. The United 
States currently funds five Afghan 
NGOs—Afghan Technical Consul-
tants, Demining Agency for Afghan-
istan, Mine Clearance Planning 
Agency, Mine Detection Center, 
and Organization for Mine Clear-
ance and Afghanistan Rehabilita-
tion—that are uniquely positioned 
to implement these community-based 
projects quickly and effectively.
CBD differs from other demining 
and clearance efforts; organizations 
work closely with the local leader-
ship in a specific village, district or 
province. The local leaders identify 
projects and assist in informing the 
residents of the impact of CBD and 
the need for a local workforce. This 
workforce, many times consisting of 
young men who would otherwise be 
recruited by the Taliban for insur-
gent operations, is then trained in 
the skill of demining. Often the men 
are put through vocational training 
during their off-duty hours to en-
sure they have a relevant trade once 
the project is complete. This in turn 
builds confidence and a sense of 
ownership in the overall project, as 
well as a sense of pride that the lo-
cal populations are involved in the 
improvement of their village or dis-
trict. Such examples of CBD rein-
force local governance and reduce 
the influence of insurgents. 
Successes of CBD in Now Zad
PM/WRA regularly makes an ef-
fort to coordinate closely with U.S. 
or Coalition Forces in an area, and 
Task Force Leatherneck was no ex-
ception. The U.S. Marines quickly 
understood the importance of dem-
ining and clearance operations and 
the benefits that CBD could provide. 
Soon after the completion of the 
operation, Brigadier General Law-
rence Nicholson, the Command-
er of Task Force Leatherneck, along 
with members of the U.S. Embassy 
in Kabul, Helmand Provincial Gov-
ernor Mangal and leaders from Now 
Zad, as well as representatives of the 
five Afghan demining NGOs fund-
ed by PM/WRA, conducted a dem-
ining shura. Shura, the Arabic word 
for consultation, is the way most Is-
lamic tribal leaders meet to resolve 
problems and issues. The purpose 
of this shura was to highlight the 
need to implement a CBD project 
in Now Zad, one that would address 
the most urgent clearance needs of 
recruiting and training a local workforce is vital to community-based demining. 
Photo courtesy of alex heneGar
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the village and enable further de-
velopment projects to begin. Brig-
adier General Nicholson stressed 
that residents and local leadership 
needed to step up and take control 
of Now Zad or risk the town being 
returned to the Taliban. As a result 
of the shura, close coordination and 
planning commenced between the 
Marines, PM/WRA, U.S. Embassy, 
United Nations Mine Action Coor-
dination Center for Afghanistan, lo-
cal leadership and the NGOs. 
Vital to the NGOs and the lead-
ers of Now Zad were assurances of 
security from Task Force Leather-
neck—security that was not visi-
ble, but effective. What eventually 
materialized was a collaborative ef-
fort for a $1.8 million project with 
three of the five NGOs (Mine Clear-
ance Planning Agency, the Dem-
ining Agency for Afghanistan and 
the Mine Detection Center) where 
the strengths of each organization 
were leveraged. The project began in 
March 2010 and is scheduled to be 
completed within 12 months, em-
ploying more than 120 local staff, 
benefitting more than 1,350 fami-
lies and clearing 594,000 square ki-
lometers (229,345 square miles) of 
land covering the four most affect-
ed communities in and around Now 
Zad: Ali Zai, Barakzi, Deh Meyan 
and Sarkani. 
Over and above the initial ben-
efits, the project includes the es-
tablishment of a clinic, primarily 
for the medical care of the demin-
ers, but also to serve as a source of 
health support for the citizens of 
Now Zad. As the word spread that 
deminers were starting their work, 
many of the displaced members of 
Now Zad started to return, some for 
the first time in four years. 
CBD has been conducted in Af-
ghanistan for several years, with 
projects funded and executed in Ku-
nar, Nangahar and Kandahar prov-
inces. The projects’ workforce was 
recruited from the local area and 
included vocational training. Un-
like the projects that began sever-
al years after fighting had ceased in 
the Kunar, Nangahar and Kandahar 
provinces, however, the project in 
Now Zad commenced within weeks 
of combat concluding, giving devel-
opment agencies the opportunity to 
provide relief to the Now Zad area 
sooner than expected. The project 
in Now Zad is seen as a model for 
future uses of CBD, especially since 
it uses Afghan NGOs and beginning 
work early with local authorities 
means clearance operations can al-
low relief and development to arrive 
quickly. This further builds the pop-
ulation’s confidence in the NATO 
International Security Assistance 
Force’s work, and more important-
ly, in the local Afghan government.
Conclusion
Confidence is key to successful 
counterinsurgency operations. The 
local population must have confi-
dence in the forces in its area and in 
the agencies and organizations pro-
viding relief and development. The 
Marine Corps’ approach to coun-
terinsurgency stresses building this 
confidence through close coordi-
nation and partnering with local 
forces, government officials and the 
citizens of the areas for which they 
are responsible. In order to provide 
relief and development quickly, the 
time between hold and build must be 
as short as possible. Many times, due 
to combat operations recently con-
cluding, this time is delayed in order 
to clear the area of explosive rem-
nants of war. This delay could poten-
tially result in a loss of confidence by 
the local communities in the forces 
operating in their area. CBD is yet 
another way for the United States 
to insure that the “bridge” from 
hold to build is as short as possible. 
 see endnotes page 80
u.s. and local leadership must be in-
volved to ensure the “bridge” from hold 
to build is successful.
Photo courtesy of the author
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Destruction of Cluster Munitions 
     in Moldova
by Colin King [ C King Associates, Ltd. ] 
For some countries affected by cluster munitions, the obligations to demilitarize that 
accompany ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions may appear daunting. 
In 2009, however, Norwegian People’s Aid undertook a pilot project in Moldova to 
find a cheaper, more efficient alternative-disposal method. They discovered that not 
only can destruction of cluster munitions be done more effectively, but also that by 
using locally administered programs, international organizations can promote capac-
ity building and increased employment while also bolstering national pride and com-
mitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
During the Oslo Process, it became clear that several nations were con-cerned about their obligations to de-
stroy cluster munition stockpiles under Article 
3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 
fact, it soon became apparent that this might be 
a significant obstacle to signing or ratification 
for some countries.
Industrial demilitarization plants exist in 
several developed nations; however, costs are 
high, and most are running at or near capacity. 
Even if the resources were available, it would 
be uneconomical for an industrial unit to gear 
up for the disposal of small quantities of clus-
ter munitions, especially if these were unusual 
types. A new process would involve a great deal 
of additional effort, including research on the 
ammunition, development of a new procedure, 
fabricating or adapting existing machinery, re-
training the workforce, development of ade-
quate quality control measures and so forth.
The need for another option led Norwegian 
People’s Aid to examine alternative-dispos-
al means on a national or regional basis. One 
possible benefit of using locally administered 
programs was program ownership. This own-
ership, or increased national involvement, 
brings with it tangible gains, such as capacity 
building and increased employment, as well as 
intangible gains, such as a strong demonstra-
tion of commitment to the CCM and a sense 
of national pride. Other potential advantages of 
utilizing locally administered programs includ-
ed lower cost and faster completion. During the 
2008–09 period, a preliminary study established 
that locally administered, alternative-disposal 
options were realistic.
Moldova Pilot Program
The concept of small-scale regional pro-
grams was presented at the 2009 Berlin 
Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Mu-
nitions;1 here, Moldova was among a small 
number of delegations that approached NPA 
to express an interest in a pilot project. 
An NPA assessment team visited Moldova 
in October 2009 and identified five types of 
Russian cluster-bomb and submunition pay-
loads in the Moldovan inventory. The sub-
munitions included three types of anti-armor 
bomblets (PTAB-2.5, PTAB-2.5M and PTAB-
10-5) and two types of fragmentation bomb-
lets (AO-1SCh and AO-2.5RT). Externally, the 
bombs were in reasonably good condition, 
suggesting that the submunitions would be 
well-preserved.
Unloading of cluster bombs. The NPA team 
conducted all work at a Bulboaca military 
7
JOURNAL: The Journal of ERW and Mine Action Issue 14.3
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2010
14         focus | the journal of erW and mine action | fall 2010 | 14.3 14.3 | fall 2010 | the journal of erW and mine action | focus         15
facility, which includes a demolition area. Bomb dis-
assembly was carried out in two adjacent tents, despite 
extremely cold weather and heavy snow. A team of Mol-
dovan soldiers, trained in demolition under NPA super-
vision for unloading the submunitions from the bombs 
and assembling the demolitions, mainly used the first 
tent. The NPA team used the second tent for submuni-
tion disassembly.
The two types of bomb containers, RBK-250 and 
RBK-500, were similar in structure and were easily un-
loaded once the tail section was removed. After refin-
ing their technique, the Moldovan soldiers successfully 
conducted the unloading procedure in approximately 20 
minutes per bomb.
Submunition disassembly. One of the primary objec-
tives was to create simple, practical processes to remove 
bomblet fuzes, thereby exposing the explosive filling in 
order to make subsequent demolition simple and safe. 
This objective was achieved with four out of the five sub-
munition types, with the AO-2.5RT as the exception. A 
number of these bomblets were also dismantled and de-
fuzed; however, the process was considered too delicate, 
and therefore dangerous, for inclusion in a regional de-
struction program.
In keeping with the concept of regional program 
ownership, locally available tools were used wherev-
er possible. The few exceptions included hook-and-pin 
wrenches and a chain vice, which was particularly use-
ful for securing the bomblet bodies.
Explosive demolition. Successful explosive demo-
lition of cluster munitions is notoriously difficult, as 
unexploded submunitions tend to be “kicked out.” Bom-
blets may become armed as they are ejected from the 
demolition, risking widespread site contamination with 
hazardous ordnance.
The relatively straightforward process of removing 
the submunitions from the bomb body makes successful 
demolition substantially easier. Furthermore, taking the 
additional step of defuzing the bomblets before demoli-
tion not only eliminates much of the residual hazard, 
but also exposes the high-explosive filling, thus further 
increasing the likelihood of complete detonation.
Once defuzed, demolitions were prepared by placing 
the bomblet bodies in wooden ammunition crates and 
covering them with a layer of TNT demolition blocks. 
This allowed the indoor preparation of shots, minimiz-
ing the time needed for final preparation at the demo-
lition grounds. The efficiency of this process indicated 
that this technique could be employed successfully on a 
far larger scale.
Burning. Burning has a number of potential advan-
tages for bomblet destruction, including avoidance of the 
noise and shock involved in demolition, elimination of 
the need for large stocks of high explosives, minimizing 
metallic contamination, and the retention of steel scrap.
Burning normally requires detonator extraction and 
exposure of the main explosive filling, which was easily 
achieved in a single step by removal of the fuze-assem-
bly from all of the bomblet types, except for the AO-
2.5RT. Once defuzed, the bomblet bodies were stacked 
Moldovan soldiers, under supervision, removing the tail from an 
rBK-500 cluster bomb.
all Photos courtesy of the author
ao-1sch bomblet bodies after the explosive charge has been 
burned out.
into wooden ammunition crates 
and covered with a propellant layer 
that had been salvaged from artil-
lery ammunition. The bomblet bod-
ies were then ignited remotely using 
electrical squibs placed into small 
bags of black powder.2
The A-IX-2 explosive used in the 
AO-1SCh bomblet was particular-
ly difficult to ignite, and burning 
out these bomblets required careful 
preparation. A number of successful 
burns were conducted, once again 
indicating the technique could be 
applied within a large-scale process.
Inerting. A selection of each 
bomblet type was designated free 
from explosives for use as demon-
stration and training aids. This in-
volved complete disassembly of the 
fuzing-system to locate and remove 
all components containing energetic 
material and refitting the now free-
from-explosive fuze assembly to a 
bomblet body from which the explo-
sive had been burned out.
A simple quality-control system 
was implemented for the inerting 
process, involving two people inde-
pendently confirming the absence 
of explosive components, with each 
marking the assembly using paint. 
The finished training aids were then 
marked clearly in blue, the NATO 
color code for inert items.
Re-use of warheads. Fuze and 
tail-assembly removal offers the 
possibility of retaining the shaped 
charge warhead for non-hostile ap-
plications, such as explosive-ord-
nance disposal, demolition or 
engineering. This option was high-
lighted during early program pro-
posals and is especially relevant to 
the warheads used in PTAB bomb-
lets; it may also be applicable to du-
al-purpose improved-conventional 
munition, such as the US M42, M46 
and M77 series.
PTAB-2.5 and PTAB-2.5M-bom-
blet disassembly confirmed the 
achievability of this option. How-
ever, a complication in the PTAB-
2.5M-shaped charge is the presence 
of a flash-receptive detonator, which 
must be pressed out to make it safe.
Conclusions
The research-and-development 
phase of Moldova’s pilot program 
was a great success despite extreme 
weather, a difficult operating en-
vironment and a restricted time 
frame. The operation confirmed that 
regional demilitarization programs 
involving Russian cluster bombs re-
quire minimal resources and could, 
therefore, be implemented anywhere.
As an unexpected bonus, Mol-
dova quickly announced its inten-
tion to ratify the CCM, having been 
commended for its positive engage-
ment and encouraged by its ability 
to achieve the demands of Article 
3. Moldova subsequently became 
the final state needed to trigger the 
CCM’s entry into force. 
In addition to the immediate re-
sults, the availability of such a na-
tional capability may well prove 
valuable for further regional clus-
ter-munition destruction programs. 
Furthermore, the facilities and ex-
pertise in ammunition disposal may 
be utilized or adapted for other am-
munition types, which will inevita-
bly require attention as aging Soviet 
ordnance becomes unusable.
Currently, the NPA team is liais-
ing with a number of other coun-
tries that are interested in developing 
their own locally administered clus-
ter-munitions destruction programs. 
The question is whether the principle 
can be applied safely to more com-
plex or challenging ammunition, 
such as cargo projectiles, rockets and 
NATO cluster bombs.
Reproduced with permission from 
HIS (Global) Limited–Jane’s Explo-
sive Ordnance Disposal, 2010–11.
Note: Since this article was writ-
ten, Moldova has concluded the fi-
nal phase of this project, in which 
their entire stockpile of cluster bombs 
was destroyed. The work was car-
ried out by Moldovan soldiers under 
the supervision of NPA and C King 
Associates Ltd, making them the first 
nation to achieve compliance with 
CCM Article 3 using a “self-help” de-
militarization program.
 see endnotes page 80
removing the fuze from a PtaB-2.5.
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Albania Makes Progress 
      in Demilitarization 
by Captain Matt Goodyear [ United States Army ]
With the goal of destroying all excess munitions by 2013, the Albanian government is 
working to eliminate stockpiles of excess military munitions. Following a 2008 deadly 
explosion at a munitions dismantling factory, the government established safer man-
dates and successfully destroyed thousands of tons of munitions.
shells from demilitarized 82mm mortars.
Photo courtesy of WilliaM WaDe, sterlinG international, llc
Two years after the 2008 deadly explosion1 at a demilitarization2 facility on the outskirts of Tirana, Albania’s capital, the Albanian govern-
ment has made significant progress in reducing excess 
stockpiles and demilitarizing hazardous and obsolete 
ordnance. Although ridding the country of more than 
100,000 tons (9,072 metric tons) of outdated and danger-
ous munitions and weapons has been a formidable chal-
lenge, the government’s efforts, in conjunction with the 
international community, have resulted in a robust and 
effective demilitarization program. Another 5,000 tons 
(4,536 metric tons) is expected to be destroyed by the 
end of 2010. This notable improvement in the manage-
ment of Albania’s excess munitions stockpiles reflects 
the government’s commitment to the process and il-
lustrates the impact of international contributions and 
collaboration. 
Albania’s History of Explosives
The communist period of Albania's history (1946–
91) was marked by a massive build-up in munitions and 
weapons of Albanian, Chinese and Soviet origin. Hun-
dreds of depots were placed in every corner of Albania 
and were stocked with more than 100,000 tons (9,072 
metric tons) of munitions. Each depot housed various 
types of munitions that became potentially dangerous 
after years of degradation. With the fall of communism 
in 1991, maintenance and management of the depots was 
neglected, and when anarchy enveloped the country in 
1997, many depots were damaged, destroyed or looted. 
After stability was restored, the return of reclaimed mu-
nitions to depots was not handled systematically, further 
exacerbating an already dangerous storage environment. 
Now, two years after the explosion, ordnance has been 
consolidated into 44 depots. Because of their age, poor 
maintenance and lack of proper storage, some of these 
munitions are unstable. In addition, due to residential 
encroachment, several depots are located close to civil-
ian populations, endangering the lives of many people. 
Gërdec Depot
Some demilitarization efforts began in 2001, includ-
ing an assistance project by the NATO Maintenance and 
Supply Agency, which destroyed more than 8,700 tons 
(7,892 metric tons) of munitions between 2002 and 2007. 
Then, on 15 March 2008, a massive explosion occurred 
at an ammunition dismantling facility in Gërdec, 30 ki-
lometers (19 miles) west of Tirana and 3 kilometers (2 
miles) from the national airport. Previously home to 
a tank division, the site had been converted to allow a 
private company to demilitarize ordnance and sell the 
scrap residue. The residents of the area were unwitting-
ly living too close to the factory, and the blast killed 26 
people, injuring more than 300.1 The explosion’s exact 
cause is still unknown; however, unsafe standards and 
practices were clearly being used at the Gërdec facili-
ty. As a result of this disaster, the Minister of Defence, 
along with 29 other people, was subsequently charged 
with abuse of office. The explosion and the public outcry 
that ensued brought demilitarization efforts in Albania 
to a standstill and created an atmosphere of paralysis in 
the Albanian Ministry of Defence. During the months 
immediately following the disaster, Albania, with tech-
nical assistance from the international community, 
worked to establish the necessary legal framework to 
demilitarize munitions and upgrade the decrepit facili-
ties to reduce risk.
The National Plan
In the summer of 2008, the Albanian government es-
tablished a plan to demilitarize the remaining 85,000–
90,000 tons (77,111–81,647 metric tons) of various 
ordnance types. According to the plan, three primary 
factories would be used for industrial dismantling and 
destruction, including cutting open the mortars and 
removing the explosives, and eight demolition rang-
es would be used for open detonation3 and burning. To 
realize this goal, significant financial and other contri-
butions would be needed not only by the Albanian gov-
ernment, but also by foreign donors and international 
institutions. An ongoing demilitarization project man-
aged by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 
in the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs (PM/WRA) was expanded to provide an addi-
tional US$2 million for the Gërdec munitions clean-
up.”4 In addition, the international community5 offered 
financial support and expertise to safely clear the explo-
sion site and demilitarize the remaining stockpiles. In-
dustrial demilitarization finally commenced in January 
2009 and open detonation began several months later. 
Since then, the Albanian government has prioritized its 
demilitarization efforts. 
Mjekes Explosives Factory
During its 2001–07 project, NAMSA developed part 
of the communist-era Mjekes explosives factory (just 
east of Elbasan in central Albania) to destroy small-
arms ammunition. As a result of the project and a suc-
cessful business in reprocessing explosive material, the 
Mjekes explosives factory received significant invest-
ment and was developed into a modern facility. In 2008, 
the Mjekes factory purchased two band saws to destroy 
3,400 tons (3,084 metric tons) of 160mm mortars. Af-
ter cutting the mortars and revealing the explosives, 
the workers used a steam generator to remove the ex-
plosives, and the shells were either discarded or sold for 
scrap. The explosives were then either burned or repro-
cessed to sell as low-grade explosives. 
The Mjekes factory began processing the 160mm 
mortars in January 2009, and by June 2010, had suc-
cessfully completed the project without incident. The 
factory line is now being adjusted to dismantle the ap-
proximately 11,000 tons (9,979 metric tons) of excess 
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itarization occurred through simple dismantling (un-
screwing the heads and steaming out the explosives). In 
May 2009, Polican began the demilitarization of 82mm 
Chinese-made mortars with TNT explosives. In ear-
ly 2010, Polican received a donation of four band saws 
from Denmark. With these band saws, the factory is 
developing a dismantling line to demilitarize the more 
sensitive Amatol-filled Soviet mortars. So far, Polican 
has destroyed 2,300 tons (2,087 metric tons) of Alba-
nia's 15,000 tons (13,608 metric tons) of 82mm mortars.
Polican also benefits from a PM/WRA-funded por-
table incinerator for use in destroying small caliber 
ammunition, beginning with 7.62mm bullets. The in-
cinerator heats the bullets until the gunpowder ex-
plodes, leaving the melted brass and lead for scrap. 
120mm rounds. The government of Denmark through 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope recently donated to Mjekes four more band saws 
to establish a second dismantling line to handle other 
large-caliber munitions.
Polican Munitions Factory
While the communist-era Polican munitions factory 
near Berat in Southern Albania was part of the original 
NAMSA project, it did not receive capital investment, 
and its technology and upkeep were significantly be-
hind Mjekes. PM/WRA assisted the government of Al-
bania by funding a U.S. contractor, Armor Group, to 
supervise demilitarization operations there. Polican did 
not have the capital to buy band saws, and thus, demil-
The incinerator, which went into 
use in January 2010, can burn be-
tween five and eight tons (5.54 and 
7.26 metric tons) of bullets per day. 
To date, it has destroyed approxi-
mately 360 tons (327 metric tons) 
of 7.62mm bullets. 
Gramsh Factory 
Solely run by Albania, the 
Gramsh factory also does industri-
al demilitarization. The government 
has established a line there to de-
militarize 37mm ammunition. Due 
to its proximity to the local popu-
lation, the factory must maintain 
a very low production rate and ex-
plosive-storage capacity. The pro-
cess does not use band saws and 
involves manually dismantling the 
37mm projectile from the fuze and 
steaming out the explosives. The 
Albanian government expects to 
complete destruction of all 4,000 
tons (363 metric tons) of 37mm pro-
jectiles before the end of 2010, when 
the plant will retool the line to han-
dle up to 100mm projectiles.
Albanian EOD and Ranges
Due to previous accidents on 
ranges, all open detonation of mu-
nitions in Albania was suspended 
in 2007. However, open detonation 
plays an integral part in the new na-
tional demilitarization plan. Thus, 
in 2009, the government of Albania 
designated eight ranges and began 
training its explosive ordnance dis-
posal unit for detonation activities. 
The Albanian Armed Forces EOD 
units also received training from 
the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency and U.S. EOD Navy experts. 
Despite various setbacks (including 
sometimes resistant civilian popu-
lations, theft of scrap and minor ac-
cidents on site), the EOD company 
has made impressive progress, de-
stroying up to 900 tons (817 metric 
tons) of ordnance per month. With 
support from the Dutch govern-
ment, AAF EOD received three elec-
trical firing devices to improve its 
safety on demolition ranges. Addi-
tional EOD safety and personal pro-
tective equipment was provided to 
Albania by the U.S. European Com-
mand. This equipment was used to 
train EOD operators, and it will in-
crease safe operations through com-
munication and positioning data 
with GPS-enabled radios. Since be-
ginning work in 2009, the AAF EOD 
teams have destroyed approximately 
4,400 tons (3,992 metric tons) of var-
ious size munitions.
The Way Forward
In 2009, Albanian Prime Min-
ister Sali Berisha announced the 
demilitarization of all hazard-
ous ordnance by 2013. With 75,000 
tons (68,037 metric tons) of ord-
nance identified for destruction, 
experts concur that this is an ambi-
tious goal. To support demilitariza-
tion, the Albanian government and 
PM/WRA jointly funded a NAMSA 
feasibility study to assess a possible 
NAMSA project built upon the suc-
cess of its 2002–07 project. In March 
2010, NATO members approved the 
project and opened a NAMSA of-
fice in Tirana in September 2010. 
While the memorandum of under-
standing between NAMSA and the 
government of Albania is still under 
review, experts anticipate demilitar-
ization under this long-term project 
will begin in January 2011, funded 
primarily by the United States, fol-
lowing the signing of the MOU.
Through these projects, Albania 
is developing specialized EOD and 
demilitarization capabilities that are 
in high demand throughout the re-
gion. As the country completes its 
national demilitarization plan, the 
Albanian government and military 
will end up with a viable skill set that 
could be beneficial to NATO and 
other countries with deteriorating 
stockpiles. Likewise, the Mjekes fac-
tory, with minor upgrades in equip-
ment and training, could become a 
regional hub for demilitarization. 
While the prospect of regional weap-
ons destruction cooperation may 
seem ambitious, a regional approach 
to stockpile reduction is beginning 
slowly to take shape. By taking ad-
vantage of assistance from the in-
ternational community, Albania is 
strengthening its expertise, gaining 
proficiency in munitions and ord-
nance handling, and is establishing 
appropriate munitions dismantling 
and destruction facilities. 
 see endnotes page 80
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the Mjekes demilitarization facility.
Photo courtesy of anthony Baird
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The Terter Regional  
    Vocational Training Center 
by Nick Nwolisa [ International Eurasia Press Fund ]
Recently, International Eurasia Press Fund helped to form the Terter Regional Voca-
tional Training Center to provide computer, business and vocational training for mine 
victims and their family members. The victims are also given medical and legal help 
by the Azerbaijan Mine Victims Association. The VTC and the AMVA both work to 
help war victims reintegrate into society.
The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action was established in 1998 and since then, has car-ried out mine-clearance operations and human-
itarian support in several regions and communities in 
Azerbaijan. Beginning in 2000, the International Eur-
asia Press Fund joined ANAMA in conducting various 
surveys to determine the impact of landmines on Azer-
baijani territory. The survey results indicated that mine 
victims predominately resided in Agstafa, Fizuli, Goran-
boy and Terter. 
In 2004, ANAMA worked with IEPF to conduct the 
Mine Victims Needs Assessment project. The project 
documented some of the challenges mine victims faced, 
such as:
• They were in urgent need of financial assistance.
• The families that had lost their bread-winners in the 
war needed assistance in establishing small-scale 
businesses to support themselves.
• Mine victims often faced legal challenges, particularly 
while trying to obtain their disabled status, citizen-
ship registration card, etc.
• Both victims and people residing in mine-affected re-
gions needed mine-risk education because accidents 
continued to occur due to lack of information.
• Mine victims, their families and the local population 
residing in mine-affected regions needed access to ur-
gent medical attention following mine accidents. 
• Mine victims required assistance in community and 
mainstream-society reintegration.
In order to help mine victims overcome some of 
these challenges, IEPF decided it should first bring the 
mine victims together through the creation of an asso-
ciation. This association would serve as a platform where 
different initiatives and programs related to victim as-
sistance could be developed through ideas contributed 
by the mine victims themselves. Terter was the first re-
gion identified for bringing together victims because of 
the high number of mine victims residing there. More 
than half of the Terter region’s territory remains under 
Armenian occupation, and landmines and unexploded 
ordnance affect a large portion of the land.
Azerbaijan Mine Victims Association
The Azerbaijan Mine Victims Association was for-
mally established and registered with the Azerbaijan 
government in May 2007. Through its various achieve-
ments, the AMVA Terter branch was evaluated as a suc-
cess by a committee within IEPF’s executive board, and 
was highlighted by several international and local news 
outlets. Some of the achievements from AMVA Terter’s 
project activities were:
• More than 50 mine victims received assistance in 
various legal matters, such as changing their federal 
disability status so their pensions aligned with the se-
verity of their injuries and documenting marital sta-
tus to allow access to family benefits.
• 140 mine victims actively participated in various 
training courses on small-scale business manage-
ment, computer literacy and first aid. 
• Three mine victims worked in various capacities in 
the regional IEPF offices.
• 27 mine victims received advanced medical diagno-
ses from specialists, which helped them access federal 
disability benefits. 
• More than 30 mine victims received varying amounts 
of social assistance.
In 2008, based on AMVA Terter’s 
success in assisting mine victims, 
the Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. Department 
of State’s Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs (PM/WRA), AMVA’s origi-
nal donor, financed the replication of 
similar actions in the Fizuli and Ag-
stafa regions, and assisted AMVA in 
Terter with pursuing more activities. 
Most of the AMVA-Terter members 
joined the project working group, as-
sisting mine victims with their legal 
issues and also providing courses in 
business training. Moreover, PM/
WRA approved seed capital for pro-
viding microcredit loans to the mine 
victims. With this initial capital, the 
IEPF established the Avrasia-Kredit, 
Ltd., a non-banking organization dis-
tributing small loans to the less for-
tunate people in Agstafa, Fuzuli and 
Terter. Additional financial donors, 
including CredAgro, AzerStar and 
AzerCredit, have increased the cof-
fers of Avrasia-Kredit from an initial 
donation of US$45,000 to $600,000 
recently, and Avrasia-Kredit is 
ranked among the top non-banking 
organizations allocating microcredit 
loans in the region, with more than 
1,300 beneficiaries.
The mine victims who benefited 
from microcredit loans were main-
ly concerned with the expansion of 
their existing businesses, although 
some were interested in starting new 
businesses. IEPF and AMVA contin-
ued to provide business advice and 
entrepreneurial skills training to the 
mine victims and to a larger extent, 
the inhabitants of the communities 
in the regions. As the demand for 
microcredit swelled, a need to create 
a viable and sustainable source for 
job creation grew; hence, the IEPF 
programs-development team estab-
lished the Terter Regional Vocation-
al Training Center.
The VTC was designed to not 
only help mine victims and their 
families gain the skills they needed 
to become self-sufficient, but IEPF 
suggested retired mine-clearance 
workers were in need of retrain-
ing, as well. Due to the extremely 
stressful nature of their work, mine-
clearance workers normally retire 
from their positions at approximate-
ly 45 years of age; however, the law 
does not regulate the retirement age. 
IEPF noticed that many demining 
retirees had a difficult time finding 
other work and becoming financially 
independent because of the difficul-
ty in transferring their unique skills 
into other professions. Vocational 
training is needed to help them find 
employment in other fields and re-
integrate into society. Consequently, 
deminers were encouraged to attend 
the training courses.
Training Center Goals and Strategies
On 30 March 2010, the VTC offi-
cially announced its opening. IEPF, 
in close collaboration with the Ter-
ter region’s local municipalities, or-
ganized the ceremony, and many 
dignitaries attended, including PM/
WRA’s Azerbaijan Country Program 
Manager, Katherine Baker, and Mi-
chael Gaunt, the military attaché 
for the U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan, 
along with a large number of com-
munity members. ANAMA’s Infor-
mation Manager, Murad Rahimov, 
also attended the opening ceremony 
to express ANAMA’s desire to ensure 
mine-free zones in Azerbaijan’s bor-
der territories. During the ceremony, 
Vudadi Isayev, the head of the local 
authority, expressed his delight with 
the continuous financial support of 
the United States. 
The Terter Regional Vocational 
Training Center is unique, teaching 
food and nutrition skills; domestic 
skills such as painting, carpet weav-
ing and decorative design; and tech-
trainees at the terter regional vocational training center. trainees are mine victims, 
spouses or family members of war victims.  
all Photos courtesy of the author
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nical skills like electrical wiring, carpentry, and 
advertising and graphic design. VTC also pro-
vides training on agricultural practices, busi-
ness skills and microfinance management. The 
first participants were drawn from the Terter 
region, but VTC expects others will come from 
the Agdam, Goranboy and Goygol regions. 
Presently, the two-story VTC building has vari-
ous offices, restroom facilities and two training 
rooms that can seat up to 20 persons per room. 
In the future, VTC will enroll war victims 
and retired deminers, irrespective of their lo-
cations. To accommodate the needs of these 
remote victims, VTC envisions having ap-
proximately six lodging rooms for partici-
pants and trainers from more distant regions 
of Azerbaijan, as well as a conference hall that 
can seat approximately 120 people. 
During the opening ceremony, the chair-
man of IEPF, Umud Mirzayev, outlined the 
VTC’s overall goals, which include develop-
ing income-generating skills for war victims, 
their family members and retired humanitar-
ian mine-action personnel, as well as integrat-
ing those trained into mainstream society. To 
succeed, IEPF will assist with constructing and 
equipping the VTC, operating the VTC (train-
ing component), and finding job placements 
or business opportunities for the mine victims 
and the retired deminers.
Various local and international specialists 
and experts were involved in creating the VTC’s 
training curriculum. The curriculum designed 
for VTC is modeled after best practices rec-
ommended by the International Labour Or-
ganization, and IEPF also has adopted several 
curriculum materials from Western Australia’s 
Department of Education and Training and var-
ious similar institutions in the United States. 
Although VTC will use local experts as train-
ers, it will also work with established interna-
tional organizations, particularly U.N. agencies 
with similar practices. 
The training procedure followed by the 
trainers will be conducted using three learn-
ing approaches as outlined in the document, 
“Professional Development Framework for Vo-
cational Skills of Vocational Education and 
Training Practitioners.”1 The three teaching 
methods are:
• Formal learning: a program of instruction 
emphasizing theory through classroom ma-
terials and shared documents
• Non-formal learning: a program of instruc-
tion in which learners put into 
practice all theorized learning 
processes. The learners begin to 
develop actual vocational skills 
in this stage.
• Informal learning: At this stage, 
learners are encouraged to prac-
tice skills outside VTC’s walls, 
through their daily work and so-
cial, family or leisure activities.
VTC’s Operations and Activities
In the first week of May 2010, 
VTC officially opened its opera-
tions, with the commencement of 
four vocational training courses in-
cluding carpet weaving, food and 
nutrition, advertising and graph-
ic design, and agricultural prac-
tices. Participants were from 18 to 
50 years of age. Most of the male 
participants joined the agricultur-
al courses, while the women took 
the carpet weaving and food and 
nutrition classes. The advertising 
and graphic design course attract-
ed younger participants, both male 
and female. The first group of VTC 
participants were either mine vic-
tims or the spouse/other family 
member of a war victim; two mine-
clearance workers enrolled in the 
subsequent class.
As VTC’s main focus is provid-
ing participants with the skills to 
help them attain gainful employ-
ment, the VTC manager will closely 
collaborate with IEPF to find suit-
able places where the VTC gradu-
ates’ newly acquired skills will be 
needed. Some of the graduates will 
be encouraged to start their own 
small businesses or even joint ven-
tures. Microcredit loans from Avra-
sia-Kredit are easily accessible to 
VTC graduates. 
iePf chairman umud Mirzayev and the project working group meet with staff of the terter regional vocational train-
ing center.
one of the participants in the carpet weaving class displays her skills on knitting.
IEPF plans to expand and improve 
the VTC. Hopefully, international 
agencies and organizations will take 
advantage of the unique building 
housing the VTC. War victims, refu-
gees, internally displaced people, lo-
cal communities and deminers still 
need assistance. The VTC is a collec-
tive community resource, function-
ing to benefit the general public. In 
addition, VTC plans to diversify to 
also include the promotion of agri-
cultural practices as one of its core 
activities, since this is the primary 
trade of the region’s inhabitants. Al-
though VTC has taught agricultur-
al classes for quite some time, it plans 
to extend the training program to its 
commercial farm and provide on-
the-job training for mine victims and 
their family members. The sales gen-
erated from the farm would be used 
for salaries and running the farm. 
 see endnotes page 80
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The Bosnian War took place from 1992–1995 dur-ing the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and principally involved Serbian ethnic groups fight-
ing against Muslim and Croatian groups in Bosnia. Dur-
ing the war, Bosnian and Croatian groups also turned 
against one another for the small part of Bosnia still in 
their control. As a result of these bitter conflicts, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is one of the most mine-affected coun-
tries in the world. 
Despite massive humanitarian mine-action funding 
during the past 15 years, the suspected hazardous area 
covers 1,620 square kilometers (626 square miles) or 3.1 
percent of BiH.1 The development of a new Mine Action 
Strategy (2009–19) aiming for a country “free of mines” 
by 2019 means it is officially recognized that the strug-
gle to remove landmines will continue for at least anoth-
er decade in BiH. Humanitarian donors will not likely 
commit funding in the required quantities to achieve 
the mine-free objective within that timeframe. Mine-
action organizations, therefore, will need to use funding 
that is specified for more general development activities 
and operate mine-specific development activities in par-
allel with humanitarian assistance.
This article reflects on a pilot project currently being 
implemented in BiH. Funded by the Swiss Development 
Cooperation and Handicap International, the project 
aims to develop and test innovative ways to improve the 
links between mine action and development. This en-
deavor provides an opportunity to explore how the use 
of development funding can have a beneficial impact on 
more traditional mine-action efforts.2 
Mine Action Development Funding 
     in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
by Michael Carrier [ Handicap International ] and Dr. John Powell 
[ Community and Countryside Research Institute ]
Mine action seeks to eliminate the lingering effects of contamination from landmines 
and explosive remnants of war, but the need for development in these communities 
often trumps clearance and mine-risk education activities. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
where clearance activities are expected to continue until 2019, the Swiss Development 
Cooperation and Handicap International are exploring new ways for mine action to 
integrate development efforts into more traditional mine-action efforts.
Development Approach Complements Mine Action 
The term “mine action and development” does not 
mean “mine action” versus “development.” As a coun-
try moves from an humanitarian crisis to a develop-
ment phase, a transfer takes place from the traditional 
mine-action humanitarian assistance to a mine-action 
development approach. This evolution potentially opens 
the door to new types of cooperation as a development 
donor may support “development activities” involving 
mine action, whereas it would not support demining 
activities alone.3 Such donors would expect any mine-
action intervention to be an integral part of, or at least 
closely linked with, a development project. Funding is 
unlikely to be earmarked specifically for mine action 
but more likely to be based on sustainable effects that 
any type of intervention, including mine action, would 
have on identified development priorities. Mine-action 
organizations will have a difficult time applying for this 
type of funding without stronger cooperation with oth-
er development actors. On the other hand, without a 
mine-action contribution, development actors would 
not be able to undertake work addressing social exclu-
sion of a mine-affected population. Mine action—often 
thought to be dominated by military personnel and 
ways of thinking—and development stakeholders—of-
ten viewed by those in mine action as “civilian”—will 
therefore need to work together if they want to secure 
development money for mine-contaminated areas. 
Cooperation between the mine-action and develop-
ment worlds can be difficult and raise a number of ques-
tions, ranging from the existential “what is a ‘mine-action 
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development approach’?” to practical issues such as 
“who is in charge?” Linking mine action and develop-
ment inevitably creates friction and requires both groups 
to be aware of their differing needs and requirements in 
order to achieve synergistic benefits from linked activi-
ties. A key finding in the BiH project discussed below is 
that most of the traditional development and mine-action 
interventions do not need any major institutional mod-
ification, as long as individual organizations focus on 
their own mandates within a coherent program of activ-
ity. Project outcomes suggest the following:
• Development donors will select the most relevant, ef-
ficient, impact-oriented and sustainable project, irre-
spective of whether a mine-action element is included
• A mine-action center can effectively supervise the 
five official pillars of mine action without the need to 
control development interventions in mine-contam-
inated areas.4 
• All practitioners should maintain leadership of their 
core activities, while at the same time creating stron-
ger linkages with other stakeholders. 
Strong project management is required, with both 
sides involved from the beginning in a process of project 
planning that identifies clear goals, actions and evalu-
ation criteria to measure overall effectiveness. An inte-
grated approach requires:
• A risk-benefit approach in which risk assessment in-
corporates immediate local community social and 
economic objectives within long-term regional and 
national goals. The current risk-assessment approach 
needs modification.
• Demining and other mine-action operations pri-
oritized on the basis of local needs. Prioritization 
already occurs, but integrating demining more fre-
quently with development priorities is needed.
• Local-level processes to enable identification of so-
cial and economic benefits. These practices might 
need to be created from scratch but can be staged 
to identify key priorities early on and more complex 
concerns later.
• Mine action (e.g., fencing, education) delivered 
alongside development activities (provision of em-
ployment and income assistance, enhanced local ser-
vices, road rehabilitation, etc.) requires a higher level 
of communication between mine-action and devel-
opment organizations.
• Institutional processes enabling compromise be-
tween differing objectives. Mine action and develop-
ment must adapt institutional goals and practices to 
allow for cooperation and coordination. 
The emphasis is twofold, on both project planning 
and management, and on a deeper understanding of 
community development needs. The approach may re-
sult in a slower start to mine-action activities on the 
ground, but the outcome would be more effective inter-
vention that simultaneously develops a community and 
releases it from the wider impacts of mines. 
When the BiH project started in 2007, local com-
munity members from the mine-affected municipali-
ties of Stolac and Berkovici identified road rehabilitation 
as a key priority. They realized that better accessibility 
within their community was necessary to obtain ben-
efits from future mine-action intervention. Mine action 
would release land for agricultural purposes, thereby in-
creasing local production, while the rehabilitated road 
would ensure that the agricultural products could be 
taken to regional markets, thus enhancing local income 
streams.
The Best Way to a Mine-free World?
The concept of mine action needs enlargement in or-
der to encapsulate a country’s evolution from human-
itarian needs and immediate survival to development 
and sustainable livelihood, as well as a concept that 
enables movement from a risk-focused to an impact-
oriented approach. Instead of taking the traditional 
mine-free approach—where all possible resources focus 
on removing all mines before development can occur—
an intermediary mine-impact-free goal may be needed. 
Mine-affected inhabitants actively involved in reconstructing 
the existing road leading to the community of Burmazi, Bosnia 
and herzegovina.
Photo courtesy of hanDicaP international
ty. In the long run, however, it may 
be the best possible way toward a 
mine-impact-free world, as it could 
secure longer-term funding and en-
sure mine action is only undertaken 
if the community benefits. In addi-
tion, to obtain local community sup-
port by enabling current generations 
to engage in rewarding and sustain-
able employment is more likely to 
occur than waiting for some future 
promised land that may never mate-
rialize in their lifetime. 
Development: An Effective Response
If the concept of mine action is 
expanded beyond its current narrow 
focus on simply removing mines to 
consider a wider set of options for 
managing and removing the nega-
tive impacts of mines first, develop-
ment intervention could become a 
very effective mine-risk response. 
More than 15 years after the con-
flict, the majority of new mine/UXO 
victims in BiH are adults entering 
into known hazardous areas for eco-
nomic reasons.5 Without sustain-
able employment alternatives, they 
face bitter choices between neglect-
ing their families and risking their 
lives to meet their basic needs. Evi-
dence from a field study implement-
ed through this pilot project in May 
2009 in the mine-affected commu-
nities of Stolac and Berkovici reveals 
that 24 percent of households sur-
veyed continue to use marked mine 
areas. These are people fully aware 
of the risk, but they see entering the 
minefields as the only alternative to 
sustaining their incomes; therefore, 
no amount of risk education will 
curtail their actions. Project efforts 
to integrate mine action and devel-
opment in these communities have 
revealed a local capacity to engage 
in bottom-up development activities 
that enhance the inhabitants’ social 
and economic lives, largely through 
redirecting the focus away from 
mine removal and instead toward 
prioritizing development activities 
in safe areas. 
Prioritizing action, based on 
the limited resources available in a 
mined area can ensure that the most 
important local issues are dealt with 
first. Mine-risk management has a 
role to play, including the traditional 
Questions then arise as to what such 
a term might mean on the ground 
and how a potential donor might in-
terpret it. 
We define mine-impact-free as 
freedom for local communities to 
attain sustainable livelihoods (i.e., 
economic, social and environmen-
tal benefits) provided through two 
broad sets of actions: first, by re-
moving fear and uncertainty about 
what actions can and cannot be un-
dertaken in a specific area, and sec-
ond, through support for developing 
alternative livelihoods. Providing 
concrete examples of links between 
traditional mine-action outputs—
mine-risk education, humanitarian 
demining, victim assistance, stock-
pile destruction and advocacy—and 
human-development goals will ul-
timately be more convincing to po-
tential donors. 
The adoption of an intermediate 
mine-impact-free target would un-
doubtedly delay the ideal time when 
all mines would be fully eradicated, 
as resources formerly devoted to de-
mining would be diverted to social 
and economic development activi-
iMaGe courtesy of naviD BulBuliJa
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mine-action threat-reduction activ-
ities (demining, fencing, marking), 
but in order to ensure behavioral 
changes, it must also link standard 
mine-risk education with actions to 
create development alternatives. In 
BiH for example, providing an un-
contaminated community space 
for collecting wood, or temporari-
ly exchanging suspected hazardous 
areas with safe agricultural land un-
til clearance is completed, would al-
leviate financial pressures on locals 
who knowingly use mine-affected 
land. Thus, these activities would be 
safe, cost-effective and complemen-
tary approaches to mine action. 
In the municipality of Berkovici, 
an association of hunters is one of 
the most high-risk groups in BiH 
and is currently involved in an in-
novative mine-risk management ap-
proach. After being accredited to 
conduct mine-risk education and 
carrying out a participatory, com-
munity-needs assessment, the as-
sociation identified priorities for 
development, demining and mine-
risk education. The priorities are 
being formalized into the existing 
mine-action system while a specific 
development alternative starts. With 
the support of local institutions, 
hunters will manage a specific hunt-
ing zone in a safe area, mark safe 
paths that any type of visitor could 
use (not just hunters) and promote 
the area to local inhabitants, as well 
as foreigners, in order to enhance 
the area’s tourism. Such an approach 
requires a deeper understanding of 
local communities and how they 
function but will potentially enable 
access to development funding for 
a more holistic form of mine-risk 
management intervention.   
Conclusion
The traditional humanitarian-
mine-action assistance alone cannot 
fully erase the impact of landmines 
and the related social exclusion fac-
tors evident in post-conflict zones. 
Traditional technical mine-ac-
tion inputs, such as mine clearance 
mine-risk education and survivor 
assistance activities, are not suffi-
cient. In order to improve quality of 
life and access development fund-
ing, mine action must also become 
part of a development response. It 
must include the setting of inter-
mediary mine-impact-free targets 
and consider a wider set of interven-
tion measures, from the recognized 
standards of mine action to innova-
tive actions including institutional 
change, community appraisal, and 
support for alternative social and 
economic opportunities. 
 see endnotes page 80
Despite the request of the handicap international team, this local mine-affected inhab-
itant refused to move out of the marked suspected hazardous area.
Photo courtesy of hanDicaP international
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Mine-action Funding: GICHD  
      Survey of Donor Countries 
A recent survey of donors conducted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining found that, while short-term donor support remains strong, levels of funding 
may decrease and become more unpredictable over the coming years. 
by Jean Devlin [ Consultant ] and Sharmala Naidoo [ GICHD ]
In May and June 2010, the Geneva International Cen-tre for Humanitarian Demining commissioned a survey of 25 donors that have contributed to mine-
action programs. The study’s objective was to gain in-
sight into the donors’ motivation in funding mine-action 
programs, the issues that play a role in driving their con-
tinued support and the factors that will influence future 
funding. The findings indicate that short-term commit-
ment and financial support remain strong. However, the 
sustainability of the current level of support for mine ac-
tion beyond 2015 is difficult to ascertain.
A few donors responding to the survey indicated that 
in the near future they would be subject to program re-
views, multi-year approvals for the renewal of funding 
for mine action or broader-defined programs that in-
clude mine action, anticipated budget cuts this year or 
in the next, and planned reductions in expenditures in 
mine action. Nevertheless, The majority of donors re-
sponding indicated that their commitment level would 
stay about the same for the next two to three years. Sup-
port will likely decrease beyond the next five years, with 
increasing unpredictability in funding. The study con-
cluded that if less money will flow to mine action in the 
future, more cost-effective methods that result in con-
crete progress will be necessary.
In the future, a number of factors will converge, pos-
ing challenges and offering opportunities to officials 
concerned with mine action. Growing competition 
for financial resources in the broader peace and secu-
rity field, a more pronounced desire to integrate mine 
action in the security-development nexus, reduced hu-
man resources in donor administrations dedicated to 
mine action and greater affected-country ownership 
and capacity for dealing with residual mine and explo-
sive-remnants-of-war contamination demand new ap-
proaches to a continual problem. Officials will need to 
work on strategies for integrating capacity-building into 
government priorities in affected countries, ensuring 
maximum protection of at-risk populations, reducing 
the size of suspected areas and concentrating on prior-
ity areas for socioeconomic development.
These elements constitute a strong argument for sus-
taining dialogue between donors and affected countries 
on how to assist the countries in their gradual takeover 
of Ottawa Convention responsibilities and obligations. 
The current explorations, such as those of GICHD into 
the best way of instituting this dialogue, are a positive 
step in this direction. 
What Led to the Current Study? 
Mine action has traditionally benefited from gener-
ous donor funding. According to the Landmine Monitor 
Report 2009, total funding for mine action amounted to 
US$626.5 million through May 2009. Of this amount, 
$517.8 million1 came from international sources and 
$108.7 million from mine-affected countries them-
selves. Despite recent adjustments, this amounted to 
some of the highest levels of investment to reduce the 
landmine threat since financial contributions to mine 
action were first recorded in 1992. Despite minor fluc-
tuations in donor data, the Landmine Monitor has also 
recorded constant growth in annual mine-action con-
tributions since 1996. Contrary to this encouraging 
trend, concerns remain about the effectiveness of mine-
action programs, the uneven distribution of support 
and the sustainability of funding. While funding for 
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mine action has remained relative-
ly high and donor commitment has 
been positive, there is some concern 
that funding over the coming years 
might be limited and difficult to se-
cure. This is particularly true for less 
developed countries that have ap-
plied for deadline extensions to ful-
fill their clearance obligations.
Methodology
The study carried out between 
May and June 2010 consisted of a 
written questionnaire sent to 25 
donors, including the European 
Commission, as well as telephone 
interviews with 10 donors selected 
from the study group.2 The findings 
are based on the answers 18 donors 
(85.3 percent of total external fund-
ing) provided and a review of donor 
documents and websites.
Key Findings
1. Broader environment and mine 
action.
Even though the Ottawa Conven-
tion remains the central anchor of 
donor policy-making, it is no lon-
ger the only point of reference. Most 
donors view mine action as part of 
broader development cooperation, 
which includes humanitarian assis-
tance. Donors no longer view mine 
contamination strictly as an emer-
gency issue requiring an immediate 
humanitarian response. 
2.  Policy and strategic planning for 
mine action.
Donors are pragmatic in the way 
they relate to mine action. Donor 
policy language is now more nu-
anced and realistic in terms of what 
is achievable. Thinking has shift-
ed toward placing greater emphasis 
on socioeconomic impact, protec-
tion, reintegration, livelihoods, gen-
der equality and care for survivors 
than on the number of mines found 
and destroyed.
Unless there is an unexpected 
turn of events, donors are unlike-
ly to launch new initiatives and in-
crease mine-action funding levels. 
This could well be the preview of a 
leveling off in programming. It also 
presents a challenge and an oppor-
tunity for mine-affected countries 
and mine-action operators to adjust 
programming during these strate-
gically important next five years, in 
order to not only prioritize funding, 
but also to improve efficiency and 
transparency in mine action.
Donors are increasingly concen-
trating their support on a smaller 
number of countries. Fifteen out of 
18 donors said that to varying de-
grees, the countries receiving as-
sistance for mine action are also 
partner countries for other forms 
of aid. This is consistent with the 
calls made by the Paris Declara-
tion on Aid Effectiveness and the 
Accra Agenda of Action3 for do-
nors to focus their development 
assistance on a smaller number 
of partner countries. It is also in 
line with the desire expressed by 
donors and recipients to ensure all 
government departments involved 
offer a coherent and consistent ap-
proach in providing assistance. 
For fragile states and states com-
ing out of conflict, this means 
placing greater attention on ensur-
ing that security and development 
programs are planned in tandem, 
which further supports the argu-
ment not to isolate mine action.
Putting these principles into 
action is not an easy task. Do-
nors generally favor coordination 
among themselves and mine-affect-
ed countries but are not proactive 
in pursuing this coordination. They 
tend to respond to invitations from 
a female deminer in Jordan.
Photo courtesy of eriK tollefsen/GichD
national authorities to become part of a joint evaluation or 
assessment rather than initiate the project (with the nota-
ble exception of Japan which has emphasized this aspect in 
its recent aid policy). They remain divided about instituting 
new structures like a standing committee on international 
cooperation and assistance.
3. Budget and program management.
The budget process varies considerably from coun-
try to country. In most cases, mine-action allocations 
are not highlighted as specific line items in budgets, but 
rather are subsumed in humanitarian, development, se-
curity or other related programming. Eight donors of 
the 18 that provided answers choose to dedicate a por-
tion of their budget allocations for mine action or a mix 
of mine action and ERW/cluster munitions. Two of these 
donors dedicate part of their budget allocation for mine 
action for a specific purpose such as victim assistance.
The majority of mine-action funding is channeled 
bilaterally (directed to a specific country), typically 
through a multilateral organization, a nongovernmen-
tal organization or an operator. Most donors provide 
some un-earmarked funding, for example, core fund-
ing through multilateral channels (the United Nations 
Mine Action Service, GICHD), and through NGOs (In-
ternational Campaign to Ban Landmines, Geneva Call, 
International Committee of the Red Cross), but these 
amounts are substantially smaller. The preference for bi-
lateral funding is based on foreign policy and strategic 
reasons, as well as a desire to focus aid on those coun-
tries most in need. This partly explains why the majority of 
mine-action funding focuses on less than 10 mine-affected 
countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cambodia, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Lebanon and Sudan.1
Within donor agencies, the growth of competing 
fields, such as peacebuilding, security-sector reform, 
and conflict prevention and recovery, have affected 
mine-action programs. Competition for time and bud-
gets has become a serious challenge. As a result, fewer 
people are tasked with primarily mine-action responsi-
bilities than in previous years, and there has been a rapid 
turnover of mine-action personnel, resulting in a loss of 
corporate memory and in-house expertise. 
Donors typically channel their support for mine action 
through a small number of intermediaries with limited 
direct support provided to national mine-action author-
ities. Of the 18 responses, only two donors mentioned 
clearly that their funding decisions took consultations 
with mine-affected governments into consideration. 
This is at odds with the general trend by donors calling 
for greater national ownership and enhanced national 
mine-action capacity.
The main criteria that donors take into account 
when considering funding proposals and making 
funding decisions include:
• Measurement and prioritization of needs, i.e., fo-
cusing on clearing areas that yield the most mea-
surable benefit
• National ownership and capacity
• Commitment to meeting Ottawa obligations
• Measuring the developmental outcomes resulting 
from mine action
• Measuring the experience and the capacity of lo-
cal and international partners
• Aid effectiveness factors (coherence, coordination, 
sustainability, capacity development, etc.)
• Gender equality
• Proven effectiveness and experience of local and 
national mine-action programs and agencies
4. Relationships with mine-affected countries and 
mine-action organizations.
Due to competing demands and reduced capacity, 
donor engagement at international mine-action meet-
ings and at field level is weak. Donors typically func-
tion in response mode, reacting to proposals submitted 
to them as opposed to developing their own programs. 
Visits from donors are few and far apart, and are typi-
cally for monitoring and evaluation purposes. Most of 
the liaison work is left to embassies.
Donors tend to have a light footprint in host coun-
tries in terms of informing mine-affected governments 
of their decisions to fund a mine-action project, with 
a village development committee in cambodia.
Photo courtesy of sharMala naiDoo/GichD
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the exception of the United States 
and the European Commission. Di-
rect contacts with central agencies 
occur more frequently when coun-
tries integrate mine action with de-
velopment, such as in the case of 
Australia and Sweden. 
5. Funding trends and prospects.
While the total flow of official as-
sistance to developing countries may 
still be growing despite the current 
economic climate, there is little evi-
dence that mine-action funding will 
follow this trend. On the contrary, 
mine action’s relative importance, 
combined with mounting donor in-
terest in other global challenges, and 
the fact that the Ottawa Convention 
has delivered tangible results, will 
probably mark a turning point in 
the next three to five years. Beyond 
the next five years, the picture be-
comes difficult to predict. However, 
it is quite plausible that funding will 
take a further downward trend. 
Donor reaction to the recent ex-
tension process is prudent. As other 
countries join the extension process 
with their list of additional resourc-
es needed, the gap between needs 
and available resources will likely 
widen considerably.
In terms of change between 
channels, programming types and 
modalities, donors do not antici-
pate any major changes in the way 
they do business. Donors are open 
to integrating mine-action projects 
in broader development programs 
if mine-affected countries take the 
lead in raising the issue. Opportu-
nities within donor administrations 
for initiating new funding avenues 
for mine action are marginal.4 
In terms of commitment to sup-
port mine action, 17 donors stated 
their commitments (which differ 
from actual expenditures) would 
hold until the end of the current 
funding period (usually part of an 
official strategy, a mine-action plan 
or a public commitment of some 
sort). Donor funding for mine ac-
tion may well have peaked in 2008–
09 and has reached a new plateau for 
the immediate future (2010–11). In 
the medium-term (2012–15), fund-
ing will likely fall to a lower plateau. 
This situation could change during 
the 2014–15 period, as some ma-
jor donors review their multi-year, 
mine-action assistance. 
Many reasons explain this slow 
but predictable trend toward grad-
ually reduced funding levels in-
cluding lack of transparency and 
progress on clearance, lack of val-
ue for funds invested, extension 
requests with unreasonable financ-
ing estimates, budget restrictions, 
and competition for limited fund-
ing. Many donors and experts, how-
ever, contend that it is not the level 
of funding that counts as much as 
the effectiveness of assistance pro-
grams, socioeconomic impact, na-
tional authorities demonstrating 
ownership and pace of progress in 
land release.
The full report will be available for 
download through the GICHD website 
(http://gichd.org) by late 2010. For fur-
ther information, contact Sharmala 
Naidoo at s.naidoo@gichd.org.
 see endnotes page  80
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The United Nations Portfolio      
        of Mine Action Projects 
In Xieng Khouang, Lao PDR, an all-female demining team assesses and 
clears unexploded ordnance-contaminated land. In Bogotá, Colombia, a team 
of practitioners nationalizes a plan to train local health personnel about the 
psychosocial needs of explosive-remnants-of-war victims. In Banja Luka, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, primary schoolchildren attend educational puppet shows about 
small-arms-and-light-weapons risks. At the heart of each initiative is a collaborative 
resource-mobilization system called the Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, and in 
2010 it gives life to 277 projects in 27 countries.
by Chad McCoull [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
The U.N. Portfolio of Mine Action Proj-ects allows government agencies and nongovernmental and international or-
ganizations in the field to publicize their plans 
to deal with local mine-action issues and to 
seek financial assistance for these plans. The 
annual appeal also serves as a compendium of 
global mine-action accomplishments and as a 
catalog for potential donors to browse. In ad-
dition, it is a reference and capacity-building 
tool, providing a snapshot of global funding re-
quirements, the status of countries’/territories’ 
strategies and whose submission process helps 
appealing agencies hone their skills in proposal 
writing and strategic planning.
Simply submitting a project to the Portfo-
lio, however, rarely gets it funded. In reality, 
the politics of aligning voluntary donors’ in-
terests with those of the manifold field agents 
often involves complex negotiations. Routine 
communications between stakeholders are nec-
essary to strategize the yearly process of ap-
proving, funding, facilitating and publicizing 
country projects. 
The process begins when an appealing 
agency identifies an outstanding need for 
which it requires external funding. For example, 
DanChurchAid, operating in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, may lack the resourc-
es and personnel necessary to clear minefields 
in the Katanga province. The appealing agency 
must carefully articulate and submit a request 
to its respective Country Portfolio Coordina-
tor who then liaises with the Portfolio Team 
at the U.N. headquarters. Getting indexed in 
the Portfolio requires that an appealing agency 
work with its implementing partners to formal-
ize a detailed project proposal. In this example, 
DanChurchAid arranges for one implement-
ing partner to provide mine-detection dogs and 
mechanical assets while another implementing 
partner conducts advocacy activities. 
The U.N. Headquarters Portfolio Team—an 
interagency group of staff from United Nations 
Mine Action Service, United Nations Devel-
opment Programme and UNICEF—vets the 
project proposals to ensure consistency and 
coherence with the stated requirements by the 
Country Portfolio Team. Finally, donor rep-
resentatives select projects to fund, specifying 
budget timelines and accountability measures. 
Throughout the predetermined duration of 
project implementation, the applicant (in the 
above example, DanChurchAid) and its part-
ners report progress to all relevant stakehold-
ers. Once a year, the Portfolio Team publishes a 
new Portfolio online, refreshing the register of 
new requests and ongoing projects.
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Thirteen Editions and Counting
Originally called the Portfolio of Mine-Related Proj-
ects in 1998, the Portfolio first arose from UNMAS’ 
imperative to appraise and monitor the global mine 
problem’s funding requirements. The first edition only 
acknowledged official U.N. programs, eight integrated 
mine-action programs and 10 countries’ proposed proj-
ects lists. During the first five years, increasing numbers 
of NGOs and national authorities began to participate, 
some even actively replacing U.N. officials as Country 
Portfolio Coordinators.1 Since its inception, the propos-
al process has evolved from a top-down approach to a 
decentralized approach in which field agencies chiefly 
assess needs and draft proposals. Today more than ever, 
the national strategies, priorities and coordinated pro-
cesses of the 95 appealing agencies currently included 
in the Portfolio guide its content.
More recent in its history has been the 2007 debut 
of the invaluable Automated Portfolio System, which 
streamlines data submission and funds tracking and re-
porting in real time. The web-based AP System has been 
instrumental in accommodating ad hoc electronic up-
dates and biannual progress reports. According to the 
Portfolio Team, such efforts promote greater local and 
national ownership of the Portfolio process and support 
capacity development in terms of outreach efforts, espe-
cially to donors.
Linking Mine Action with Development
Following the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 
victim rates have receded, consequently enabling the 
global mine-action community to pay greater heed to 
issues of community development. Recent studies have 
proven the importance of linking mine action with de-
velopment,2 and an increasing number of mine-action 
entities have begun aligning their efforts with the U.N. 
Millennium Development Goals3 and Development As-
sistance Frameworks.4 
The Portfolio is a testament to this trend. Accord-
ing to the Portfolio Team, “The benefits of mine action 
are seldom singular. A road made passable reduces vic-
tims, but also promotes the return of displaced popu-
lations and stimulates trade.”5 With priorities shifting 
toward development-conscious mine action, the Portfo-
lio has reflected a “more explicit elaboration of develop-
ment aspects, where they may previously not have been 
highlighted.” In recent years, appealing agencies have 
increasingly partnered with development practitioners 
to attract the interest of progressive donors. 
Matching Agencies with Donors
The track records of some appealing agencies show 
years of experience while others have only recently be-
gun to grapple with mine-action issues. Despite such 
complexity, the United Nations and donors have been 
encouraged by the increase in national authorities as-
serting their right to oversee their own countries' multi-
farious activities. 
Some appealing agencies have held the misconcep-
tion that simply participating in the Portfolio will guar-
antee them funding from the international community. 
Programs that have not received funding in a particular 
year have thereafter withdrawn their proposals. While 
the Portfolio ultimately strives to connect the donor and 
implementer and serves as a reference tool for many do-
nors, both parties must align regional and topical pri-
orities before plans can be discussed. For this reason, 
not every project can receive funding. In 2010, for ex-
ample, most projects did not receive funding. Out of the 
US$589 million requested for the 
combined projects, only $24 million 
was secured at the time of publica-
tion, amounting to a record shortfall 
of $565 million. In December 2009, 
UNMAS director Maxwell Kerley 
announced, “It is unlikely with our 
best efforts that funding would be at-
tained, but it does not mean that the 
job won’t get done—it will just take 
longer and more people will die.”6
The United Nations hypothesiz-
es that some of the reasons for this 
shortfall include deficient reporting, 
the global economic downturn and 
new directions in donors’ earmark-
ing decisions. In addition, while 
the Portfolio has expanded from 10 
countries in 1998 to 27 countries in 
2010, donor interest in the mine-
action field has stagnated. Though 
global support for mine action has 
remained constant, forecasts from 
The Landmine Monitor Report7 indi-
cate that donors may decrease fund-
ing in future years.8 To gain donor 
attention, the Portfolio Team rec-
ommends that appealing agencies 
respond by “recognizing the wider 
funding interests of traditional and 
non-traditional mine action donors 
and to partner with wider thematic 
and geographic funding sources.”5
Building upon Assets
Donors praise the Portfolio both 
for its utility as a reference tool and 
for its flexibility in expressing the dy-
namic needs of a particular commu-
nity. Japan, one of the major donors, 
annually references the Portfolio to 
inform earmarking decisions. Do-
nors also gain greater awareness of 
the plights of lesser publicized coun-
tries, such as Mauritania.
When stakeholders meet to 
solve a problem, assess local needs 
and strategize a plan of action, the 
Portfolio empowers these parties to 
communicate uniformly and glob-
ally. According to the U.N. Portfolio 
Team, Albania often cites the Portfolio 
as invaluable for coordinating part-
ners and attracting funds. In the 
Democratic Republic of the Con-
go, all national authorities, interna-
tional agencies and NGOs found the 
Portfolio to be a useful means to co-
ordinate activities. Amid Sudan’s civ-
il war, the call to compile the Portfolio 
brought together stakeholders from 
both the North and South in confi-
dence-building roundtables, long be-
fore the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.9
These success stories underscore 
the prospect that the Portfolio will 
continue to serve the mine-action 
sector as a permanent fixture. Cur-
rently, the Portfolio Team is review-
ing inefficiencies and assets, listening 
to stakeholder feedback and improv-
ing objectives for the upcoming years. 
The 2011 Portfolio is expected to be 
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“it is unlikely with our best efforts that fund-
ing would be attained, but it does not mean 
that the job won’t get done—it will just 
take longer and more people will die.”
cover of the 2010 Portfolio of Mine action 
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The Mine Action Programme of Afghan-istan is one of the oldest and largest mine-action programs in the world.1 
Coordinated by the Mine Action Coordina-
tion Centre of Afghanistan, more than 10,000 
individuals in commercial and noncommer-
cial entities work in Afghanistan’s mine-action 
field.2 MAPA’s implementing partners vary in 
size from large organizations with thousands 
of employees to smaller organizations with 
few personnel. MAPA covers all mine-action 
pillars,3 including demining (survey, marking 
and clearance), mine-risk education, victim as-
sistance and advocacy.
MAPA began in 1988 as a United Nations 
Office of Humanitarian Affairs coordinated 
operation based in Peshawar, Pakistan. After 
the Taliban’s fall in 2001, the new government 
of Afghanistan delegated program respon-
sibility to the United Nations to coordinate 
mine-action activities in the country. Since its 
inception, MAPA has grown in size and ex-
panded its area of operation to every mine-
affected province. In 2000, MAPA received 
only US$17 million4 in funding; since 2001 
the overall budget of bilateral and multilateral 
funding has averaged $140 million per annum. 
The additional funding received since 2001 
has allowed for some significant achievements. 
For example, the number of victims has been 
reduced by 75 percent from its high point in 
2002, when the International Committee of the 
Red Cross reported more than 1,200 casualties 
from landmines, unexploded ordnance and 
cluster munitions.5 More than 12,000 mine-
fields have been cleared and the land has been 
made available for productive use. The initial 
priorities were to clear the areas blocking ac-
cess to schools, universities, hospitals, residen-
tial areas and farmlands. Although many of 
these priorities have been completed, as more 
refugees return and resettle in Afghanistan 
and the country slowly works toward building 
a modern infrastructure, mine action will con-
tinue to play a crucial role in the country’s post-
war development, such as in the clearance that 
was necessary to allow electricity lines to run 
from Tajikistan to Kabul. Despite the fact that 
the amount of funding received has increased, 
current funding is insufficient for Afghanistan, 
as it is in many other countries, if Ottawa Con-
vention and Afghan Compact deadlines are to 
be met on time.
As the number of known minefields is re-
duced, MACCA works with implementing 
partners to annually review the planning cri-
teria against which priorities are set and pub-
lishes an Integrated Operational Framework6 
detailing these priorities. This handbook out-
lines mine-action sector policies, details data 
analysis of the current hazard areas and con-
tains a compilation of the aspirations of all 
implementing partners. Although more than 
600 square kilometers (231.7 square miles) 
The Mine Action Programme  
    of Afghanistan 
by Dr. Mohammed Haider Reza [ MACCA ] 
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan, coordinated by the Mine Action Coordina-
tion Centre of Afghanistan, faces a unique set of challenges in combating the national 
mine/explosive-remnants-of-war contamination problem. The ongoing war and chang-
ing political climate force the country to adapt its mine-action plan to meet new de-
mands as they emerge. The following summary of MAPA’s activities highlights these 
challenges and their implications for the continued humanitarian effort in Afghanistan. 
of contaminated area remain, MAPA can elimi-
nate high-impact hazards relatively quickly, clear-
ing approximately 80 square kilometers (30.9 square 
miles) each year. Furthermore, having cleared the 
high-impact minefields in the last 20 years, MACCA 
and its implementing partners must begin to con-
sider how to restructure over time in order to meet 
the next decade’s challenges. For example, 40 per-
cent of the existing contamination covers relatively 
large areas, with low-density contamination of min-
imal-metal anti-tank mines outside urban centers. 
Although once not considered a priority, the impact 
of these minefields on Afghanistan is increasing as 
the country’s infrastructure and industry develop, 
particularly those associated with natural resourc-
es. Therefore, the priority for clearance of these sites 
must also adapt. 
 
Afghanistan’s Goals and End States
In 2003, Afghanistan became a signatory to the 
Ottawa Convention which commits the country to:
• Clear all emplaced anti-personnel mines by 2013
• Destroy all known AP-mine stockpiles by 2007 
(this goal was achieved in October 2007)
• Provide mine-risk education to Afghans and as-
sist mine survivors
In addition, mine-action goals were includ-
ed in the Afghan Compact, namely:
• Land area contaminated by mines and ERW 
will be reduced by 70 percent by March 2011. 
• All stockpiled AP mines will be located and 
destroyed by March 2007.
Future Goals
The Afghan government’s end-state vision is 
“a country free from landmines and explosive 
remnants of war, where people and communi-
ties live in a safe environment conducive to na-
tional development, and where landmine and 
ERW survivors are fully integrated in the soci-
ety and thus have their rights and needs recog-
nized and fulfilled.”7 
In order to realize the end-state vision, the 
following end goals must be achieved:
Goal 1: Demining. The end goal for de-
mining will be achieved when all known mine/
ERW-contaminated areas have been cleared. 
Once this goal is achieved, an effective de-
mining capability will continue and respond to 
unknown residual risk and raise public aware-
ness. Mapping of cleared areas will be complete 
and accurate, and this data will be available as 
needed to the public and designated institu-
tions. All post-clearance documentation will 
be complete, and all cleared land will be hand-
ed over in accordance with national standards.
Goal 2: Mine/ERW-Risk Education. The end 
goal for MRE will be achieved when a compre-
hensive and sustainable system is in place to 
educate and raise awareness throughout com-
munities nationwide regarding the residual 
mines/ERW threats. This includes providing 
the public with sufficient information to rec-
ognize and report these suspicious items to the 
appropriate authorities. 
Goal 3: Stockpile Destruction. The end goal 
for mine-stockpile destruction will be achieved 
when all known illegal, abandoned or otherwise 
unwanted munitions are destroyed or disposed 
of in addition to the AP-mine stockpile destruc-
tion already completed.
Goal 4: Mine/ERW-Survivor Assistance. 
The end goal for mine/ERW-survivor assistance 
Mine-risk education is now taught by 17,000 trained Ministry 
of education teachers throughout afghanistan.
all Photos courtesy of MaPa
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will be achieved when mine/ERW survivors 
are reintegrated into Afghan society, with sup-
port provided through a national system that 
incorporates the rights and needs of people 
with disabilities. 
Goal 5: Advocacy and Coordination. The 
end goal for advocacy and coordination will 
be achieved when relevant institutions and 
civil society cooperate and support the ful-
fillment of Afghan commitments to mine/
ERW eradication and acknowledge the impor-
tance of mine action for communities and na-
tional development.
Meeting Milestones
Clearly, the challenge of reaching these 
end states in a country as contaminated as 
Afghanistan, and where conflict is ongoing 
in many areas, is a major one. Nonetheless, 
MAPA has met a number of significant mile-
stones. In addition to the achievements high-
lighted earlier and the completion of stockpile 
destruction in line with the Afghan Compact 
goals, significant steps have been made in the 
areas of MRE and victim assistance. These are 
the two areas where the transition to the gov-
ernment of Afghanistan has made the most 
significant progress. 
Mine/ERW-risk education messages have 
been incorporated into the national educa-
tion curriculum, and more than 17,000 Min-
istry of Education teachers have been trained 
and provided the resources to teach MRE in 
classrooms. In order to ensure the sustainable 
quality of this teaching, Child Protection Of-
ficers in all provinces have been certified as 
MRE trainers and also trained in monitoring 
and evaluation. MACCA currently supports 
this transition by providing the external moni-
toring and quality management of this system.
The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Mar-
tyrs and Disabled, and the Ministry of Public 
Health are leading victim/disability assistance 
activities, ensuring that landmine survivors 
and others with disabilities have their rights and 
needs addressed alongside all Afghan citizens. 
Adapting to Change
Afghanistan faces particular challenges: the 
ongoing conflict in many parts of the coun-
try and the security threats presented by the 
widespread use of improvised explosive de-
vices by Opposition Forces. In some commu-
nities, IEDs have been laid around villages 
in strategic patterns resembling traditional 
minefields, although without the density of 
the minefields laid by, for example, the Soviet 
Forces in the 1980s.
MAPA is dealing with the IED issue care-
fully to ensure it maintains its humanitari-
an neutrality and does not deal with IEDs in 
active conflict areas, which would lead to the 
deminers being perceived as parties to the con-
flict. However, it is important to heed the hu-
manitarian imperative of clearing fields of 
abandoned IEDs in areas where conflict has 
been concluded.
As the nature of Afghanistan’s armed con-
flict has changed over the last 20 years, MAPA 
has adapted and adjusted the delivery of mine-
action services. In the last few years, commu-
nity-based demining has been reintroduced 
to the program. Community-based demining 
projects are designed by the traditional Afghan 
implementing partners working closely with 
community shuras (or leadership committees) 
and the National Solidarity Programme Com-
munity Development Councils. These imple-
menting partners work to develop projects that 
clear mines from the community by training 
local people from within that community. The 
traditional implementing partners also pro-
vide expert oversight and quality management. 
creative mine-risk awareness techniques capture chil-
dren’s imaginations
The program is proving to be a successful way of 
enabling access to less secure areas as local recruit-
ment and strong community involvement enhanc-
es deminers’ security. An additional benefit of the 
community-based demining program is the eco-
nomic boost provided to the small rural communi-
ties through the deminers’ wages and other income, 
and through building rentals, etc., over a two-year 
period, which empowers them to take advantage of 
land development once it has been cleared. 
The Road Ahead
Looking to the future, the program’s major chal-
lenge is the requirement to make significant prog-
ress toward completely removing the impact of 
mines and ERW. There are a number of aspects to 
consider in order to achieve this objective: contin-
ued careful and strategic planning, investigation 
into new technologies (for example, those needed to 
clear very large minefields), continued adaptation of 
the program’s structure, and a significant influx of 
donor funds.
Risks Remaining
MACCA believes no risk level is acceptable in 
areas communities regularly use. If the community 
fears certain areas, this will have a negative impact 
on its livelihood and ability to develop. Therefore, 
the fear must also be addressed. One of MACCA’s 
2010 tasks is to attempt to create a list of hazards 
that do not cause problems for communities and 
therefore could be managed in a different way. 
In the same way that buried bombs from 
World War II are still discovered in Europe, 
the issue posed by ERW will be a problem in 
Afghanistan for many years to come. However, 
these concerns should be managed in a very dif-
ferent way, within the realm of a small national 
mine-action capacity by potentially partnering 
with the Afghan National Army and police.
 
Conclusion
MAPA and its partners have made tremen-
dous strides toward ridding the country of 
landmines and other ERW, and in clearing the 
way for its country to develop and prosper. This 
progress has been achieved through increased 
focus and priority-based strategies, more funds 
to expand the workforce and support from the 
Afghan and international community. Many 
challenges lie ahead if the Afghan govern-
ment’s vision is to be achieved. That vision will 
require even greater commitment and focus 
than exhibited thus far. 
   see endnotes page 81
a demining team walks toward a minefield.
Dr. Mohammed Haider Reza is the Programme 
Director of the Mine Action Coordination Centre of 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina  
  Demining 15 Years Later
by Zoran Grujic´ [ Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Information System ]
This article outlines the demining steps taken by the United Nations and national au-
thorities following the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. The author further 
explores the shortcomings and successes of the demining projects and laws, with at-
tention to preparations for the state’s next decade of mine action.
In 1995, the Dayton Agreement put an end to three-and-a-half years of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) following the dis-
solution of Yugoslavia. The first minefields in 
BiH were placed in late 1991 across the bor-
der with Croatia in the north. At that time, 
the United Nations Protection Force1 was de-
ploying in the country. Later, with a U.N.-insti-
tuted no-fly zone,2 the Implementation Force3 
helped significantly reduce pollution from air-
craft submunitions. 
According to the Dayton Agreement (An-
nex 1-a), former warring factions were obliged 
to submit war documentation to the Imple-
mentation Force under the code name Op-
eration Joint Endeavour. Initial information 
reported 16,500 minefields and enabled IFOR 
to begin clearance.
As it was too complicated, logistically and 
politically, to involve the existing three armies—
ABiH (Bosniac), HVO (Bosnian Croat Army) 
and VRS (Bosnian Serb Army)—in demining, 
the Dayton Agreement tasked local armies to 
remove all of the minefields within their area 
of responsibility, but results failed to assure that 
the land could be used safely afterward. 
Getting into the Game
Following the conflict’s end, BiH had no re-
sources to begin the arduous task of clearance. 
In January 1996, the Council of Ministers of BiH 
requested the assistance of the United Nations 
to start demining activities. As a result, during 
the same year, the United Nations Mine Action 
Centre was founded. The BiH demining project 
started in 1996 with the center taking responsi-
a deminer in action.
all Photos couresy of BhMac
Another part of the initial demining ef-
forts was instituting mine awareness. Risk ed-
ucation started as a joint venture between the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 
UNMAC and UNICEF. 
The initial programs’ results were signifi-
cant. The rate of more than 50 mine accidents 
per month in 1995 was reduced to fewer than 
30 in 1998. BiH’s problem was that all of the 
available procedures at the time had been de-
veloped for sandy areas such as Afghanistan 
and the Persian Gulf. In response to its unique 
situation, BiH modified procedures, shifting 
from a “retrace your footsteps” to a seven-step 
procedure, with the primary aim to avoid en-
tering a dangerous zone. This procedure was 
later used worldwide. 
Close to the end of the U.N. demining pe-
riod (August 1996–July 1998) in BiH, UNMAC 
had five regional offices in Tuzla, Banja Luka, 
Mostar, Pale and Bihac, and was employing 
close to 40 trained, local mine-action center 
staff to conduct mine-action activities on their 
own. UNMAC also had four fully equipped 
teams capable of demining approximately six 
square kilometers (2.3 square miles) per year. 
a deminer begins activities in a new lane.
bility for mine-action coordination in July 1998. 
The following three “chapters” detail the U.N.-, in-
ternational community- and state-led projects in 
BiH demining. 
Chapter One: U.N.-led Project
The United Nations Mine Action Center was 
established in Sarajevo in May 1996. RONCO, an 
American contracting company, was awarded a 
bid to equip, staff, train and start demining activi-
ties. Its first task was to assess the problem. 
Some 16,600 minefield records were entered 
into a database. At that time, mine-action centers 
in Cambodia and Afghanistan had database sys-
tems, but they were custom-tailored to suit their 
own needs. BiH’s situation was different: a small 
area dense with contamination. 
In the early days, the BiH demining effort 
was a U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions program, and all activities were targeted to-
ward establishing a mine-action-center structure. 
Nevertheless, the need for action was pressing as 
the landmine incident rate reached nearly 50 per 
month. Reporting procedures were still in their 
development phase, and demining reports from 
this time had to be resurveyed. 
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Information systems successfully followed 
activities, and maps were produced accurately 
depicting minefields. The program was slowly 
moving toward chapter two.
Chapter Two: State/International  
Community-led Project
On 31 July 1998, UNMAC was transferred 
to BiH authorities. To achieve this, structur-
al changes had to be made. Project financing 
for demining operations was conducted most-
ly through the International Trust Fund for 
Demining and Mine Victim Assistance and 
the United Nations Development Programme. 
The staff was increased to 63 local staff mem-
bers and approximately 20 international advi-
sors and consultants. 
The tripartite structure required strong co-
ordination, which was lacking because resourc-
es were not sufficient to support all demining 
activities. With a changed mandate, it was illog-
ical for the MAC to maintain its own demining 
team, so these teams were reassigned to survey 
and quality-control tasks. A number of the de-
miners, wishing to remain active with clear-
ance, joined one of the three nongovernmental 
organizations that were established during this 
time—Pale’s Stop Mines, Sarajevo’s BH Demin-
ing and Mostar’s Pro Vita. Further, to improve 
better territorial coverage, the regional offices 
in Sarajevo and Travnik opened. 
Information systems were refined and map-
ping standards were established, increasing the 
MAC’s effectiveness. An emphasis was placed 
a deminer uses a metal detector in preparation for technical survey.
on planning and coordination among the mem-
bers of the Mine Awareness Working Group. 
As time passed, it became increasingly obvi-
ous that the tripartite structure could not achieve 
the maximum efficiency. In February 2002, the 
state parliament adopted the first demining law, 
moving BiH demining to chapter three.
Chapter Three: State-led Project
BiH took responsibility for enacting the 
demining law and appointed the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs and the Demining Commis-
sion to be the national authority responsible 
for instituting the law. BHMAC's role was to 
coordinate and plan BiH mine-action activi-
ties, including establishing a mine-detection 
dog center and conducting systematic land-
mine impact surveys. With the new demining 
law, the former tripartite structure unified and 
former entity offices became operational offic-
es within their territories. While UNDP origi-
nally covered BHMAC’s operational costs, BiH 
eventually assumed responsibility for the costs, 
and donor countries continued to send funds 
through ITF.
BHMAC decided to use Technical Survey 
to release demined areas rather than focusing 
solely on the complete clearance of demined 
areas; this resulted in an increase in produc-
tivity. Rather than clearing 10 square kilome-
ters (3.9 square miles) per year, figures went 
up to 150 square kilometers (57.9 square miles) 
cleared in 2009. Also, with the exception of 
2008, there has been a decrease in landmine 
accidents. Estimated annual productivity has 
grown to 35–40 square kilometers (13.5–15.4 
square miles) for area clearance and Technical 
Survey and 80 square kilometers (30.9 square 
miles) for General Survey area. 
The Way Forward
BHMAC has begun to revise the current 
demining law and create new legal documents 
that would enable greater involvement of local 
authorities in mine action. Having recognized 
the need to plan the next decade of mine action, 
the Council of Ministers evaluated the mine-
action strategies employed from 2005–09 and 
drafted a new strategic document for 2009–19. 
With the new strategy, at the 9th Meeting of the 
States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty, BiH sub-
mitted an application for an extension to clear 
landmines; the extension was approved. 
With the adoption of the first demining law, 
BiH accepted responsibility for mine action 
and developed standard operating procedures 
and quality assurance procedures for mine-risk 
education. These actions enabled strict qual-
ity control and allowed MRE field work to be 
evaluated. The law’s creation also resulted in an 
increase in mine-safe areas and a continual re-
duction (with the exception of 2008) in land-
mine incidents.
   see endnotes page 81
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Mine Action in North Sudan 
North Sudan’s National Mine Action Centre is making great strides toward clearing all 
known mined areas in Sudan’s northern regions by April 2014. In this article, the author, a 
Quality Assurance Officer for NMAC, explores NMAC’s work, future plans and how it has 
linked mine action to development and recovery in North Sudan. 
by Khalid Ibrahim Hamed [ National Mine Action Centre ]
More than 20 years of conflict be-tween North and South Sudan, end-ing with the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement,1 has left Sudan riddled with land-
mines and explosive remnants of war. Based on 
the CPA, the northern region of Sudan consists 
of 15 states including the Blue Nile, Gadaref, 
Gezira, Kassala, Khartoum, Northern, North 
Darfur, North Kordofan, Red Sea, River Nile, 
Sennar, South Darfur, South Kordofan, West 
Darfur and the White Nile. Nine of these states 
in North Sudan reportedly have varying de-
grees of landmine and ERW-contamination 
with the Blue Nile, Kassala and Southern Kor-
dofan being the most-affected regions.2 Despite 
several years of intensive mine-action opera-
tions, landmines and ERW continue to threat-
en civilians and impede economic recovery 
and development. Contaminated land reduces 
productivity, thereby negatively affecting the 
sustainable livelihoods of rural communities. 
Furthermore, landmine and ERW contamina-
tion on key logistical supply routes continues 
to hamper safe and free movement of citizens, 
trade and humanitarian interventions. It also 
endangers the lives of local communities, inter-
nally displaced persons and refugees, as well as 
the staff of humanitarian operations. The pres-
ence and perceived threat of landmines/ERW 
prevents and delays IDPs and refugee popula-
tions from returning to their hometowns, and 
as a result, constrains recovery, reconstruction 
and development efforts in mine/ERW and war-
affected areas. 
The National Mine Action Centre
The National Mine Action Centre is the govern-
ment body mandated to plan, coordinate and over-
see all mine-action operations in coordination and 
collaboration with the Northern Region Office of 
the United Nations Mine Action Office in North 
Sudan. NMAC also serves as an implementing arm 
of the National Mine Action Authority.
As of June 2010, of the total 1,559 recorded dan-
gerous areas identified in Sudan's nine affected 
northern states, 1,164 were cleared or verified while 
395 dangerous areas remain to be addressed. Dur-
ing clearance/verification operations, a total of 2,625 
anti-personnel mines, 686 anti-tank mines, 347,472 
small-arms ammunition and 35,736 items of unex-
ploded ordnance were identified and destroyed.
As a State Party to the Ottawa Convention, 
Sudan’s northern regions are meeting their envi-
sioned end state for mine action, as well as their 
obligation to clear all known mined areas by April 
2014. Mine-action operations commenced in North 
Sudan in 2004, and since then, North Sudan has met 
a number of key milestones in reaching its mine-
free end state, including the establishment of the 
mine-action authority and its substructures, adop-
tion of the North Sudan mine-action law, inclusion 
of mine action in the state budget and the train-
ing of more than 40 mine-action management staff. 
Furthermore, North Sudan has developed and re-
sourced national landmine/ERW clearance assets, 
including 120 deminers and technical staff. They 
are part of the Joint Integrated Demining Units 
that are actively engaged in mine/ERW clearance 
activities in partnership with several internation-
al mine-action operators in North Sudan, and that 
also manages a number of projects independently. 
Although North Sudan continues to receive as-
sistance from the United Nations and other donors, 
mine action has also been included in the state 
budget. Approximately US$13.5 million has been 
allocated to mine action since mid-2006. This has 
encouraged other donors to continue supporting 
North Sudan to address its landmine/ERW con-
tamination problem. 
With the capacity-development assistance pro-
vided by the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme and United Nations Mine Action 
Service, the national mine-action authorities 
are actively engaged in the planning, coordi-
nation, priority setting, accreditation, quality 
assurance and oversight of mine-action opera-
tions in North Sudan.
Development and Recovery
North Sudan has been very successful in 
linking mine action to recovery and develop-
ment activities. The Government of National 
Unity has secured funds from the state budget, 
the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the World 
Bank for the rehabilitation and reconstruction 
of 446 kilometers (277 miles) of railway lines, 
and approximately 200 kilometers (124 miles) 
of main roads have been cleared and verified to 
be free of landmines and ERW in the country’s 
central and southern regions. 
a victim-assistance project under nMac va supervision.
all Photos courtesy of nMac MeDia DePartMent
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Socioeconomic rehabilitation and reintegra-
tion of landmine and ERW victims remains 
a high national priority. Furthermore, North 
Sudan has signed and ratified the Convention 
on the Rights of People with Disabilities. Since 
2007, 22 community-based projects have been 
implemented for the socioeconomic rehabili-
tation and reintegration of the landmine and 
ERW victims in various parts of the country 
with generous contributions from Canada, 
Japan and the state budget. 
The North Sudanese authorities, UNDP and 
the UNMAO have embarked on a broader and 
more practical partnership in various areas of 
mine action in support of the implementation 
of the mine-action transition plan, and look 
forward to further expanding this cooperation 
and partnership in the future. 
Future of Mine Action in North Sudan
From August 2010 until April 2014, the 
key challenge for North Sudan will be to clear 
known-mined or suspected-mined areas un-
der its Article 5 obligations. In the future, 
North Sudan envisions producing an expe-
rienced mine-clearance staff capable of ful-
filling its local role of mine clearance while 
offering support to other countries through 
sharing experiences and lessons and deploy-
ing trained staff.
With the engagement of all relevant stake-
holders, a mine-action transition plan was con-
cluded in November 2008. In 2009, based on the 
provisions of this plan, the national authorities 
made significant progress toward transitioning 
by strengthening and consolidating their insti-
tutional and management capacities. As part of 
its long-term planning process, North Sudan’s 
National Mine Action Authority, together with 
the UNMAO, UNDP and other stakeholders, 
has developed a three-year operations plan, cov-
ering 2009–11 to implement the Cartagena Ac-
tion Plan. North Sudan aims to clear 80 percent 
of all known high- and medium-priority affect-
ed areas by the end of 2011 at an estimated cost 
of US$120 million. 
Conclusion
North Sudan is committed to fully imple-
menting the Cartagena Action Plan. As it reach-
es the Article 5 mine-clearance deadline, North 
Sudan will put all necessary measures in place 
to achieve all the goals and objectives set forth 
in the action plan. To fulfill its Article 5 obliga-
tions, North Sudan’s national demining teams, 
which are the nation’s most cost-effective and 
sustainable assets, need continued and gener-
ous support from the donor community. This 
will enable North Sudan to realize the goal of 
being mine-free by 2014.  
   see endnotes page 81
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the sudan Joint integrated Demining units go to a 
field at Babanusa-Waw for a railway clearance project.
Mine-action Program in  
 Southern Sudan  
Following more than two decades of civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan, 
much of Southern Sudan has been left contaminated with landmines and explosive 
remnants of war. As a result, the Southern Sudan Demining Authority, along with the 
United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Mine Action Office and oth-
er organizations, have been diligently working toward clearing 80 percent of the mines 
in Southern Sudan by 2011.  
by Margaret Matthew Mathiang [ Southern Sudan Demining Authority ]
The 21-year north-south civil war in Su-dan that killed an estimated two mil-lion people, uprooted four million and 
caused 600,000 to take refuge outside of Sudan1 
has left Southern Sudan littered with landmines 
and explosive remnants of war. The contamina-
tion poses a serious challenge to the Govern-
ment of Southern Sudan’s development plans 
and is considered a serious threat to the suc-
cessful implementation of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement signed in 2005 and ending 
in 2011. In 2011, in accordance with the CPA, 
a referendum will determine whether South-
ern Sudan will remain a part of a united Sudan 
or become its own separate entity. Based on the 
CPA, in 2005, Southern Sudan gained the right 
to self-determination in Bahr El Gazel, Eastern 
Equatoria, Jonglei, the Lakes, Northern Bahr 
El-Ghazal, Warab, Western Bahr El Ghazal, 
Western Equatoria, Unity and Upper Nile. 
All of its 10 states are reported to have vary-
ing degrees of landmine/ERW contamina-
tion.
As with the rest of the country, the civil war 
has left Southern Sudan with a large-scale land-
mine/ERW contamination problem. Despite 
several years of intensive mine-action opera-
tions, landmine/ERW contamination contin-
ues to threaten civilians and impede economic 
recovery and development. Contaminated land 
reduces productivity and thereby the sustain-
able livelihoods of affected communities.
Landmine/ERW contamination on key lo-
gistical supply routes continues to hamper safe 
and free movement, trade and provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Contamination also 
endangers the lives of local communities, inter-
nally displaced persons, refugees, staff of hu-
manitarian missions and the personnel of the 
United Nations Mission in Sudan. The presence 
and perceived threat of landmines/ERW pre-
vents and delays IDPs and refugee populations 
from returning to their hometowns, and as a 
result, constrains recovery, reconstruction and 
development efforts in mine/ERW- and war-
affected areas.
Mine-action Assistance
The Southern Sudan Demining Authority 
is the mandated government body established 
in 2006 through presidential decree number 
45/20062 to plan, coordinate and oversee all 
mine-action operations in Southern Sudan with 
assistance from and in coordination and collab-
oration with the National Mine Action Centre 
based in Khartoum and the southern regional 
sub-office of the United Nations Mine Action 
Office in Sudan.
Other partners in UNMIS who assisted 
SSDA include the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme in the area of capacity build-
ing, UNICEF in support of mine-risk education 
initiatives, international nongovernmental or-
ganizations (Norwegian People’s Aid, Mines 
Advisory Group, Danish Demining Group) and 
national organizations (Operations Save Inno-
cent Lives, Sudan Landmine Response, Sudan 
Integrated Mine Action Service), as well as oth-
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er national and government institutions. 
Achievements
Since 2004, when mine-action operations 
started in Sudan, Southern Sudan has met a 
number of milestones, including the estab-
lishment of the SSDA and its substructures, 
drafting of the mine-action bill, inclusion of 
mine action in the state budget and the train-
ing of more than 80 management staff in differ-
ent technical and specified fields. Additionally, 
five senior personnel from SSDA completed the 
James Madison University Senior Managers' 
Course in Mine Action, thereby contributing 
to improved managerial performance. Further-
more, Southern Sudan is supporting the Joint 
Integrated Demining Units (national land-
mine/ERW clearance support) and has provid-
ed 120 deminers and technical staff to the JIDU. 
As of June 2010, 4,206 of the 4,733 recorded 
dangerous areas identified in Southern Sudan 
have been cleared or verified as mine-safe, while 
another 527 dangerous areas are waiting to be 
addressed. During clearance/verification oper-
ations, a total of 17,023 anti-personnel mines, 
2,290 mines, 779 landmines of unknown origin, 
836,355 small arms ammunition and 575,382 
pieces of unexploded ordnance have been found 
and destroyed.2
With the capacity development assistance 
provided by UNDP and the UNMAO, the SSDA 
is now actively engaged in the planning, coor-
dination, priority setting, accreditation, quality 
assurance and oversight of mine-action opera-
tions. In addition to assistance provided by the 
United Nations and others, 5 million Sudanese 
pounds (US$2.11 million)3 has been allocated by the 
GOSS to mine action since mid-2006. This has en-
couraged other donors to continue to support mine-
action operators in Southern Sudan to address its 
landmine/ERW contamination. 
Mine Action and Development
Sudan has been very successful in linking mine 
action to recovery and development activities. 
Northern Sudan’s Government of National Uni-
ty and the GOSS have secured funds from the state 
budget, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the World 
Bank for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
446 kilometers (277 miles) of railway lines and ap-
proximately 200 kilometers (124 miles) of main 
roads have been cleared of landmines/ERW in the 
central and southern parts of Sudan. The clearance 
of railway lines has been extremely important in re-
storing safe passage between Northern and South-
ern Sudan as the Babanusa-Wau railway line is the 
only all-season land link between the northern and 
southern parts of the country. In addition, the clear-
ance and reconstruction of railway lines and roads 
has enabled the safe return and resettlement of IDPs 
and refugees.
Socioeconomic rehabilitation and reintegration 
of the victims of landmines/ERW continues to be a 
priority on the national agenda. Sudan has signed 
and ratified the Convention on the Rights of Peo-
ple with Disabilities. Over the past three years, 22 
community-based projects have been implemented 
for the socioeconomic rehabilitation and reintegra-
tion of the victims of landmines and ERW in various 
parts of the country with generous contributions 
from Canada, Japan and the state budget. 
Challenges 
Southern Sudan is working toward becoming 
“impact free” as soon as possible, as achieving the 
status of “landmine free” is very much debatable. 
One of the key challenges for Southern Sudan is the 
clearance of known mined/suspected mined areas to 
provide a safe environment for returning IDPs and 
refugees. In addition, the SSDA in Southern Sudan 
faces challenges from the long rainy seasons, logisti-
cal complications and lack of enough data to deter-
mine the level, type and locations of contamination.
As UNMAO is operating under UNMIS’s man-
date, a reduction in international support is also ex-
pected during the forthcoming referendum period. 
This loss of funding calls for more financial support 
to national mine-action capacities, which remains a 
challenge for the GOSS, as it must confront conflict-
ing development priorities in the post-war rehabili-
tation period.
Transition Plan and End State
Southern Sudan faces major challenges in pursuit 
of clearing all known landmines by 2014; however, 
this might not be realistic due to the aforementioned 
geographical and logistical challenges.
With the engagement of all relevant stakeholders, 
a mine-action transition plan was concluded in No-
vember 2008. Based on the provisions of the transi-
tion plan, the national authorities made significant 
progress in 2009 by strengthening and consolidat-
ing their institutional and management capacities.
The aim of the process is to transition the man-
agement and coordination of the Sudan Mine Action 
Programme to national authorities in a systematic 
and gradual manner as soon as possible but no lat-
er than early 2011. The desired end state therefore 
is that the national authorities in Sudan manage all 
aspects of mine action with minimal technical as-
sistance from the United Nations. The national au-
thorities, UNDP and UNMAO have embarked on 
a broader and more practical partnership in mine 
action to support the implementation of the mine-
action transition plan and would like to further ex-
pand this cooperation and partnership in the years 
to come. 
As part of SSDA’s long-term planning pro-
cess and in its implementation of the Cartage-
na Action Plan, UNMAO, UNDP and all other 
stakeholders have developed a three-year oper-
ations plan covering 2009–11. With the imple-
mentation of the plan, Sudan aims to clear 80 
percent of all known high- and medium-priority 
affected areas by the end of 2011 at an estimated 
cost of US$120 million. 
Southern Sudan Demining Authority has 
developed a three-year strategic plan that aims 
to strengthen national capacities in mine-ac-
tion activities and to meet the vision of freeing 
the country from the effects and threat of land-
mines and ERW. Southern Sudan also envisions 
itself to one day be active regionally and glob-
ally supporting other countries with an ex-
change of lessons learned and deployment of 
trained and experienced staff. In the mean-
time, Southern Sudan continues to address its 
landmine/ERW contamination. It is in need 
of ongoing generous support from the do-
nor community to all mine-action operators 
working in the region.
   see endnotes page 81
After receiving her Master's Degree in  
development training and education from  
the U.K.'s University of Wolverhampton,  
Margaret Mathew Mathiang became the 
Deputy Chairperson of the Southern Sudan De 
mining Authority in Juba, Southern Sudan in 
2006. Today, she is the Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, a 
position she has held since September 2010.
Margaret Matthew Mathiang
Undersecretary 
Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare
Ministries Compound 
Government of Southern Sudan 
Juba, Southern Sudan
Tel: + 256 477 112 938
E-mail: mandakweat@yahoo.com
a mine was found along a well-traveled path. 
all Photos courtesy of the author.
a man walks past unexploded ordnance.
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An article in the 14.1 issue of The Journal of ERW and Mine Action made some observations about the completion status of the Falkland 
Islands Demining Program.2 This article aims to ar-
ticulate the program’s objectives, the problems encoun-
tered and methodologies used, and to draw on some of 
the key lessons learned from the experience.
Objectives
The program’s objectives were twofold: to conduct a 
pilot clearance program to meet the requirements of Ar-
ticle 5 obligations and to inform future projects about 
clearance challenges. For this reason, the U.K. govern-
ment selected four suspected hazardous areas in close 
consultation with the Falkland Islands government, 
which would provide different types of terrain and dif-
ferent mine and unexploded-ordnance threats—two 
SHAs near Stanley were known minefields (Surf Bay and 
Sapper Hill), and accurate minefield documents were 
held for them, while the ones in Goose Green and Fox 
Bay East had a less well-defined threat. The U.K. gov-
ernment set standards in excess of International Mine 
Action Standards by demanding a 200-millimeter (7.87 
inches) contract depth for the clearance of mine pan-
els. In addition, mines affected by the formation of sand 
dunes required excavation 300 millimeters (11.81 inch-
es) below the 1982 profile. These increased standards 
were designed to address concerns within the island 
community about the ability of a mine-clearance pro-
gram to remove all of the explosive hazards.
The Threat
The Joint U.K.-Argentine Feasibility Study3 identi-
fied the different types of landmines encountered on 
the islands. The majority of minefields contain plas-
tic, minimum-metal mines, which present a challenge 
for conventional metal-detection technologies due to 
the exceptionally small quantities of metal within the 
mines. Some of the SHAs had been subjected to BL 755 
cluster-munitions strikes, but because of their high 
metallic content, these did not present the same level of 
technical challenge to detect.
Clearance Methodologies Used
Modern metal-detection equipment struggled to de-
tect the minimum-metal mines to the contract depth. 
Therefore, the demining contractor BACTEC Interna-
tional Ltd. used layered and full excavation techniques, 
depending on the expected mine threat, to meet the 
contract’s requirements. The mines had been laid in a 
very formal pattern using cord and markers at inter-
vals, and the documents recording the two minefields 
near Stanley soon proved to be credible records of the 
mine pattern.4 Therefore, once rows were encountered, 
the mine patterns could be followed and fully exploit-
ed using excavation techniques. This is a slow and de-
manding method of clearance in normal circumstances, 
but additional external factors exacerbated the situation 
further. During austral summer 2009–10, the Island re-
corded the worst weather patterns on record, with con-
ditions including cold high winds, rain, sleet and snow. 
Additionally, much of the contaminated ground con-
sisted of thick, fibrous peat and heavy vegetation, which 
was difficult to cut. This challenged the deminers5 to 
draw on exceptional levels of patience, skill, good hu-
mor, and sheer grit and determination. 
The Surf Bay Minefield was the most challenging 
task. The dense, mixed minefield contained more than 
1,000 mines (SB33 & SB81) within a relatively small area 
of 3.34 hectares (8.25 acres), and the terrain also varied 
Falkland Islands Demining Pilot  
    Project: Completion of Phase 1
by Robin Swanson [ Biron Associates Ltd. ]
The United Kingdom has started to remove anti-personnel mines from the Falkland/Malvinas 
Islands1 in order to meet its obligations under Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention. A pilot phase 
was completed in June 2010 to clear four suspected hazardous areas—a critical first step to 
inform future projects following the conclusion of the Joint U.K.-Argentine Feasibility Study. 
within it. The local airport road bi-
sected the minefield with deep peat 
to the west and gradually thinner 
peat and sandier terrain toward the 
beach on the east. Six mixed mine 
panels6 straddled a previous track in 
sandy soil in the minefield’s north-
east part where sand accumula-
tion demanded manual excavation 
of 400 millimeters (15.74 inches). 
Two further panels, consisting of 16 
anti-vehicle mines each, had been 
covered by large sand dunes since 
1982. Conflict-aerial photography 
revealed that the mines had been 
laid at the current beach level, which 
was marked by a cobbled layer of 
stone, but the sand dunes were be-
tween two and five meters (7–16 feet) 
above that level. After initially iden-
tifying the start of the first panel us-
ing manual excavation techniques, it 
then became a mechanical clearance 
task routinely operating in four to 
five meters (13–16 feet) of sand. 
Finding mines at these depths re-
quired systematic search procedures. 
One early lesson learned was that a 
detailed, centimeter-accurate survey, 
used to establish exactly what had 
been excavated and where the mines 
were located, was absolutely essen-
tial to ensure efficient use of time 
and resources. Fortunately, the Pub-
lic Works Department on the Islands 
had access to Real Time Kinematic 
Survey7 and its survey team support-
ed the minefield mapping process 
very effectively. 
Where the threat was less well-
defined at Goose Green and Fox Bay, 
traditional non-technical and tech-
nical survey procedures were ad-
opted. Much information still exists 
within the Falkland Islands local 
and military community and among 
military veterans concerning the 
events that took place during and 
immediately after the 1982 conflict. 
Fortunately for this pilot project, 
quality information was available. 
This may not be the case for many 
other areas where the minefield doc-
uments and records do not exist, 
and as time goes on, memories will 
fade, and key witnesses will be hard-
er to track and interview. 
The Environment
Concerns about the project’s en-
vironmental impact were raised be-
fore it began and were a particular 
issue for the Falkland Islands gov-
ernment. The Planning Permission 
and consent provided by the FI gov-
ernment required submission of an 
acceptable ground remediation plan 
with each SHA Clearance Plan and 
that steps were taken to educate the 
deminers in the identification of 
rare plant species expected in the 
area. The Clearance Plans divided 
the cleared areas into three parts:
1. One area is left to recover natu-
rally.
2. One area has the cut vegetation 
replaced so seeds from the cut-
tings can drop and germinate.
fully excavating the access lanes on sapper hill before the first P4Bs were encountered.
Photo courtesy of Guy Marot, DPo technical aDviser
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3. One area is left for a different 
approach to be specified using 
natural and introduced meth-
ods. A broad plan was devel-
oped to satisfy these planning 
conditions. 
Perfectly rebuilding the sand 
dunes was never an aspiration, but 
in close cooperation with the Envi-
ronmental Planning Department, 
BACTEC replaced the sand to the 
best of their abilities, stabilizing the 
dunes’ bases where possible using 
geo-textiles and aggregate bags. The 
area was left deliberately unsmooth 
in order to provide relief for natural 
forces to work on and to catch drift-
ing seeds for germination purposes. 
Monitoring will take place over 
the next two years to establish the 
most effective approach for future 
programs; not only does it need to 
be environmentally acceptable, it 
needs to be a practical, relatively 
simple and cost-effective procedure. 
These additional planning require-
ments are not always associated with 
mine-action programs and provided 
different challenges which required 
close liaison with local environmen-
tal bodies.
Although the tender document 
had been written to discourage the 
use of specialist mechanical sys-
tems, at the end of the process, the 
final result was visually not dissimi-
lar to what might have resulted from 
a mechanical approach without the 
advantages of immediate re-germi-
nation when earth is processed and 
seeds are reintroduced immediate-
ly. As a result of the pilot program, 
these alternative approaches may be 
considered during follow-up phases.
Results
The following table represents the 
areas actually cleared (including ad-
ditional battle-area clearance tasks 
associated with the four SHAs) and 
records the mines and UXO locat-
ed between 3 December 2009 and 4 
June 2010:
In order to place this into con-
text, it is useful to note that Argen-
tina10 declared to the United Nations 
that it brought 25,000 landmines to the Falkland Is-
lands at the start of the conflict (20,000 anti-personnel 
and 5,000 anti-vehicle mines) and that some 5,000 have 
been accounted for since the conflict ended. This means 
that approximately 20,000 landmines remained in the 
ground prior to Phase 1 clearance and that this pro-
gram cleared more than 6 percent of the remaining 
mine contamination. 
Confidence Building
An important part of any demining program is in-
stilling confidence within the local community. On 
arrival, the Demining Programme Office11 needed to 
reassure the community that all the mines could be re-
moved from the areas selected, and to address a wide-
ly-held community view that the money could be better 
spent removing mines in other parts of the world. While 
this may be an honorable stance, the United Kingdom 
has an international obligation to clear the landmines in 
the Falkland Islands; therefore, the money for the Phase 1 
program was allocated separately from the donations the 
United Kingdom provided for other international mine-
action projects.   
The Falkland Islands government was also concerned 
about the risk of injury to deminers when local demand 
to clear the minefields was nonexistent, no civilian inju-
ries were sustained, and the minefields posed no human-
armored excavator searching for the sB81 mines at the 1982 profile within the surf Bay sand Dunes.
Photo courtesy of the author
the sand was replaced in a manner to provide relief for natural forces to operate.
Photo courtesy of JosePhine sWanson
SHA AP Mines AV Mines UXO Area Cleared
Surf Bay SA-008 488 SB33 568 SB81 1 M67 Grenade + 7.62mm ammo 3.34 Ha
Surf Bay BAC
(Canache Wet Area) - -
4 M67 Grenades 
+ 7.62 ammo 3.44 Ha
Sapper Hil SA-025 190 P4B - - 0.77 Ha
Sapper Hill BAC8 
(BL755 Strike Area) - - - 6.29 Ha
Goose Green GG-011 - - - 2.41 Ha
Fox Bay FB-008W - - - 2.3 Ha
Fox Bay BAC (Head-
land Area) - - - 1.99 Ha
9
Total 678 568 8 UXO + 7.62mm ammo 20.54 Ha
summary of areas cleared.
itarian, social or economic impact to the community. 
Fortunately, no one sustained injuries during the pro-
gram, which can be attributed to good procedures, cor-
rect protective equipment and a strong ethos for safety 
adopted by BACTEC and the DPO.
The FI government and the local community were 
also influenced by certain historical myths that had per-
petuated over time, adding to the belief that full clear-
ance was impossible. One of these myths was that mines 
move in peat and would not be found. Most surface lay-
ers of peat (0–300 millimeters, or 0–11.81 inches) contain 
fibrous peat, or at least semi-fibrous peat, in the topsoil’s 
lower parts, with a structure displaying horizontal lami-
nations reflecting the gradual accumulation of little-de-
composed plant debris. The large surface area and light 
weight of the mine would make it highly unlikely to shift 
within the peat and, indeed, the Phase 1 clearance pro-
gram found no evidence of this. Taking Sapper Hill as 
an example of a typical peat minefield, no P4B mine was 
found deeper than 120 millimeters (4.72 inches), and 97 
percent were at less than 80 millimeters (3.14 inches) or 
were located on the surface. The program did conclude, 
not surprisingly, that light, plastic anti-personnel mines 
can be moved by wind, water or by ground slippage, 
particularly when the topography, such as downhill 
gradients, was also a factor. Most mines were discov-
ered at their predicted location within the documented 
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pattern, but natural forces had moved a very small mi-
nority. What is particularly interesting is that the condi-
tion of the majority of the mines was very good despite 
resting in acidic soil and damp conditions for 28 years, 
and we assess that most would certainly have functioned 
given the right pressure.
The FI government, concerned about its residual li-
ability in the event of any future incident within the 
cleared areas, considered a number of proposals to keep 
the fences and some form of warning signs in place af-
ter clearance. The DPO made many announcements 
through the media to keep the community fully in-
formed of the clearance process, encouraged visits to the 
minefields and held briefings to explain the detail and 
quality procedures associated with the clearance pro-
gram. In addition, a public confidence demonstration 
was run after the completion of each task site. Following 
the last demonstration at Surf Bay, spectators swarmed 
onto the cleared area with their children confirming 
their confidence in the clearance process.
the manually excavated area at sapper hill. (yellow pickets indi-
cate where P4B mines were found.)
Photo courtesy of the author
Robin Swanson, MBE, Director of Biron Associ-
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in the U.K. Ministry of Defence as a senior policy 
maker in International Humanitarian Law, specifi-
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conventional munitions, unexploded ordnance and 
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Argentine Feasibility Study to demine the Islands.
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Strengthening the Demining   
 Sector Response to HIV/AIDS  
  in Sub-Saharan Africa 
by Dr. Martin Chitsama [ Demining HIV/AIDS Service Foundation ]
In this article, the author explores how HIV/AIDS affects deminers in the African areas 
where the disease is most prevalent. He considers how deminers’ lifestyles make them 
especially susceptible to HIV/AIDS and suggests mobile HIV/AIDS programs can effec-
tively combat this growing threat.
Demining began in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, incidental-
ly commencing just a decade after 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic started 
calling on the human race.1 Ac-
cording to the 2007 and 2009 Land-
mine Monitor Report and national 
mine-action centers in Africa, at 
least 50 national and international 
demining organizations currently 
conduct landmine-clearance opera-
tions in Sub-Saharan Africa, collec-
tively employing more than 10,000 
deminers.2 Angola's National Dem-
ining Institute alone has a contin-
gent of 4,000 deminers organized 
into 18 brigades that are demining 
across the heavily mined southern 
African country.2
Considering that all the African 
States Parties to the Ottawa Conven-
tion are lagging behind their targets 
under Article 5 and are continually 
calling for extensions, deminers in 
Africa are set to clear landmines on 
the continent for many more years. 
As reported in 2009 by the Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV/
AIDS (UNAIDS), the region is also 
"more heavily affected by HIV and 
AIDS than any other region of the 
world.” All in all, “an estimated 22.4 
million people are living with HIV 
in the region—around two thirds of 
the global total.”3 As a result, large 
numbers of deminers in Africa are 
at a significant risk of contracting 
HIV/AIDS for many reasons, in-
cluding worker mobility and ex-
tended separation from spouses.
For a deminer, the work-leave cy-
cle provides for limited family time 
in a year. There is so much to catch 
up on when families reunite af-
ter long separation periods that the 
Demining crews always have medical teams onsite. Medics 
could be trained to run workplace hiv/aiDs advocacy programs.
all Photos courtesy of JosePh Kilino, MDD hanDler, vDs anGola
question of checking on a spouse's 
HIV status is hardly a priority. 
The demining-site remoteness 
means that deminers are cut off 
from mainstream public-health 
campaigns, including HIV/AIDS 
programs. Health workers fear trav-
eling to suspected-mined regions in 
Africa, which also leaves deminers 
isolated in terms of outreach pro-
grams. Furthermore, deminers are 
usually 20 to 49 years old, sexual-
ly active and tend to have capital to 
spend while interacting with war-
surface-laid P4B with lot numbers easily visible and rubber seals 
intact.
Photo courtesy of Guy Marot
By the end of the program, all mine signs 
were removed from the cleared sites, but the 
fences remained around the former minefields 
at Surf Bay and Sapper Hill. The fences re-
mained in place not to mark the areas as unsafe, 
but to prevent unnecessary damage during the 
environmental remediation period and to allow 
proper monitoring of the regeneration process. 
Conclusion
One key conclusion from this program in-
dicates that further research and development 
is necessary to improve the ability of manual-
ly detecting minimum-metal mines at greater 
depths. The program encountered many phys-
ical and philosophical challenges; however, it 
was an enormous success. This pilot phase will 
undoubtedly inform future projects about the 
technical, environmental and logistical chal-
lenges associated with clearance in the Falk-
land Islands, and will provide more accurate 
planning data for follow-on phases.
   see endnotes page
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torn communities whose sexually active youths often 
engage in commercial sex due to limited economic op-
tions.
To compound the situation, most demining opera-
tors in Sub-Saharan Africa only have informal HIV/
AIDS policies, and financial and human resource con-
straints hamper the transformation of these policies into 
workplace programs. The inherent risk associated with 
demining further puts deminers at risk of occupational 
exposure to HIV transmission when a landmine casu-
alty occurs. All personnel on the demining site are in-
volved if an incident occurs and occupational exposure 
is probable during the handling of the injured party. Ad-
ditionally, antiretroviral post-exposure prophylaxis4 is 
largely absent in the demining industry. 
Deminers and HIV/AIDS
In May 2002, the Interagency Coalition on AIDS and 
Development made observations regarding the relation-
ship between deminers and HIV/AIDS risk and recom-
mended that intervention programs be implemented for 
the sector. The Accelerated Demining Programme in 
Mozambique claims that while it has lost only one de-
miner to a mine accident, it has lost 10 to HIV/AIDS.5
The labor laws in some countries, such as Mozam-
bique, demonstrate the difficulties that demining 
companies face regarding HIV tests and can result in 
demining operators facing legal problems. For instance, 
in 2005, Mozambican Labour Minister Helena Taipo 
rejected an appeal by the U.S.-based demining compa-
ny RONCO Consulting Corporation against a fine im-
posed for violating Mozambique's ban on compulsory 
HIV tests. In June 2005, the Labour Ministry discovered 
that when selecting Mozambican sappers to go on a de-
mining mission to Afghanistan, RONCO required them 
to take HIV tests. Similarly, ArmorGroup was fined in 
Mozambique for allegedly hiring deminers destined for 
Cyprus on the basis of HIV results. In addition, Zimba-
bwe’s Southern Africa Demining Services Agency had to 
compensate deminers loaned to BACTEC International 
for South Lebanon operations in 2002 when the demin-
ers were denied deployment on the basis of HIV tests.
The Solution 
The World Health Organization, UNAIDS and the 
United Nations Population Fund recommend the im-
plementation of mobile HIV/AIDS services targeting 
hard-to-reach populations, including deminers. The 
mobile-service efficacy for hard-to-reach populations 
has been demonstrated by the Uganda Program for Hu-
man and Holistic Development, the success of voluntary 
counseling and testing in the United States Agency for 
International Development's outreach services in Ethio-
pia, New Start Centres in Zimbabwe, and through the 
Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome’s re-
port on increased voluntary counseling and testing 
uptake in mobile clinics as compared to "stand alone" 
clinics in Nairobi, Kenya. Similarly, the Tanzanian Mili-
tary reports success stories for its four mobile HIV clin-
ics established with the U. S. Military HIV Research 
Program in 25 camps along Tanzania’s Lake Zone.6
Feasibility and Benefits of Mobile HIV/AIDS  
Programs for Deminers
Having worked with thousands of deminers as a 
medical doctor from 1998 to the present, I have inter-
Demining control Points could carry hiv/aiDs-advocacy banners, reaching out to millions of people using roads being cleared of land-
mines in africa.
acted with deminers in Luena and Menongue (Angola); 
Shilalo (Eritrea); Mukumbura (Mozambique); Garowe 
and Hargeisa (Somalia); Ed Damazin, Juba and Rum-
bek (Sudan); and the Gonarezhou National Park and the 
Zambezi Basin (Zimbabwe). I recommend implement-
ing mobile HIV/AIDS programs for deminers for the 
following reasons:
• Deminers have easy access to medics at their work-
sites, which would allow the medics to be trained 
and become part of the HIV/AIDS healthcare team.
• Demining operators will benefit from getting test-
ed: Negative HIV deminers will want to preserve 
their statuses, and positive deminers will be anxious 
to enter into antiretroviral treatment programs.
• Circumcision is of particular interest, and if pre-
sented properly, this practice will benefit deminers 
and their spouses significantly. Circumcision ben-
efits are well-documented, and instituting Kenya’s 
Raila Odinga-inspired male circumcision program7 
to the demining setting would immensely benefit 
deminers.8
• All Sub-Saharan African states have national and 
regional HIV/AIDS policies, but these policies are 
sometimes contradictory. Forming national/region-
al protocols for hiring and managing deminers is 
practical.
• The United Nations International Mine Action 
Standards IMAS 10.409 already provides for the 
updating of HIV lists during demining operations 
making it easy for the United Nations to contact de-
miners and provide comprehensive HIV/AIDS pro-
grams for them.
Call for Mobile HIV/AIDS Services for Deminers 
Motivated by the success stories of mobile HIV/AIDS 
services programs targeting hard-to-reach groups and 
the feasibility of an HIV/AIDS program for deminers, a 
group comprised of demining experts and medical doc-
tors who had worked in demining for the past decade 
formed an initiative called The Demining HIV/AIDS 
Service Foundation in 2009. The Foundation, a nonprof-
it trust based in South Africa, was specifically created to 
mitigate the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca’s demining sector.
The Foundation is calling the mine-action commu-
nity to partner with it in building up and implementing 
the following programs for deminers and landmine- 
impacted communities in Sub-Saharan Africa:
• An HIV/AIDS risk-assessment profile for deminers 
• An HIV/AIDS educational program for deminers 
and program managers
• Mobile Voluntary HIV/AIDS counseling and test-
ing programs for deminers
• Delivery of mobile male circumcision services for 
deminers in Sub-Saharan Africa
• Delivery of antiretroviral treatment and care for de-
miners in Sub-Saharan Africa 
    see endnotes page 82
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The Growing Threat to 
   Humanitarian Operations 
by Adrian King [ HMS, Ltd. ]
Deminers and other humanitarian-aid workers around the world, though previously 
viewed as off-limits, have become targets of distrust and even violence by certain 
groups. This article explores the reasons for this shift in ideology, and what action hu-
manitarian organizations must take in order to protect their personnel. 
The days of showing respect to civilian humanitar-ian-aid personnel and organizations in the field are long gone, so that even the once sacrosanct 
International Committee of the Red Cross is no lon-
ger safe from attack. In recent times, increased rhetoric 
against the United Nations and humanitarian-aid agen-
cies, mainly from jihadist groups (such as those in the 
call-out box below), has led to a long overdue appraisal 
of the vulnerability of aid workers and U.N. peacekeep-
ing personnel as the global security situation deterio-
rates and risk of violent attack increases. 
The Developing Mindset 
Since the rise in international terrorism, providing 
aid has become more of a high-risk occupation than ever 
before. Military operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have fueled the ill-informed and biased speculation of the 
jihadists and stirred suspicion of Western motives in these 
and other regions, with aid workers often seen as agents 
of military powers. Both the United Nations and aid or-
ganizations are now viewed in some areas of the world as 
being part of a Western agenda, led by the United States 
and its allies, to suppress Islam, spread Christianity in 
the Muslim world, and support an invasion and occupa-
tion strategy directed toward Muslim countries. These 
views can be seen in the Afghan Talibans' monthly mag-
azine, Al Samood.
One only has to look at the grim record of attacks 
against personnel working for U.N. agencies and oth-
er humanitarian-aid organizations to appreciate the 
fragile and, at times, near non-existent nature of secu-
rity measures taken in the field. Humanitarian organi-
zations and personnel must understand that deprived 
populations’ access to aid must be balanced against un-
derlying security threats where, as a consequence, the 
susceptibility and accessibility of aid personnel and 
their local employees is increased, and the risk of vio-
lent compromise in certain locations is ever more likely.
Valuable Human Assets 
Personnel engaged in humanitarian work are ded-
icated to the work they do and the people they serve. 
Thoroughly commited to their vocation, these aid work-
“The UN is also standing with the enemy against Muslims
 what about the standing Muslim matters like Palestine, 
Chechnya, Cyprus ... and other Muslim matters, all these are  
evidence of the oppression of the UN against Muslim countries ...”
Al Somood, the struggle1 ( jihadist propaganda)
ers venture into areas and situations considered by most 
to have an unacceptable risk of attack or at least con-
frontation with hostile groups. These groups, for one 
reason or another, do not appreciate or support the aid 
work carried out, and because of their beliefs, view hu-
manitarian-aid workers and those who support them as 
viable targets for aggression.
In the demining world, work is often conducted in 
countries where the underlying security situation is un-
stable or where low-level conflict is in progress. How-
ever, exceptions exist. In Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia 
for example, mine-action activities continue effective-
ly despite widespread and ongoing violence, where no 
peaceful resolution is in sight and the situation may es-
calate at any time. In the case of Afghanistan, NATO 
maintains that its in-country presence is for the pur-
poses of stabilization and infrastructure development. 
Unfortunately, this gives the impression that the “war” 
has been won when it is apparent that ever more vio-
lence occurs daily in communities and organizations 
throughout the country.
Sanctioning the deployment of U.N.-armed military 
personnel to a country or region in crisis not only shows 
that violence is expected, but that weapons used for pro-
tection are essential to the success of legally mandated 
work in agreement between national governance and the 
United Nations. The question then has to be asked, in 
view of this decision to deploy an armed force, on what 
basis do nongovernmental organizations and private 
and commercial companies deploy their personnel to 
such areas, where the risk of attack is high and the lev-
el of protection offered is generally not commensurate 
with the threats that may be encountered?
As previously alluded to, many individuals are 
“called” to intercede on behalf of the victims of crisis 
through their vocation and belief, but what is their level 
of responsibility, both to themselves and to those who 
will support them in-country and be formally engaged 
by them in the conduct of their mission? And perhaps 
more importantly, what is the responsibility of the orga-
nizations that employ humanitarian workers? 
The posed questions are not meant to undermine 
an individual’s integrity or an organization’s justifica-
tion for carrying out humanitarian work, but to provoke 
discussion on the criteria used to guide risk assessment. 
This assessment should be conducted with the expatriate 
professionals and the local nationals involved at varying 
levels, from humble driver to mission manager. 
u.s. army soldiers assigned to the 203rd combat engineer Battalion of the Missouri army national Guard use a tracked excavator to re-
move tons of rubble and debris as rescue workers search for victims at the united nations office of the humanitarian coordinator build-
ing in Baghdad, iraq, after a truck bomb destroyed much of the building on 19 august 2003.
Photo courtesy of Master serGeant JaMes M. BoWMan, usaf
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Process and Procedure 
The Geneva Conventions of 19492 are the legal ba-
sis for categorizing humanitarian work; they guaran-
tee protection for humanitarian workers provided that 
they are not party to the conflict. The Conventions do 
not, however, give right of access to conflict areas; and 
although combatant attacks  on humanitarian personnel 
are prohibited, providing escorts is not a requirement, in-
cluding where other factions may pose a threat to safety. 
This article does not provide an analysis of all attacks 
on U.N. or other aid personnel, but in analyzing dem-
ining specifically, it is possible to draw a loose analogy 
from the evidence gathered through attacks and, in some 
cases, predict a continuance of the trend in some coun-
tries and regions. Since 2003, more than 50 mine-action 
personnel have died from non-mine related injuries, the 
majority in Afghanistan.3 The evidence shows that, in 
most cases, attacks are targeted directly at the demining 
workers and not randomly, as some believe. In the ma-
jority of the incidents, the attacks were carried out using 
small arms and improvised explosive devices, the latter 
of which are a well-known threat in Afghanistan and a 
growing threat globally, and which allow precise target-
ing without exposure to retaliation or identification of 
the perpetrator(s) at the incident scene.
Deminers as Targets
Mine action is an activity built on military breach-
ing and explosive ordnance disposal skills to remove 
area explosive hazards, thus allowing repatriation of 
displaced persons and communities following the con-
flict and enabling infrastructure renewal and a return to 
normal life activity. For the majority, mine action would 
be seen as an essential and normal part of a country’s 
post-conflict recovery process, and many would perhaps 
struggle to understand why people would oppose such 
action taking place. The reality is not so simple, howev-
er, and in assessing the chronological data of attacks on 
demining personnel, one has to surmise that a political 
motive is often the basis for the incident. In Afghanistan, 
the Taliban see the United Nations and other aid organi-
zations as collaborators with NATO’s International Sta-
bilization Force and corruptors of the Muslim religion, 
views echoed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
For these reasons, attacks on the United Nations 
and humanitarian-aid workers, including demining 
personnel, are justified in the perpetrators’ minds, but 
aid workers’ links with sponsors and other organiza-
tions may further strengthen motives, as in the case of 
the lethal attack on deminers in Kandahar province on 
11 April 2010, where the Office of Weapons Removal 
and Abatement in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) sponsored the 
victims’ demining activity. This extra “link” (i.e., the 
sponsorship) may provide an additional motive for an 
attacker to target one aid group over another and should 
possibly be part of the risk-assessment process.
Another possible motive for attacking deminers in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere is because mine action re-
moves resources from the Taliban’s arsenal. Their use of 
explosive remnants of war as main charges in their IEDs, 
or even as a viable ammunition source, is well known. 
“The UN is a tool of American global politics, duping people by 
claiming that it is a neutral international organization, where it is in 
fact a criminal American institution; the presidential election in Ka-
bul is evidence enough of this. This organization has not been 
established to support and help people, and since it was es-
tablished, it has taken part and contributed to war crimes ...
In the same way the invader forces will be forced to leave  
Afghanistan; this institution called the UN must leave for good ...”
~ Al Somood. the struggle”1 ( jihadist propaganda)
This was recognized in Iraq during 
the height of the insurgency, where 
foreign contractors were deliber-
ately used to remove explosive ord-
nance from stockpiles and former 
battle positions in an attempt to in-
terrupt the chain of activities that led 
to building IEDs to attack Coalition 
troops.
Protecting Deminers
As employers, humanitarian de-
mining organizations have a duty of 
care and responsibility toward their 
personnel. Top-level personnel must 
thoroughly investigate the risk of at-
tack and assess and mitigate against 
apparent threats in the country and 
region of the proposed work activity. 
At the lower levels, the duty extends, 
through managers and team leaders, 
to enacting and maintaining the se-
curity plan and providing local op-
erating procedures and resources in 
managing the risks described. 
The threshold for conducting or 
suspending mine-action operations 
due to security concerns is usually 
a responsibility of the mine-action 
coordination center, if present in-
country, normally on advice from 
a number of internal and external 
agencies. Yet is this enough? Is it 
sufficient, and is it justifiable in high 
threat-level locations such as Af-
ghanistan and Somalia? Surely with 
the growing threat levels, aid orga-
nizations in general should take a 
more responsible stance in provid-
ing levels of security. If it is known 
that attacks are likely and that re-
prisals may also be visited on local 
workers as a result of mine  action 
or any other humanitarian activity, 
the decision to deploy at all should 
be questioned.
The United Nations, which over-
sees demining and other contracts, 
should perhaps also play its part by 
ensuring organizations and individu-
als are aware of the inherent risks of 
working in a particular country or 
region and that they are taking the 
proper security precautions. Person-
nel validation should begin prior to 
arrival in the country and should in-
clude checks to make certain that em-
ployees are sufficiently briefed and 
trained on safety issues, and pro-
vided with the resources, including 
procedures and equipment, to safe-
ly conduct their work. However, this 
should only happen after an organi-
zation understands the risks involved 
and has determined whether it is pru-
dent to allow the commencement or 
sustainment of humanitarian demin-
ing activity in a specific area. 
 see endnotes page 82
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In Remembrance: 
Stephen “Darby” Allan  
Stephen “Darby” Allan, a Technical Field Manager with Mines Adviso-
ry Group, died on 15 October 2010, fol-
lowing an explosion in which he was 
critically injured. The explosion took 
place around noon as Darby was do-
ing mine-clearance work at a site near 
Kapoeta, in Southern Sudan. He died 
a few hours later. Darby is survived by 
his wife, Karen, and his children, Sarah 
and David. 
A British national from Portsmouth, 
Darby Allan began his mine-action ca-
reer doing underwater and shoreline 
mine clearance as a diver in the Royal 
Navy. In 2002, he began working as an 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist 
and Trainer at the Defence EOD School 
on Horsea Island. A year later he was 
promoted to Chief Instructor for the 
Royal Navy Clearance Diving Officers, 
a position he held until he joined MAG 
in 2006.
Darby worked as a Technical Field 
Manager for MAG for nearly four 
years, moving from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo to Lebanon and 
finally to Sudan in September 2009. 
MAG estimates that the land Darby 
helped clear around Kapoeta, will ben-
efit more than 7,000 people in the area 
who are now able to grow crops, build 
schools and raise telephone masts. The 
town’s market, a vital source of trade 
for the region, has also been built on 
land cleared by MAG teams.
During a celebration of Darby’s life, 
Lou McGrath, OBE, MAG’s Chief Ex-
ecutive, said, “He took pride in reduc-
ing the risks communities faced …. [He] 
did not have to be in Sudan; he chose 
to be. He was a true humanitarian who 
believed in making a difference, and 
the world will be a lesser place without 
him.”
Darby Allan’s family, friends and 
coworkers paid tribute to his life and 
work as well. Lieutenant Command-
er Mick Beale, who knew Darby from 
their time together at Horsea Island, 
praised him as “a hugely experienced 
diver” and “an inspiration and a true 
legend in the diving branch. He was a 
big man with a big heart who could al-
ways be relied on to get the job done 
with no fuss,” he said. Andy Glesson, 
Darby allan in a MaG vehicle with his son David during the MaG project they worked togeth-
er on in the Democratic republic of congo in 2008.
Photo courtesy of the allan faMily
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research and Development section sponsored by
a member of MAG’s technical staff 
who worked closely with Darby in 
Lebanon, called him “a great team 
member with a dry humor [and] a 
dependable, affable technician who 
managed several clearance teams 
with skill and determination.” Fi-
nally, Darby’s wife Karen said, “He 
was a gritty, humorous man who 
commanded friendship and respect 
from colleagues and friends, a per-
son who was not just larger than life 
but was, in fact, life. We are proud 
to say we were part of that life and it 
was a great, great adventure. Thank 
you for the adventure.” 
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Method
Subjects. Six male non-neutered dogs, aged between 6½ and 7½ 
years, with several years of previous REST training participated. Five 
were Labrador Retrievers (Retzina, Stavros, Tan, Zante and Zulu) and 
one was a Springer Spaniel (Rusty). Each dog was assigned an experi-
enced Angolan dog handler. The dogs were exercised six days a week by 
walking and swimming, housed in individual kennels, given free access 
to water, fed a high-quality dry dog food in sufficient quantities to main-
tain a healthy weight, and were not food-deprived.
Apparatus. Filters were placed on a carousel apparatus (Figure 1). The 
carousel was a large stainless-steel wheel, mounted horizontally to the 
floor, which could be rotated. Filters were mounted horizontally at the 
ends of 12 arms that were removable for cleaning. The rooms’ walls were 
concrete block, and tiled floors minimized odor contamination. A stain-
less-steel screen inside the rooms shielded a supervisor from the search-
ing dog. All other personnel (the dog handler and documenter) watched 
activities from adjacent rooms through internal one-way glass windows.
The filters were a PVC core wrapped in mosquito netting and housed 
inside a PVC tube (known as the “Mechem” filter, named for the manu-
facturer). 
Procedure Sampling. Unused filters were contaminated with air to 
produce positive filters (filters believed to contain the odor from one or 
more landmines) and negative filters (filters believed to be free of explo-
Remote Explosive Scent Tracing—or Odor Capture—is a detection process 
in which odor is captured on an absorbent fil-
ter and analyzed by a detector, such as a dog 
or rat.1,2 The detector works in a safe and con-
trolled environment and is capable of search-
ing large areas of ground in a short period. 
Odor capture has a wide range of potential ap-
plications (for example, the detection of oil-
pipeline leaks and the detection of cancer or 
tuberculosis), but with respect to explosive 
detection, REST’s main value is eliminating 
road sections that do not contain explosive 
ordnance, allowing clearance to proceed more 
rapidly than is possible using most standard 
detection technologies. 
REST will only be used if it can deliver 
consistently-high detection reliability for fil-
ters containing explosive odor (hits on “pos-
itive” filters). However, as a key use of REST 
is for uncontaminated land release, REST 
must also deliver reliable decisions on filters 
not containing explosive odor (correct rejec-
tion of “negative” filters). A filter analysis pro-
duces four possible outcomes (See Table 1), of 
which two are undesirable—“miss” and “false 
alarm.” A miss means that explosive ordnance 
is undetected, presenting a danger to future 
land users. A false alarm means unneces-
sary additional work for the mine-clearance 
program. Low reliability on either of these 
outcomes reduces confidence in REST as a de-
tection technology.  
The typical procedure is summarized as 
follows. A team uses a suction pump to vacu-
um the air over a road section, typically 100 or 
200 meters (109 or 218 yards) long and about 
5 meters (5 yards) wide. The air is sucked 
through a filter, and careful records are kept of 
the road section that each filter represents. The 
filters are transferred to a laboratory where 
they are presented to trained detectors (usual-
ly dogs or rats) using a standard methodology, 
such as on the arms of a carousel (Figure 1) or 
in a line of stands (Figure 2).
The dogs are trained using filters made 
from controlled odor sources (“benchmark 
filters”). For training mine detection, most 
REST agencies plant test minefields, noting 
each mine’s location, type and depth. Filters 
can then be made in areas that should be con-
taminated with explosive odor from a known 
source, and areas treated as free of explosive 
odor. With a variety of odor sources used, it 
is assumed that background odor is consis-
tently variable across filters, and the detectors 
must therefore use the explosive odor’s pres-
ence or absence as the determining variable 
in their analysis. A key benefit of REST anal-
ysis over field-based animal-detection systems 
is that benchmark filters can be mixed in with 
operational filters, allowing the continuous 
monitoring of each detector’s reliability during 
operational analysis. 
All REST agencies use a training system in 
which hits on positive benchmark filters are 
reinforced, typically using a toy or food. Cor-
rect rejections of negative filters are not rein-
forced because they do not provide a discrete 
behavioral unit (the detector moves past the 
figure 1: Dog searching filters in a carousel-style presentation system.
figure 2: Dog indicating a filter in the line-stand presentation system.
negative filter without being rewarded for its 
correct “response”). This training methodolo-
gy potentially introduces response bias, most 
likely as a tendency to give an indication re-
sponse on a negative filter (a false alarm). Thus, 
the training procedure itself may be a source of 
false alarms, limiting the agency’s ability to at-
tain the objective of minimizing false alarms 
while maintaining a reliably high hit rate. 
Signal-detection theory3 gives the issues 
and principles discussed above detailed tech-
nical analysis, and we use that theory’s lan-
guage in this paper. With respect to REST’S 
two objectives of maintaining high hit and low 
false-alarm rates, the theory distinguishes two 
processes affecting accuracy:
• Sensitivity: The dog’s ability to discrimi-
nate between positive and negative filters 
can be improved in a variety of ways, in-
cluding increasing the overall reinforce-
ment rate for correct responses.4
• Response bias: If the training or opera-
tional experiences have asymmetries (such 
as only rewarding responses to positive 
filters during training or more abundant 
negative filters than positive filters, which 
is expected for operational filters), then re-
sponse asymmetries are also expected.5,6 
Under signal-detection theory, all filters 
contain a background odor (noise). 
Positive filters should carry an additional 
odor from the explosive ordnance (signal-plus-
noise).3,7 A filter’s signal strength can be placed 
somewhere in the area under two normally dis-
tributed Gaussian functions plotting signal in-
tensity as a function of that odor’s probability 
of being present (Figure 3 on page 66). Signal 
availability to the left of line “C” will result in 
an “ignore” response (filter is negative), where-
as signal availability to the right of C will result 
in an “indication” response (filter is positive). 
Sensitivity (d’) is determined by the separation 
between the peaks. Greater separation should 
result in greater accuracy because positive fil-
ters are less easily confused with negative.
Signal-detection theory assumes that each animal responds accord-
ing to a response criterion (the vertical line C in Figure 3 on page 66). An 
animal’s responses can become biased toward one response type if more 
reinforcement is made available for one response type over another or if 
unequal numbers of positive and negative filters are presented.6
Signal-detection theory makes the following predictions:8
• If the sensitivity of the detector (d ’) varies and the response criterion 
(C) remains constant, hit rate and false-alarm rate should be nega-
tively correlated; i.e., as the functions move apart, hit rate will in-
crease, and false-alarm rate will decrease. 
• If the response criterion (C) varies, hit rate should be positively cor-
related with false-alarm rate. For example, if a detector is biased to-
ward indicating, it will hit more positive filters, but will also indicate 
more negative filters, creating a high false-alarm rate. 
• A strong correlation between hit and false-alarm rate would be a use-
ful finding for REST. 
• If hit and false-alarm rates were positively correlated, the relation-
ship between them could be optimized by manipulating reinforce-
ment bias, filter ratios, or the experimental method. 
• If hit and false-alarm rates were negatively correlated, the training 
approach could focus on increasing hit rate, with the desired low 
false alarm-rate achieved without explicit training.
The present experiment used data from the regular training of six 
REST dogs in Angola to explore the relationship between hit and false-
alarm rates. The overall reinforcement rate for positive-filter hits was 
manipulated across 28 weeks of a calendar year, according to Table 2 on 
page 66. The proportion of negative filters was held constant (between 94 
and 99 percent of filters presented were negative).
It was expected that hit rate and false-alarm rate would be correlat-
ed. Given that only reinforcement for hits was varied, increasing reinforce-
ment availability for hits could have produced a bias toward indicating, 
producing a positive correlation between hit and false-alarm rate. If, how-
ever, the reinforcement-rate manipulation for hits altered the dog’s sensi-
tivity to the signal, we would expect a negative correlation between hit and 
false-alarm rate. In other words, increasing reinforcement for hits would 
either have been expected to cause a bias toward indicating or to improve 
the dog’s ability to discriminate between positive and negative filters.
table 1: Matrix of outcomes in a  
rest task.
all graphics and photos courtesy of the authors.
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The Effect of Reinforcement 
Rate Variations on Hits and 
False Alarms in Remote Explosive 
Scent Tracing with Dogs
Detection animals offer untapped potential in terms of locating landmines and explosive ordnance in the field and 
in the laboratory. In this study, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining investigated the effect 
of low, medium, and high levels of reward on the performance of six dogs searching filters for explosive odor.
by Rebecca J. Sargisson [ University of Waikato ] and Ian G. McLean [ Consultant ]
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ters because the reinforcer for blank runs was not contingent upon a dis-
crete response, such as sitting. Zero to three positive filters were present 
on the carousel among the remaining negative filters. 
After the summer break, training recommenced for all six dogs in 
Week 2 of 2005 and continued for four weeks before experimental ma-
nipulations. At this point, reinforcement frequency for correct indica-
tions on positive filters was manipulated by providing a reinforcer, such 
as a click from the clicker and food or access to a ball, on only some 
correct indications (intermittent reinforcement). This can be contrast-
ed with earlier training stages where reinforcing every correct indica-
tion is common in order to aid learning (continuous reinforcement). All 
other variables were held constant, including the number of negative fil-
ters available on the carousel, and reinforcement for correct rejections 
of negative filters.
Table 2 shows the experimental conditions. From Weeks 6 to 10, 
hit reinforcers were held at a “low” level (20 to 30 percent of hits were 
reinforced), from Weeks 11 to 27 at a “medium” level (35 to 50 per-
cent) and from Weeks 28 to 33, at a “high” level (60 to 75 percent of 
hits were reinforced).
Results
A decision for each filter from each dog was obtained. Signal-detec-
tion theory terminology was used to define the four analysis results pos-
sible for a filter: hit (indication on a positive filter), miss (no indication on 
a positive filter), false alarm (FA, indication on a negative filter) and cor-
rect rejection (CR, no indication on a negative filter). Hits, misses, false 
alarms, and correct rejections were summed for each week for each dog 
and used to calculate hit rates [(hits / (hits + misses) *100] and false-
alarm rates [(FAs / FAs + CRs)*100]. 
Figure 4 shows hit and false alarm rates for all individual dogs, and 
for the mean across all dogs, as a function of week. When actual rein-
forcement rates were found to deviate from planned reinforcement rates, 
these data were removed, and are therefore missing from Figure 4. Pear-
son correlation coefficients were used to test the relatedness of hit rate 
to false-alarm rate shown in Figure 4. A significant, negative correlation 
appeared between mean hit rate and mean false-alarm rate (r = -.72, p = 
.000). The correlation between hit and false-alarm rate was also negative 
sive odor but containing other neutral odors from similar locations). Air 
was added to the filters by placing the filters at the end of a long stain-
less-steel tube subject to continuous suction via a vacuum-pump ma-
chine worn as a backpack. The filter was held close to the ground and 
swung to the left and the right of the pump operator as he slowly walked 
a 100-meter distance. Filters were considered positive if the pump op-
erator passed within 1 meter of a buried landmine and negative if no 
landmines were present within 100 meters of the filter during sampling. 
The landmines were a range of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines com-
monly found in Angola. The mines were laid between 0 and 10 centi-
meters (0–4 inches) beneath the ground surface for a minimum of six 
months before they were used for sampling. A total of 275 mines were 
available for sampling. All sampled filters were stored inside small PVC 
containers, and positive filters were stored separately from negative fil-
ters until analysis to avoid odor cross-contamination.
Analysis. The dogs searched filters on the carousel between 8 a.m. 
and 1p.m., Monday through Friday, taking rest breaks when required. 
After preparation of the carousel, each dog was brought to the carousel 
room’s door in a sequential but random order. When the dog was calm, 
the handler instructed the dog to “search,” and the dog handler stepped 
behind a wall out of the dog’s view. The dogs walked unaccompanied, 
off-lead, in an anti-clockwise direction around the carousel, sniffing 
each filter consecutively. The dog exited the room after it had correct-
ly indicated a positive filter by sitting next to it and hearing the condi-
tioned reinforcer (clicker), or when the dog handler called it from the 
room. Reinforcement was occasionally available for hits (indicating a 
known positive filter). The reward most often delivered was small pieces 
of dry dog food and sometimes access to a ball or squeaky toy. A reward 
was occasionally delivered following a “blank” run (a run containing 
only negative filters), if the dog correctly ignored all filters. However, the 
reward may not have acted to reinforce correct responses to negative fil-
figure 4: hit (red circles) and false-alarm (yellow circles) rates calculated as percentages for 
each week for all six dogs and for the mean across dogs. vertical dotted lines show changes 
in reinforcement level for hits from low, to medium, to high from left to right across the x-axis. 
Pearson correlation coefficients are given for each dog, and for the mean, and are significant 
(p<.05) unless shown (ns).
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figure 3: hypothetical noise and signal-plus-noise distributions in a sensory discrimination task according to signal-detection theory. the left panel 
demonstrates discriminability (d’) as the distance between the means of the two functions. the right panel illustrates the animal’s response criterion 
(C), which dissects the two functions and can shift to the left and right as a function of response bias.
table 2: experimental conditions.
for all individual dogs and significantly so for two of the six dogs. All r values are shown in Figure 
4. Figure 5 (on page 68) displays the data used to calculate the mean correlation and clearly shows 
a strong negative relationship between hit and false-alarm rate, in that, as hit rate increases, false-
alarm rate decreases.
Weekly hit and false-alarm rates for each dog, and for the mean, were grouped according to 
reinforcement-rate condition (low, medium, and high). These data are shown in Figure 6 (on page 
68). A one-way analysis of variance indicated that hit rates in the three groups differed significant-
ly [F(2, 15) = 5.34, p < .05]. A Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test9 showed that the medium and high rein-
forcement rates produced significantly higher hit rates than the low reinforcement rate condition, 
but that the medium and high conditions did not differ significantly from one another in terms of 
hit rate. No significant difference in false-alarm rates were found across the three reinforcement 
conditions [F(2, 15) = 0.89, p >.05]. However, 
Figure 6 ( on page 68) shows that false-alarm 
rate was lowest during the medium-reinforce-
ment rate condition for four of the six dogs, 
and for the mean.
Discussion
Hit rate and false-alarm rate were overall 
significantly negatively correlated. 
Thus, as hit rate increased, false alarms de-
creased. According to signal-detection theory, 
these negative correlations are to be expected 
if the distance between the noise peaks and the 
signal-plus-noise functions changed. In other 
words, the correlations between hit and false-
alarm rate were caused either by changing dis-
criminability between positive and negative 
filters, or by changing the dog’s sensitivity to 
the odor, and not by changing response bias 
(decision criterion). Given that the filters’ dis-
criminability was not manipulated, the likely 
reason for the negative correlation between hit 
and false alarm rate was the dog’s increasing 
sensitivity due to changes in the overall rein-
forcement rate for hits.
This result suggests that the experimen-
tal method’s nature, reinforcing hits and not 
correct rejections, does not produce chang-
es in the dog’s response bias. In other words, 
greater reinforcer availability for hits did not 
cause a bias toward indicating. Instead, in the 
present experiment, low reinforcement rates 
for hits produced poorer performance on neg-
ative and positive filters, while medium and 
high reinforcement levels produced more ac-
curate responses on both filter types. In the 
present experiment, performance peaked un-
der the medium level of hit reinforcement. In-
creasing the reinforcement frequency beyond 
this medium level did not result in greater ac-
curacy on positive or negative filters. One im-
plication of this finding is that procedures to 
improve the REST system’s accuracy should 
focus on increasing the animals’ hit rates, and 
that any hit rate increase will be accompanied 
by a false-alarm rate decrease.
Manipulating reinforcement ratios is one 
way to alter an animal’s response accuracy. 
Another way is through the experimental pro-
cedure itself. The current procedure was a “go/
no-go” procedure, whereby animals indicat-
ed, by sitting, the presence of explosive odor 
but made no response to filters containing no 
explosive odor. Such a procedure producing a 
bias toward indicating, rather than ignoring, 
is possible because ignoring is not explicitly 
reinforced. Alternatively, due to the greater 
numbers of negative filters (between 94 per-
cent and 99 percent of filters were negative), 
the dog’s behavior could become biased to-
ward ignoring because it is the most frequent-
ly-required response. An analysis of bias, using 
[log b = ½ log (FA / Hits)(CR / Miss)], showed 
Weeks Reinforcement Level Percentage of Hits Reinforced
6-10 Low 20-30
11-27 Medium 35-50
28-33 High 60-75
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The Advanced Intelligence Decision 
Support System for the Assessment 
of Mine-suspected Areas
Several research and development projects have been created to utilize airborne and spaceborne remote sensing 
for mine action, but the Advanced Intelligence Decision Support System is the first mine-action technology 
to successfully combine remote sensing with advanced intelligence methodology. The result is a rigorously 
operationally validated system that improves hazardous risk assessment for greater efficiency in land cancellation 
and release. This article discusses the components of the AI DSS system and its achievements in mine action.  
by Milan Bajić [ University of Zagreb ]
Longstanding research into aerial and spaceborne remote sensing for mine action1,2,3,4,5,6,7 led to the creation of the first operational system 
for this purpose as recently as 2008–09.8 Although the remote sensing 
methodology and technology were the system’s basis, only significant 
use of the general-intelligence approach, known as the Space and Air-
borne Mined Area Reduction Tools7 (SMART) system, made its substan-
tial operational success in mine action possible.9 
Well-developed mine-action programs implement conventional 
technologies and standard operating procedures of General Survey (also 
called Non-technical Survey) and reduction of mine-suspected areas10 
while International Mine Action Standards define wider and more gen-
eral aspects of general mine-action assessment11 and land release.12
Development of AI DSS
The Croatian Mine Action Centre tries to reduce mine-suspect-
ed areas10 by using conventional technologies such as General Surveys; 
however, the repeated use of these mechanisms eventually becomes in-
effective and ground-based costly means (demining, Technical Survey) 
application of ai Dss in the community. figure 1.1 (left): the state of the mine-suspected area (56 square kilometers) before the project. (legend: 
crossed pink for undergoing clearance, striped pink for undergoing survey, yellow if used on owner’s responsibility, blue if excluded from Msa.) 
figure 1.2 (right): the state of the Msa after the application of ai Dss, as carried out by croMac. note the Msa reduction in the southern part 
of the Msa polygon at the ridge of velebit Mountain. (legend: crossed pink for undergoing clearance, striped pink for undergoing survey, yellow if 
used on owner’s responsibility, blue if excluded from Msa.)
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that the behavior of four of the six dogs was bi-
ased toward indicating, and this bias strength 
decreased as reinforcement for hits increased 
for all six dogs. The behavior of two dogs was 
biased toward ignoring, and this bias was un-
affected by reinforcement-rate manipulations. 
Thus, the present procedure appeared to not 
produce consistent effects on response bias, 
nor did it produce bias in one direction over 
another. Instead, each dog tended to maintain 
a fairly reliable preference for either indicat-
ing or ignoring, and biases toward indicating 
were counter-intuitively reduced by increas-
ing reinforcement availability for correct in-
dications.
REST programs should include ongoing 
monitoring of response bias, so they can re-
dress any imbalance. Manipulation of rein-
forcement rates can eliminate response bias 
more easily in procedures where responses to 
positive and negative filters are directly rein-
forced. In procedures where responses to only 
one type of filter are reinforced, such as in the 
present REST system, response bias may be 
eliminated by careful manipulation of the ra-
tio between positive and negative filters. REST 
programs should seek to determine the opti-
mum ratio for their procedure and animals, 
and maintain this ratio while continuing to 
monitor ongoing response bias.
Other factors which affect the overall ac-
curacy of animals’ responses concern the 
quality of the samples. Sampling can be opti-
mized in terms of filter material, climatic con-
dition, avoidance of contamination, and so on. 
Once collected, filters should be handled to 
minimize cross-contamination. By maintain-
ing as clear a signal on the filter as possible, 
the animal is given the best chance to obtain 
high hit rates.
  see endnotes page 82
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false-alarm rate. a straight line has been fit 
to the data to illustrate the pattern repre-
sented by the datum points.
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figure 6: Mean hit (red circles) and false-
alarm (yellow circles) rate for each dog 
and for the mean in each of the three 
reinforcement conditions (low, medium, 
and high).
Author note: The authors conducted this re-
search while employed by the Geneva Interna-
tional Centre for Humanitarian Demining. We 
thank members of the REST team in Angola, es-
pecially Andolosi Sanjala and Felisberto Joao, 
Birgitte Lauritzen and Rune Fjellanger for their 
help. Norwegian People’s Aid, and the govern-
ment of Switzerland through a grant to GICHD, 
funded the research. 
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Minefield Area Reduction (ARC) project,6,7,13 and was successfully ap-
plied in the first operational project.8 The statement of operational needs 
will contain: 
• The MSA’s analytical description and assessment
• Map reconstruction of the minefield polygons based on the avail-
able minefield records and other data in the Mine Information 
System of the MAC
Derivation of general and particular requirements. Once the state-
ment of operational needs is derived, the next step is developing two 
requirement types: the general and the particular requirements for col-
lecting new data to replace missing or unreliable data or for improv-
ing information quality. The general requirements include analyzing 
data on mine barriers, exploring mine incidents, analyzing military and 
U.N. demining records and maps, and examining land conditions where 
military operations occurred. The particular requirements are a set of 
hypotheses based on available data sources in the MAC, and they pres-
ent desired results of the AI DSS application. In Croatia, due to envi-
ronmental changes at the scene that happened after the minefields were 
laid, along with a lack of available data, only a percentage of the particu-
lar requirements and hypotheses derived in CROMAC were achievable. 
Nevertheless, the airborne and spaceborne imagery processing and in-
terpretation can still provide valuable evidence about the indicators of 
mine presence and indicators of mine absence at the mined scene.
When the system is implemented and results are collected and deliv-
ered to the MAC, the next phase starts: application of the project results 
in the MAC. The project results in this phase need to pass the SOPs for 
result verification for General Survey within the MAC.10 Project results 
in Croatia show that this verification process increases benefits pro-
duced by the project.8
Assessing the terrain's impact. Observing terrain characteristics as 
a means for identifying indicators of mine absence has proved valuable. 
In the SMART project report from 2005,7 only several kinds of indi-
cators of mine absence were considered, so the addition of terrain fea-
tures as indicators of mine absence marked one AI DSS advancement.8 
In the community of Gospić, one of the three communities in Croatia 
where the project was implemented, the Velebit Mountain ridge was in 
the MSA (see Figure 1.1 and 1.2 on page 69) with sparse evidence of the 
minefields and military positions. The terrain’s slopes are the main fea-
tures for the accessibility evaluation and were analyzed for Velebit (see 
Figure 3) in Gospić and are shown in Figure 4. The AI DSS application 
results provided evidence that enabled CROMAC to exclude an MSA at 
the Velebit Mountain ridge, except on several small areas (see Figure 3).
Evaluating quality of data/information. The quantitative evaluation 
of the data quality, information and knowledge (from here on referred 
to just as data) is one of AI DSS’s important functions. It should cover: 
• Data provided by the Mine Information System of the MAC 
• Data collected and derived in AI DSS by airborne multisensor acqui-
sition, by use of satellite multispectral imagery, derived contextual 
information and experts’ knowledge 
Evaluation of AI DSS sourced data will be considered later. The evalua-
tion of the Mine Information System sourced data should assess the prob-
ability of the data’s accuracy, confidence and completeness as the main 
features of data quality; these are considered in the following sections.
Minefield records. Minefield records, if available, are usually the 
most valuable sources of minefield data. In Croatia and in BiH, the 
minefield records have similar structures and usually have 39 vari-
ables (e.g., cartographical data, minefield characteristics, number of 
figure 3: changes of Msa at the ridge of the velebit Mountain after the ai Dss project. (legend: crossed pink for undergoing clearance, 
blue if excluded from Msa.)
figure 4: this diagram displays the correlation between the degree of 
slope and the area of Msa at the ridge of velebit Mountain. the total 
area of Msa on velebit’s ridge is 23.64 sq km, with 4.36 sq km of that 
land having a slope of greater than or equal to 35 degrees.
must then be used. CROMAC has tried to re-
duce these costs by supporting the development 
of more efficient technologies.7,6,13 
Hopes of such a cost-effective solution 
arose through the development of the SMART 
system, an advanced intelligence system that 
projects such as the one funded by the Eu-
ropean Commission from 2001–04 have op-
erationally validated.7 The methodology of 
SMART used a general approach to the infor-
mation sources, made the role of the mine-
scene interpreter easier and introduced expert 
knowledge management, although the major-
ity of efforts focused on processing and inter-
preting the aerial and satellite imagery.7,14 
Unfortunately, though recognized as po-
tentially helpful operationally, SMART was 
not successful as an integrated system that 
could be used with other mine-action tech-
nologies. In an effort to reconcile the intelli-
gence system with operational purposes, our 
experience and work on several research and 
development or Technology Demonstration 
projects allowed us to develop a cost-effective 
solution, the Advanced Intelligence Decision 
Support System,9 which incorporates the ge-
neric methodology of the SMART intelligence 
system with the processes of hazardous-risk 
assessment and land release.9,13,15,16
In 2008–09, the AI DSS was implemented 
and proved effective in three Croatian com-
munities where conventional ground-based 
technology is not applicable (excluding man-
ual demining and Technical Survey). Satellite 
imagery and multisensor airborne imagery 
served as the data’s main sources. CROMAC’s 
use of AI DSS has resulted in increased land 
cancellation/release and improved hazardous-
risk assessment. AI DSS was applied in Croatia, 
and its application is underway in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.17 Other countries could benefit from 
its use as well through regional cooperation and 
capacity-building efforts.9,18
Advanced Intelligence Methodology  
and Technology
The AI DSS is a system and technology that 
combines the following main subsystems: 
• Analytic assessments and derivation of 
statements of operational needs about the 
data availability and quality, and informa-
tion in the Mine Information System and 
Geographic Information System of the 
MAC. The experts within CROMAC made 
these assessments and derivations.8,17
• The airborne multisensor acquisition sys-
tem and satellite imagery usage, which 
provide new data about an MSA’s state, 
such as the indicators of mine presence 
and indicators of mine absence, with high 
accuracy and confidence.13 The scientists 
from the Faculty of Geodesy at the Univer-
sity of Zagreb, in cooperation with other 
researchers and pilots, applied this sub-
system. This partnership proved very suc-
cessful in Croatia and in BiH.8,17 
• The subsystem for multi-level fusion and 
multi-criteria, multi-objective processing, 
and interpretation and production of out-
puts, operated by remote-sensing scien-
tists and researchers from the Faculty of 
Geodesy at the University of Zagreb.16
SMART’s generic methodology and its 
theoretical background are presented in sev-
eral references.7,15,14 Therefore only AI DSS 
advancements that go beyond the SMART 
system are described in the following sections.
Generating the statement of needs. The 
intelligence applied in AI DSS serves to re-
construct the spatial, temporal and situational 
state at the scene during and after the mine-
laying process. It starts with a data overview—
information existing in the MAC’s Mine 
Information System. If military maps and/or 
other military documents are available (e.g., 
orders, commands and reports), they are used 
to define the situation at the MSA. Also, oper-
ational division experts in the MAC derive the 
statement of operational needs as the set of re-
quirements related to the missing, incomplete 
or low-quality data, and methods and technol-
ogies that can be used for their collection or 
for improving their quality. Not every MAC 
uses this process; it was developed and defined 
only for the needs of the earlier research and 
development projects, SMART and Airborne 
57439
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608500
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2604500
sq. m
1404520
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1899000
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figure 2.1 (left): example of the area excluded from the Msa in the central part of the Msa in Gospic´, shown in figures 1.1 and 1.2. figure 3.1 
shows the state of the Msa before application of the ai Dss project. figure 2.2 (right): the application of the project’s results by croMac. (leg-
end: crossed pink for undergoing clearance, striped pink for undergoing survey, yellow if used on owner’s responsibility, blue if excluded from Msa.) 
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Military maps. Military maps, if they exist and are available, can 
provide information about the war history on the considered terrain and 
improve understanding about the spatial and temporal distribution of 
the units and the minefields. The most usable—although rarely avail-
able—are the maps of the engineers’ activities; they contain details of 
the spatial and temporal placement of minefields. The maps of higher 
ranked military personnel contain less data about the minefields but can 
provide contextual information about the scene. Separation lines, distri-
bution of subunits and engineers’ preparation support the scene recon-
struction and can provide the spatial frame for the detected indicators 
of mine presence or mine absence. 
In the operational project in Croatia,8 military maps became avail-
able at the middle of the project, and their contribution was not used for 
the whole area or at every point during the project. In the operational 
project in BiH,17 the military maps were not available at all, but demin-
ers who participated in the war reconstructed the battle-situation maps. 
Besides the military maps, auxiliary map sources can include mem-
oirs of former military commanders. Although edited for publishing, 
these memoirs can add missing spatial, temporal and situational con-
textual information. In the operational project in Croatia,8 the memoirs 
were used in the analytic assessment of the MSA status and helped to 
better understand the MSA site’s behavior. 
Derivation of requirements for acquiring data by aerial multi-
sensor survey. The general and particular requirements derived by data 
analysis available in the Mine Information System of the MAC are tested 
regarding vegetation and snow cover, as well as the expected indicators 
of mine presence and indicators of mine absence, types, dimensions and 
shapes. The output of this process is a list of the objects the aerial mul-
tisensor system is expected to detect. The airborne sensors’ operational 
parameters will provide necessary spatial, spectral and radiometric res-
olution in imagery, as well as the surveyed area’s spatial coverage. 
Multisensor aerial imagery acquisition. The multisensor aerial sys-
tem used in mine action’s first operational remote-sensing project8 and 
in current use,17 was developed and realized in the project funded by the 
Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia13 
(Figures 7.1 and 7.2). The installation on the aerial platform (helicopters 
Mi-8 and Bell 206, airplane Cessna 172R) takes less than two hours. The 
system enables imagery acquisition in the strip mode and in a sequence 
of the frames. Width of the strip is 30% of the flight altitude above the 
terrain. The cruising speed is from 90 to 130 km/h; endurance is up to 
4h 15min (platform Mi-8). This is an electro-optical acquisition system 
that covers wavelengths from 400 to 900 nm and from 8 to 14 µm, with 
several sensors. The hyperspectral scanner in imaging mode provides a 
strip mode image in 95 channels, in wavelengths 430 to 900 nm, using 
a multispectral camera in visible and near infrared bands. The inertial 
navigational unit is integrated into the pod’s sensor system and enables 
parametric geocoding of the hyperspectral scanner’s data. 
Extraction of data and formalization of experts’ knowledge. The 
preparation phase finishes after terrain analysis, after the multisensor 
aerial imagery acquisition and after obtaining the satellite multispectral 
imagery. The next phase is data extraction from these sources and in-
formation-quality assessment. This phase also includes a formalization 
of the experts’ knowledge, which provides contextual information cor-
related with the particular terrain. The objects that should be detected 
are defined as the indicators of mine presence and the indicators of mine 
absence; this is a valuable contribution from the previous R&D proj-
ects2,5,6,7,16 (see example in Table 1).  
The data extraction is used by different remote-sensing interpreta-
tion methods and by subjective interpretation supported by different 
techniques (imagery enhancement, feature mapping, principal compo-
nent analysis, etc). Experience from the operational projects8,17 shows 
figures 7.1 (above) and 7.2 (left): Pod with sensors 
installed on the fuselage of the helicopters Mi-8 
and Bell 206. the moving map supports naviga-
tion and acquired images are stored on the exter-
nal hard disks. two or three operators control the 
aerial acquisition. the standard operating proce-
dures that include pre-flight and post-flight opera-
tional calibration are developed for general aerial 
multisensor imagery acquisition. the particular 
soPs are developed for mine-action survey and 
surveillance of the sea oil spills are under continu-
ous advancement.
Indicators of Mine Presence (IMP) Importance
Mineﬁ eld records 1
Mine accidents 2
Table marking of the mineﬁ eld 3
Fortiﬁ cations 4
Trenches 5
Bunkers 6
Natural objects modiﬁ ed to serve for ﬁ re action 7
Dry wall (in a battle area) 8
Shelters for artillery, vehicles, infantry 9
Bridges, passes of water ways 10
Dominant hill 11
Edges of forest 12
Fords 13
Helicopter landing area 14
Roads not in use (in a battle area) 15
Abandoned overgrown areas 16
Demolished houses (in a ﬁ rst front line) 17
Observation posts (usually for hunting) 18
Indicators of Mine Absence (IMA) Importance
Houses in use 1
Areas in use 1
Roads in use 1
Step terrain, slope greater than 30 degrees 1
table 1: a list of the indicators of mine presence, indicators of mine 
absence and importance rank given by an expert for the Msa in the 
community of Gospic´.8
landmines, etc.)8,17 while in other countries—
Azerbaijan, for example—the records are not 
available. The records sometimes have sketch-
es of the minefield. 
It is widely known that minefield records 
are seldom complete and that their accuracy 
and confidence are not high enough. At the 
MAC, experts reconstruct polygons of the 
minefields on the map and consider all data 
available in the minefield records, military 
maps and documents. The 39 variables of the 
minefield records differ: 21 of them are more 
important than the others (e.g., position of the 
minefield, its shape, orientation and the ref-
erence point of the coordinates) for the spa-
tial, structural and temporal assessment of 
the minefields. 
When CROMAC examined 122 MSA 
minefield records in Gospić,8 completeness 
and positioning accuracy was compared for 
39 variables/21 variables/positioning accura-
cy, as estimated by experts, and was shown to 
vary among the three. In previous R&D proj-
ects7,6 the quality of the minefield records was 
not considered. The importance of minefield-
record quality is now recognized in the cur-
rent operational project.17 Further research of 
the variables’ behavior (completeness and po-
sitioning accuracy, relationship between vari-
ables, factor analysis, etc.) is underway and 
new statistical models are expected. 
Aerial digital orthophoto maps as sources 
of indicators of mine presence. Aerial digital 
orthophoto maps, if they exist, are very im-
portant for AI DSS application. They serve as 
the cartographic reference that optimizes spa-
tial accuracy of AI DSS products. In the prep-
aration phase for AI DSS application they can 
be an auxiliary data source for strong indica-
tors of mine presence, e.g., trenches, bunkers, 
shelters, unused paths, bridges, etc. However 
the digital orthophoto maps alone are not suf-
ficient indicators of mine presence.
In the considered projects8,17 two types of 
digital orthophoto maps were available: pan-
chromatic at the scale 1:5000 and color at the 
scale 1:2000. If the digital orthophoto maps are 
acquired in different years, as was the case in 
the 2008 International Trust Fund for Demin-
ing and Mine Victims Assistance project,8 they 
can serve as valuable tools for detecting changes 
over time. The quality of the digital orthophoto 
maps in ITF’s project was limited due to the fol-
lowing constraints:
• The acquisition time was wrongly select-
ed when vegetation (forests, agricultural 
fields) was high and leaves obscured the 
ground’s surface. This problem is a con-
sequence of the false assumption that 
detecting fields in use by their owners 
will lead to the most MSA reductions 
(see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
• The MSA borders delineated the dig-
ital orthophoto area at the fine scale 
(1:2000). Due to this mistake the digi-
tal orthophoto maps did not cover areas 
outside the official MSA. Note that in 
Gospić, 6 sq km was added to the previ-
ously determined MSA, and the digital 
orthophoto map did not cover this area.
• The radiometric compression decreased 
the digital orthophoto map utility for 
remnants-of-war detection.
The quality of the aerial digital orthophoto 
map that has a ground resolving distance of 
0.20 m is weaker for the detection of the rem-
nants of war than the satellite image that has a 
ground resolving distance of 1 m.
figure 5.1 (left): Digital orthophoto map scale 1:2000; aerial images acquired in 2006. figure 5.2 (right): satellite image of the same area, acquired 
in 2006. trenches (long zigzag line) are clearly visible.
figure 6: example of the fortification ob-
jects, remnants of war marked with arrows, 
triangles or circles visible on the aerial im-
age that was acquired in april 2009 at the 
Msa community of Gospic´ .8
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Mine Action Centre Advanced Intelligence Decision Support System
MIS (mine ﬁ eld records, incidents, accidents, 
survey, QA).
MIS (Mine ﬁ eld records, incidents, accidents, survey, 
QA).
Scanned maps scale 1:5000, 1:2000, aerial 
digintal ortho photo maps scale 1:5000, 1:2000 
only for MSA.
Scanned maps scale 1:5000, 1:2000, aerial digital ortho 
photo maps scale 1:5000, 1:2000
Satellite maps at the scale 1:5000 for areas of MSA and 
outside of MSA.
Aerial digital elevation model (DEM) for 3D 
vizualisation of the terrain.
Aerial digital elevation model (DEM) for 3D visu-
alization of the terrian. Aerial and satellite DEM for 
quantitative spatial analyses of the terrain and for 3D 
visualization.
Scanned military maps. Scanned military maps.
War history data, data about explosive barriers. War history data, data about explosive barriers.
Analytic assessment of the mine suspected area (MSA).
Statistical evaluation and quality assessment of all data 
used in AI DSS: completeness, probability, conﬁ dence, 
sensitivity.
Detection and extraction of the indicators of mine 
presence (IMP) and mine absence (IMA) in the satel-
lite images, airborne multisensor images, digital ortho-
photo map (DOF) (if usable). Assessment of quality, 
conﬁ dence.
Collecting and processing of the contextual data and 
information.
Formalization of experts’ knowledge: membership 
function, relative importance of IMP.
Quantitative spatial analyses of the terrain. Detection 
and extraction of the indicators of mine absence (IMA)
Processing of the multisensor aerial and satellite imag-
ery. Detection and extraction of the strong indicators 
of mine presence IMP. Classiﬁ cation and extraction of 
indicators of mine presence IMP and absence IMA. As-
sessment of detection probability and conﬁ dence.
Delivery of the AI DSS results: danger map, conﬁ dence 
map, proposal for reduction, for re-categorisation, for 
inclusion areas into MSA, maps of conﬂ icts between 
MIS and AI DSS results.
Application of the results delivered by AI DSS. 
Exclusion from the MSA, inclusion in MSA, 
recategorization.
Feedback to AI DSS, assessment of the cost-beneﬁ t ra-
tio. Evaluation of the collected new experience, inclu-
sion into the methodology of the AI DSS.
Implementation Results in Croatia
The three Croatian communities where 
AI DSS was implemented had 104.97 sq km of 
MSA and nearly 46 sq km outside of the MSA 
prior to the project. The proposals for reduc-
ing MSAs with the highest level of accuracy 
and reliability resulted in a suggested MSA re-
duction of 7.67 sq km to 23.34 sq km, and cer-
tain areas were proposed for MSA inclusion.8 
The project results were delivered in Septem-
ber 2009 to CROMAC so it could make deci-
sions about MSA additions and reductions in 
accordance with its standard operating proce-
dures.10 In July 2010 the AI DSS process results 
as applied to the community of Gospić, Croa-
tia, were available.19 See Figures 1.1, 1.2, 3, 8.1 
and 8.2 for the map of Gospić. The results of 
its successful application in Gospić were:8 
• Exclusion of 28 sq km from 56 sq km of 
MSA (i.e., MSA reduction)
• Inclusion of 6 sq km in MSA, new areas that 
were not registered before in the Mine In-
formation System as hazardous risk areas
• Re-categorization of areas inside MSA 
(e.g., from “minefield” to “for survey”)
Similar activity started in June 2010 for 
the community of Bilje; the results should be 
available in late autumn 2010.  
Conclusions
The Advanced Intelligence Decision Sup-
port System has met an important mine-ac-
tion community need: finding a cost-effective 
way to improve land cancellation and release. 
The AI DSS cost-benefit ratio compared to that 
of other systems aiming to exclude areas from 
MSA proved more than 140:1. AI DSS is the 
first system to combine airborne and space-
borne remote sensing with advanced intelli-
gence for MSA assessment in an operationally 
effective way. The system also enables a more 
efficient resource allocation (minimizing cost-
ly Technical Surveys and demining in nonhaz-
ardous areas). Because of this success, Croatia, 
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table 2: this table shows the difference in functions between the Mac and the ai Dss. new 
content is shown in red.
along with other countries choosing to im-
plement the system (such as BiH), is moving 
closer to fulfilling the Ottawa Convention’s 
Article 5 goals.
  see endnotes page 82
Thanks to the Ministry of Science, Educa-
tion and Sports of the Republic of Croatia, AI 
DSS was developed and realized in 2007–08 
as an operational system under one of its tech-
nology projects.13 Financial support was pro-
vided by the Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs with as-
sistance from ITF, which supported operation-
alization and advancement of the AI DSS in 
Croatia in 2008–09 and has a project under-
way in Bosnia and Herzegovina. CROMAC 
provided data, information and expertise in 
mine action as crucial operational support for 
the project. The AI DSS is the result of con-
tinuous efforts of many researchers, mine-ac-
tion experts, Croatian Air Force and Defense 
pilots, research institutions, academia and 
fruitful cooperation between Croatian and 
European scientists. It was our privilege and 
pleasure to work with all of them. 
that the subjective computer-assisted indicators of mine presence ex-
traction was the most efficient solution for the extraction of the rem-
nants of war and similar objects (see Figure 7 on page 72). There are 
more efficient classification methods for indicators of mine absence 
extraction that usually cover larger areas. The goal of the considered 
activity is extract indicators of mine presence and indicators of mine 
absence with high probability and at the same time provide very high 
confidence. For this purpose, we use images from one, two or more im-
agery sources until the accuracy of the detection and/or classification 
of the indicators of mine presence, indicators of mine absence and their 
respective confidences reach high thresholds. 
Multi-level fusion, fuzzy classification and hazardous-risk maps. 
The next step in processing data is rather complex; it includes multi-
level fusion, data fuzzification, fuzzy classification, multi-criteria and 
multi-objective decision support processes. Also, danger maps and the 
maps of the confidence and stability must be produced. The original 
source for these terms is SMART7 and will not be discussed here. For 
CROMAC, the most pertinent information was the map of proposals 
for the MSA exclusion and inclusion.16,8  See Figures 8.1 and 8.2 for the 
map of the indicators of mine presence and indicators of mine absence.
figures 8.1 and 8.2: indicators of mine presence and mine absence (except for velebit Mountain in the southern part) shown over the Msa in Gos-
pic´. for velebit Mountain, please see figure 3 (on page 71). the map that visualizes conflicts of statements between Mis of Macs and the results 
of the ai Dss project are also very suitable for further application of ai Dss results in Macs.16 a similar experience was obtained by the map that 
shows detected indicators of mine presence and indicators of mine absence on the Msa as shown in the figures above.
Functionalities of the AI DSS and CRO-
MAC. Between the processes of the General 
Survey in CROMAC10 and the Advanced In-
telligence Decision Support System8,17 com-
monalities exist in their functions and data. 
However AI DSS also introduces new func-
tionalities, as seen in Table 2. 
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Probability-of-detection ranging from 0% to 100% indicate how of-
ten targets are found, and a higher value indicates a better performance. 
False-alarm rate shows how many false positive indications (false 
alarms, alarms from other than target) are obtained in one square meter, 
and a lower value indicates better performance. False-alarm rate reduc-
tion indicates how many false alarms the GPR use decreases the number 
of false alarms found with the metal-detector alone. False-alarm rate 
reduction of 100% means that GPR use successfully discriminates and 
rejects all false alarms, and 0% means that no false alarms are rejected. 
This measure directly relates to efficiency improvements. 
Probability-of-detection loss indicates how many mines detected by 
the metal-detector part are falsely identified as metals and rejected by 
the GPR. A 0% probability-of-detection loss means all mines are cor-
rectly recognized as mines, and a 100% probability-of-detection loss 
means all mines are falsely rejected. This measure is directly related to 
the safety of deminers. 
Probability-of-detection and false-alarm rate can be calculated at 
two stages of the dual-sensor detector’s operation: after using only the 
metal-detector feature and after using both sensors. On the other hand, 
false-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection loss can only be 
calculated after using both sensors. This means that both can be con-
sidered to be performance measures of the dual-sensor detectors’ GPR 
sensor. 
Note that in this data analysis, unlike previously-conducted stand-
alone metal-detector trials, metal pieces are considered a source of false 
alarms, not true positives. In this data analysis, only mine-like objects 
are considered the source of true positives (see Table 1 below from our 
earlier article).9 This is because dual-sensor detectors are supposed to 
discriminate mines from metals. In this article, this categorization is 
applied to stand-alone metal detectors as well so that their results can be 
directly compared to those of the dual-sensor detectors.
Results
To demonstrate an overview of the detectors’ performance, results 
shown in this article are averaged overall soil types. These results, as well 
as detailed interpretations, will be in the test report.3
Figure 1 shows probability-of-detection versus false-alarm rate of 
ALIS and stand-alone metal detectors. The metal-detector part of ALIS 
(blue dot) achieved a result similar to its base metal detector (CEIA 
MIL-D1, light blue cross). This result indicates that the metal-detector 
performance integrated in ALIS is not deteriorated by the combined 
GPR, and it is still as good as the base metal detector. The metal detector 
part of ALIS declared approximately 2.5 false alarms per square meter, 
and using the GPR sensor reduces it to about 1.4 false alarms, denoting 
a 45% reduction. Consequently, the false-alarm rate obtained by ALIS is 
lower than any other stand-alone metal detector tested in the campaign. 
Since the metal detector is the primary sensor in ALIS, the detection 
performance depends entirely on the base metal detector. In the soils 
used in this test, the base metal detector achieved the lowest probabili-
ty-of-detection among all tested detectors. Therefore, the probability-of-
detection obtained by ALIS is also low, but this is due to the base metal 
detector’s performance.
False-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection loss are 
plotted in Figure 2. The stand-alone GPR (red cross) achieved a remark-
ably high false-alarm rate reduction, indicating that approximately 90% 
of the false alarms are correctly identified. Furthermore, the false-alarm 
rate reduction by ALIS is much lower, meaning more metal pieces were 
misidentified and left as mines by ALIS as compared to the stand-alone 
GPR. On the other hand, the stand-alone GPR missed more mines than 
ALIS. It is difficult to grade the devices because the results can change 
with each operator. If an operator is afraid of missing mines and re-
ports mines for all metal-containing objects the metal detector signals, 
no mine will be missed, but also no false alarms will be rejected, mean-
ing both probability-of-detection loss and false-alarm rate reduction are 
very low. This is due to the fact that the device only provides informa-
tion on the objects, and this information must be interpreted by the op-
erator. Thus, the decision is entirely up to the operator. Nevertheless, the 
figure clearly shows that GPR itself is potentially capable of discriminat-
ing landmines from metal pieces. However, from the operational point 
of view, probability-of-detection loss must be kept as low as possible.
Figures 3a and 3b (on page 78) shows false-alarm rate reduction and 
probability-of-detection loss as a function of depth. As a tendency, ALIS 
and the stand-alone GPR achieved lower false-alarm rate reductions and 
higher probability-of-detection losses at shallow depths, which confirms 
the results in a former test.10 The depth dependency looks weaker for 
ALIS, especially at the shallowest depth range of 0–3 centimeters in both 
false-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection loss. This vari-
ance might be due to the difference in signal processing employed in the 
systems and the GPR data’s representation to the operators. The stand-
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figure 1: Probability-of-detection versus false-alarm rate of alis and 
stand-alone metal detectors, in all soil types averaged. the error bars 
show 95% confidence bounds. for alis, the dot and circle indicate 
before and after discrimination respectively.
objects used in the test. from left to right: metal clutter (ammuni-
tion belts, cartridges, bullets) and mine-like targets (Gyata-64, PPM-
2, era calibration target).
Photo courtesy of BWB
ITEP Evaluation of Metal Detectors 
and Dual-sensor Detectors 
Since its development in the early 1970s, scientists from an array of disciplines have found reason to utilize 
ground-penetrating radar to create radar images of the subsurface. The following article examines how GPR use 
in combination with standard metal detectors could aid workers in the field of demining.
by Kazunori Takahashi [ Leibniz Institute for Applied Geophysics ] and  
Dieter Gülle [ Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement ]
An ITEP dual-sensor detector test, led by the Bundesamt für Weh-rtechnik und Beschaffu (BWB), Germany’s Federal Office of De-
fense Technology and Procurement, took place September–October 
2009 in Germany.1,2 Analysis of the test results clearly confirmed that 
the tested dual-sensor detectors reduce false alarms and that their met-
al-detector parts are not deteriorated, in comparison to the base model 
of a stand-alone metal detector used along with the GPR part of a dual-
sensor detector. 
In this article, a dual-sensor detector refers to a combination of a 
metal detector and GPR. The combination allows the detection and 
identification of metal-containing objects; this combination is expect-
ed to contribute to the reduction of false alarms and, consequently, im-
prove clearance-operation efficiency. This article provides an analysis 
and overview of the test results. The test’s detailed descriptions, as well 
as the results, can be found in the test report which will be available on-
line soon.3
Test Conditions
A test site was constructed at a BWB facility in Oberjettenberg, Ba-
varia, Germany. Three types of soil were prepared: laterite, magnetite 
and humus. Laterite is a reddish clay loam with low stone (basalt) con-
tent. The soil has a very high magnetic susceptibility and is frequen-
cy dependent. Thus, it often causes metal detectors to give false alarms. 
Magnetite, the second soil type, is coarse sand mixed with engineered 
magnetite. The soil has a very high magnetic susceptibility but no fre-
quency dependence. The third soil type is a loamy soil with a relatively 
high humus content—about 10%. Test-soil properties are described in 
detail in an accompanying report.4 Three types of mine-like targets, in-
cluding rendered-safe mines, were planted in the soils: ERA calibration 
target, Gyata-64 and PPM-2. In addition, various sizes of metal pieces, 
such as bullets and cartridges, were buried as metal clutter. The burial 
depths ranged from 2 to 15 centimeters (0.78 to 5.90 inches). 
An advanced landmine-imaging system developed by Tohoku Uni-
versity, Japan5,6 participated in the test. Cambodian deminers, who were 
trained by Tohoku University and attended previously conducted tests, 
operated the dual-sensor detector.7 For the comparison, various mod-
els of commercial metal detectors, including the base metal detector of 
ALIS (CEIA MIL-D1), as well as a commercial stand-alone GPR, were 
also tested. Operated by two scientists in the test, the stand-alone GPR 
system is not specially designed for demining but for general non-de-
structive testing purposes. Since the stand-alone GPR is not integrated 
with a metal detector, the system followed various models of stand-alone 
metal detectors and performed only discrimination. Therefore, the de-
tection performance of the stand-alone GPR cannot be discussed, and 
only the discrimination performance is demonstrated.
The test was a blind test: The detector operators did not know the lo-
cations or the object types.8 Dual-sensor operators first used the met-
al-detector part of the device for detecting mine-suspected objects and 
switched over to the GPR for discriminating mines from metals. Two 
colors of markers were used to indicate the location and object type 
(mine or metal) found in the search with a dual-sensor detector. Opera-
tors of stand-alone metal detectors simply used one color of markers. 
After each test run, marker positions were measured with total stations.
Data Analysis
Data collected in the test was analyzed in the same way as analyzed 
in “Data Analysis and Performance Evaluation of Japanese Dual-Sensor 
Systems tested in Croatia” from The Journal of ERW and Mine Action, 
Issue 13.3.9 Detection capability is evaluated by calculating probabili-
ty of detection and false-alarm rate, and discrimination performance 
is evaluated by false-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection 
loss. The measures are defined as follows:
FAR = 
Number of false alarms
Area searched
FAR reduction = 
Number of rejected false alarms by GPR
Number of false alarms by metal detector
POD =
Number of detected targets
Number of buried targets
POD loss = 
Number of rejected targets by GPR
Number of detected targets by metal detector
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detection loss) for dual-sensor detectors.  If an 
area is assessed as dificult for dual-sensor by 
the investigation, a dual-sensor should not be 
used and other methods should be employed. 
The search speed is directly related to the ef-
ficiency improvements, and the higher the 
search speed, the more improvements can be 
achieved. The test results indicate that dual-
sensor detectors are twice as slow as stand-
alone metal detectors. Even so, the clearance 
operation can be accelerated if a certain num-
ber of false alarms are reduced. Furthermore, 
an additional attempt in this test indicated 
that operators of dual-sensor detectors who 
have more experience and knowledge working 
with the device can work as fast as operators 
using stand-alone metal detectors. However, 
this fact also indicates that more training and/
or practice is necessary for dual-sensor de-
tector use when compared to standard metal 
detectors. The advantages of experienced per-
sonnel who have trained for a short period of 
time appear significant in search speed and 
performance.
The dual-sensor test allowed us to evaluate 
detection and discrimination performance in 
a blind test. Although a very rough estimate 
of the efficiency improvements has been made, 
other factors need consideration for the de-
tailed assessment such as excavation time, de-
tector costs, and training and practice costs. 
Only a long-term field trial can evaluate these 
factors.
In the test campaign, stand-alone metal 
detectors that possess the capability of dis-
criminating objects were also tested. The 
evaluation is not discussed in this article, but 
readers interested in these devices can find the 
results in the test report.3  
  see endnotes page 83
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figure 4: average search speed of alis and stand-alone metal detectors in minutes per 
square meter. the labels “MD” and “MD mfr” indicate metal detectors operated by trained 
operators and the manufacturers, respectively.
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table 1: Differences in categorization of sources of alarms for stand-alone metal detectors and dual sensors.
alone GPR displays almost raw data11 as a vertical slice of the subsurface, 
whereas ALIS constructs horizontal slices by applying a number of sig-
nal processing operations. As a result, ALIS may be able to obtain more 
robust information on targets than the stand-alone GPR through the so-
phisticated processing. 
Figure 4 shows the averaged search speeds of ALIS and stand-alone 
metal detectors operated by newly trained vs. experienced personnel. 
ALIS required nearly double the metal detector’s time. In other words, 
ALIS was twice as slow as the stand-alone metal detectors. In this test, 
only detection and discrimination were performed. Excavation and 
confirmation of detected objects, which corresponds to the steps 4 and 5 
in the Boshoff and Cresci Journal of ERW and Mine Action article, “The 
HALO Trust and HSTAMIDS,” were not included.12 Therefore, assess-
ing the efficiency improvements of the entire clearance operation with 
a dual-sensor detector in detail is impossible based on the obtained re-
sults. However, a rough estimate can be made as follows: Let T0, the total 
time necessary for the entire clearance operation with a metal detector, 
be equal to the search time plus the time for excavation (and other pro-
cesses). The search time can be expressed as the time for searching one 
metal-containing object (ts) multiplied by the number of objects found, 
x. In a similar manner, the time for excavation can be expressed as the 
time for excavating one object (te) multiplied by the number of objects, x.
Assuming ALIS needs twice the search time of a stand-alone metal 
detector for detection and identification of one object, but reduces false 
alarms by half, the total work time using ALIS (T1) can be expressed as:
If T0 > T1, we obtain te > 2ts, which means that the clearance operation 
is expected to be accelerated if the excavation process for one object re-
quires more than twice the time necessary for finding one object, un-
der the assumption that rejected false alarms will not be excavated. For 
the sake of humanitarian demining, rejected false alarms may also need 
checking, but it can be done quickly if the detected objects are identified 
as non-explosive items like Boshoff and Cresci showed with the Hand-
held Standoff Mine Detection System.12 Even taking into account rapid 
excavation to accelerate the process, the situation may be realistic, espe-
cially in heavily metal-contaminated areas.
A study shows that the most common activity at the time of an inci-
dent is excavation.13 Using a dual-sensor detector to reject metals can-
not reduce the potential risk of the excavation process because detected 
landmines must be taken out anyway. However, the amount of this 
stressful work can be reduced, and it may help deminers concentrate 
on their tasks.
Discussion and Conclusions
The test results confirm that dual-sensor detectors can reduce false 
alarms as compared to stand-alone metal detectors, which indicates 
potential efficiency improvements in clearance operations. However, a 
few issues in need of consideration came up during the test and data 
analysis, such as probability-of-detection loss, search speed and train-
ing. From observation, dual-sensor detectors can correctly reject false 
alarms, but they also sometimes falsely reject mines. This seems to hap-
pen especially at shallow depths (see Figure 3b), but it also appears re-
lated to the soil type.14 
Investigating soil properties and screening out unfavorable soil 
types can help to minimize the false rejection of mines (probability-of-
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figure 2: false-alarm rate reduction versus probability-of-detection 
loss found in the discrimination process in all tested soil types aver-
aged. the error bar shows 95% confidence bounds.
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figures 3a and 3b: false-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection loss as a function of depth in all soil types averaged. the dashed lines 
show 95% confidence bounds.
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The Bridge from Hold to Build, Escalante [ from page 12 ]
1.	 To Walk the Earth in Safety.	2010.	Office	of	Weapons	Removal	and	
Abatement	in	the	U.S.	Department	of	State’s	Bureau	of	Political-
Military	 Affairs	 (PM/WRA).	 http://tiny.cc/jyblf.	 Accessed	 20	
September	2010
Destruction of Cluster Munitions in Moldova, King 
[ from page 15 ]
1.	 Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions.	Ger-
man	Federal	Foreign	Office	and	Geneva	International	Centre	for	
Humanitarian	Demining.	25	-	26	June	2009.	http://bit.ly/d7CK-
uw.	Accessed	1	September	2010.	
2.	 An	 electrical	 squib	 is	 a	 small	 electrical	 explosive	 device	which	
through	detonation	can	be	used	to	ignite	other	explosives.	Black	
powder	is	an	explosive	combination	of	sulfur,	charcoal	and	po-
tassium	nitrate,	also	known	as	saltpeter.	
Albania Makes Progress in Demilitarization, Goodyear 
[ from page 19 ]
1.	 “AMAE	 Response	 to	 Gërdec	 Tragedy.”	 Albanian Mine Action 
Executive.	March	2008.	http://tinyurl.com/394qpj8.	Assessed	27	
September	2010.
2.	 Demilitarization	is	the	full	range	of	operations	from	demolition	
to	industrial	dismantling.
3.	 In	open	detonation,	additional	explosive	charges	are	added	to	ex-
plosives	and	munitions	to	detonate	and	destroy	them.
4.	 “Albania.”	To Walk The Earth In Safety,	8th	Edition,	U.S.	Depart-
ment	 of	 State,	 Bureau	 of	 Political-Military	 Affairs,	 June	 2009	
(Page	 27).	 http://tinyurl.com/39l9zt8.	 Accessed	 27	 September	
2010.
5.	 The	Office	of	Weapons	Removal	and	Abatement	in	the	Depart-
ment	of	State’s	Bureau	of	Political-Military	Affairs	(PM/WRA)	
provides	funding	to	the	International	Trust	Fund	for	Demining	
and	 Mine	 Victims	 Assistance,	 which	 is	 managing	 the	 Gërdec	
site	 clearance.	The	Dutch	 government	 supported	 the	Albanian	
Army	EOD	with	equipment	and	demolition	firing	systems.	Dan-
ChurchAid	 and	 the	 United	 Nations	 Development	 Programme	
also	 assisted	 immediately	 following	 the	 accident	 with	 mine	
clearance	 through	Albanian	Mine	Action	Executive.	http://bit.
ly/boOmcj.	Accessed	4	October	2010.
The Terter Regional Vocational Training Center, Nwolisa 
[from page 23 ]
1.	 Professional	 Development	 Framework	 for	 Vocational	 Skills	 of	
VET	 Practitioners.	 1st	 Edition	 2009.	 Government	 of	 Western	
Australia	Department	of	Education	and	Training.	http://bit.ly/
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Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army.	 The	 Comprehen-
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2.	 North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	(NATO)	operation	that	be-
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3.	 The	Implementation	Force	(IFOR)	was	a	NATO-led	multination-
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Falkland Islands Demining Pilot Project: Completion of Phase 1,
Swanson [ from page 54]
1.	 Although	a	 territory	of	 the	United	Kingdom,	Argentina	 says	 it	
has	 a	 right	 to	 the	 islands,	which	 it	 calls	 the	Malvinas,	because	
it	inherited	them	from	the	Spanish	crown	in	the	early	1800s.	It	
has	also	based	 its	claim	on	the	 islands'	proximity	 to	 the	South	
American	mainland.	It	has	stressed	that	its	claim	to	the	territory	
is	nowadays	entirely	peaceful.	For	more	information:	http://tiny.
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2.	 Kuklick,	Cory.	“Falkland-Malvinas	Islands	Update”	The Journal 
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or	U.K.	http://bit.ly/bT2S7O.	Accessed	8	August	2010.
4.	 This	information	was	in	the	form	of	documents	turned	over	to	
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5.	 BACTEC	employed	Roger	Gagen	and	Kev	Bryant	as	Project	and	
Ops	Manager	repectively	plus	37	Zimbabwean	and	15	Lebanese	
demining	personnel.
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military	personnel	in	the	mid-1980s.
11.	 The	DPO	was	provided	by	C	King	Associates	Ltd.
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Victoria	 and	 spans	 seven	 regions,	 including	 the	 Kahama	 and	
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first	 pairwise	 comparison	 technique	 called	 the	 least significant 
difference	(LSD)	test.	This	technique	can	be	used	only	if	the	anova	
F	omnibus	is	significant.	The	LSD’s	main	idea	is	computing	the	
smallest	significant	difference	(i.e.,	the	LSD)	between	two	means	
as	if	these	means	had	been	the	only	means	to	be	compared	(i.e.,	
with	a	t	test)	and	to	declare	significant	any	difference	larger	than	
the	 LSD.	 For	 more	 information:	 http://utdallas.edu/~herve/
abdi-LSD2010-pretty.pdf.
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Landmine survivor and Peer Support Worker Mohamed Alisič helped 
Kavara Mehmed, a mine survivor from Bosnia-Herzegovina, recover 
from depression and resume his occupation as a farmer.
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